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OF THE

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS

OF

LANGUAGE.

Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo
Muſa loqui, praeter laudem nullius avaris.

HORAT.

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INTRODUCTION.

THIS great work, which I have undertaken, and which is now drawing towards a concluſion, I ſhould have thought very imperfect, if, after giving an account of the origin of language, and explaining the nature of it, with reſpect both to its matter and form, and compared together different languages, ſhewing in what they ſeverally excelled or were defective, I had ſaid nothing of ſtile and compoſition, by which language produces its effect, and anſwers the purpoſes intended by it. I have, therefore, in my third volume, treated of ſtile in general; and explained ſome general characters of it, ſuch as the the *auſtere*, the *florid*, the *ſublime*, the *witty*, and the *humorous*. In my fourth volume I have

been more particular, and divided ſtile, according to the ſubjects of which it treats, into ſix different kinds; the epiſtolary, the dialogue, the hiſtorical ſtile, the didactic, the rhetorical, and, laſtly, the poetical *. In that volume, and the fifth, I have treated of the firſt four kinds of ſtile, and I am now come to ſpeak of the two laſt, namely, the rhetorical and poetical, in which the beauty of ſtile is moſt conſpicuous, and produces the greateſt effect.

In treating of theſe arts, I ſhall follow the ſame method that I have followed in treating of the grammatical part of language, and of the other kinds of ſtile of which I have ſpoken. As I have not written a formal treatiſe upon thoſe other ſtiles, ſo I do not propoſe to write one upon rhetoric; but only to give the philoſophical principles upon which it is founded: For I cannot ſeparate philoſophy from any art or ſcience, as I think the principles of none of them

* Vol. 4. book 2. cap. 6. in the beginning.

can be perfectly underſtood without philoſophy; nor without philoſophy can they ever be brought to any great degree of perfection; and, among other arts, Horace has told us, that the writing art is founded upon philoſophy—

> Scribendi rectè ſapere eſt et principium et fons.
> Rem tibi Socraticæ poterunt oſtendere chartæ.

It is in this way that Ariſtotle has treated of theſe arts; and in this reſpect, his three books of rhetoric, and his ſingle book of poetry, mutilated as it is, and little better than a fragment, are of very great value *. Following, therefore, his footſteps, and making the beſt uſe I can of the lights he has thrown upon the ſubject, I will endeavour to explain the nature, and ſhew the proper uſe of rhetoric and poetry.

I begin with rhetoric, the moſt ancient art of the two, and of the greateſt utility. It is coeval with civil ſociety and government; for, in the firſt ages of ſociety, go-

* See upon his rhetoric and poetry, vol. 5. p. 402. and 403.

vernment was carried on by public ſpeaking, as governments of ſingle men, by arbitrary will, were not then known: For though, in the firſt ages of ſociety, there were men of ſuperior abilities, both of mind and body, and who therefore were deſtined by God and nature to govern their fellow-creatures, it was by council and perſuaſion that they governed; nor indeed could they govern otherwiſe in thoſe early ages. Accordingly we find, that among all the barbarous nations, which have any kind of eſtabliſhed government, public ſpeaking is very much practiſed, and is really an art. This is the caſe of the Indians of North America, among whom a chief, though he may be very eminent in war, is not regarded, if he cannot ſpeak: And among the New Zealanders, though not near ſo far advanced in the arts of life as the Indians of North America, rhetoric is practiſed; for I was informed, by a man of very good ſenſe and obſervation, who accompanied Captain Cook in the voyage to New Zealand, that when we firſt landed in the iſland, there came a body of the

natives to us, among whom there was an orator, who made a ſpeech to us of conſiderable length, in which, he ſaid, there was more expreſſion by the voice, the look, and the geſtures of the ſpeaker, than ever he had ſeen or heard of; ſo that it was evident that this orator was a practiſed ſpeaker, and who had made a ſtudy of the art. And it was ſo among the Greeks, at the time of the Trojan war, when, as Homer tells us*, the two arts that diſtinguiſhed man moſt, were war and eloquence. Poetry, on the other hand, though it may be applied to uſeful purpoſes, is more an art of pleaſure than of utility. It was therefore of later invention, even later than muſic, which I hold to have been practiſed by men, though no doubt very rudely, before they learned to articulate; and accordingly thoſe Indians

* Homer, ſpeaking of public aſſemblies, ſays,

——ἵνα τ' ἀνδρὶς ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι.

Iliad. 9. v. 441.

And Phoenix taught Achilles

Μυθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἐμεναι, πρηκτῆρα τε ἐργων.

Iliad. 9. v. 443.

of North America, though they have both muſic and eloquence, have not any thing that deſerves the name of poetry.

In this introduction, it is proper to let the reader know, that, as I have learned my philoſophy from Plato and Ariſtotle, ſo I have alſo learned any thing I know of the fine arts from the ſame authors; and rhetoric particularly I have learned from Ariſtotle's three books upon the ſubject. Whoever, therefore, thinks that thoſe arts are ſufficiently taught in the many modern books written upon the ſubject,—or who thinks, that, by his own genius and natural parts, he can diſcover every thing that is neceſſary to be known in them, needs not take the trouble to read this work; but may reſt ſatisfied with his own diſcoveries, or with what he has learned from modern writers.

OF THE

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS

OF

LANGUAGE.

VOL. VI. BOOK I.

Of the Matter and Subject of Rhetoric.

CHAP. I.

The common definition of Rhetoric not compleat.—What is wanting to it, added.—Observations upon the nature and use of

rhetoric.—Of abſolute neceſſity in popular governments—may be either abuſed, or uſed to good purpoſes, like other arts.

THE word *rhetoric* we have taken from the Latins, as the Latins took it from the Greeks: For the Latins having no arts, I mean liberal arts, of their own, before they became acquainted with the Greeks, and having learned them from the Greeks, they took their names from the Greek language: and among others they took the name of Eloquence, and called it Rhetoric. And it was the ſame with reſpect to the ſciences, which they denominated by Greek words, ſuch as *matheſis*, *mathematica*, *aſtronomia*, *geographia*, and even *grammatica*; and at laſt they adopted the word *philoſophia*, which before they were in uſe to expreſs by a word of their own growth, viz. *ſapientia* *; ſo that, though Cicero

* In the time of Cato the cenſor, the word *philoſophia* was not uſed in Rome, but in place of it *ſapientia*.

boaſts ſo much of the copiouſneſs of the Latin language*, yet there was not a word in it to denote even the art he practiſed himſelf, and which, in a country of liberty, muſt be an art of general uſe.

Therefore Cato ſaid, that *agricultura eſt proxima ſapientiae.* Nor do I think that it was uſed in Latin earlier than the days of Cicero; and even after his time, Horace uſes the old word *ſapere*, to denote the ſtudy of philoſophy, as in the lines above quoted. And here we may obſerve in paſſing, a remarkable difference between the Latin and the Gothic, which is commonly believed to be a barbarous language; for the Goths formed all the terms of art and ſcience from their own language, by derivation and compoſition. This, as I have obſerved elſewhere, (vol. 4 p. 171.) is evident from the Gothic tranſlation of the Goſpels, ſtill extant: And I am well informed, that in Iceland, where the Gothic is ſtill preſerved in the greateſt purity, the terms of art and ſcience are at this day all of their own growth.

* *De Natura Deorum*, lib. 1. cap. 4. *De Oratore*, lib. 2. cap. 4. And in his Tuſculan Queſtions, book 2. cap. 14. he has an exclamation upon the ſubject, *O verborum ineps interdum, quibus abundare te ſemper putas, Graecia!*—ſo great was his national vanity. What was his perſonal vanity is well known.

Rhetoric is commonly defined the art of perſuaſion; and no doubt it is an art of perſuaſion. But ſomething more muſt be added to the definition to make it complete, and to diſtinguiſh rhetoric from other arts, which likewiſe perſuade; for a geometer perſuades, and in the moſt forcible way too, ſo that it is impoſſible you can withhold your aſſent, yet he is not a rhetorician or orator.

It ſhould ſeem, then, that as both the mathematician and orator perſuade, it muſt be in a different manner. And if we attend, we ſhall find this difference betwixt the two, that the geometer, at the ſame time that he perſuades, teaches and inſtructs; for he defines and divides, lays down principles that are certain and clear, and from thoſe principles deduces conſequences as certain; in ſhort, he *demonſtrates*, and not only perſuades the perſon to whom he ſpeaks, but gives him ſcience, by ſhewing him both that the thing is, and why it is, and how it cannot be otherwiſe. On the other hand, the orator perſuades,

but he does not teach, nor communicate any ſcience; or, if he does ſo, he goes out of the province of rhetoric. And indeed it would be impoſſible to communicate ſcience in a harrangue, which laſts only for a few hours, and is generally addreſſed to people, a great part of whom may be ſuppoſed not capable of ſcience, if they had time and leiſure to apply to it. Beſides, the ſubject of an oration is commonly matters relating to civil or political life, incapable, by their nature, of being reduced to art or ſcience, and depending often upon future events, concerning which we can only gueſs or conjecture. It appears, therefore, that we muſt add to the common definition, and ſay, that rhetoric is the art of perſuaſion, without demonſtrating or teaching any art or ſcience *; and that men may be ſo perſuaded, and are moſt commonly ſo, is

* This is agreeable to Plato's notion of the art, ſee his Gorgias, p. 310, *et ſeq.* editio Ficin. His words are, ἡ ῥητορικη ἀρα, ὡς ἐοικε, πειθυς δημιουργος ἐστι, πιστευτικης αλλ' ὐ διδασκαλικης; that is, "The rhetor or orator "is an artificer of perſuaſion, which convinces, or "makes believe, but does not teach."

a fact of daily experience. An orator, therefore, is not obliged to be learned in any one art or ſcience, as his buſineſs is to perſuade, without teaching or demonſtrating any thing. Nor muſt it be thought that this definition implies any contradiction, as if rhetoric were an art, and yet without art; for it is only without art, in ſo far as it may not know the particular art, if there be any, to which the ſubject it treats belongs; but it is an art, in ſo far as it knows how to perſuade, without the knowledge of that particular art.

Another difference between teaching and rhetoric is, with reſpect to the ſtile or manner: For an art or ſcience may be taught by way of dialogue, or queſtion and anſwer, and is beſt taught in that way; whereas rhetoric always uſes continued diſcourſe, or what we call an oration or harrangue, of which the ſtile and compoſition is very different from that of dialogue, or even of a continued diſcourſe in which ſcience is delivered. We muſt therefore

add ſtill further to the definition of rhetoric, and ſay, That it is the art of perſuaſion, without demonſtrating or teaching, and in continued diſcourſe, of which the ſtile is different from common ſpeech.

From this definition, ſeveral obſervations ariſe: And, in the firſt place, it appears to be true what Ariſtotle ſays *, that rhetoric, like dialectic, (a kindred art, of which I ſhall ſpeak more hereafter), has no determinate ſubject, but may be practiſed indifferently upon all ſubjects, though, as I have obſerved, the common ſubject of it be the affairs of life. But there is nothing to hinder any matter of art or ſcience to be made the ſubject of an oration: But then it muſt be treated not ſcientifically, or as an art, but rhetorically; ſo that it is the manner of treating the ſubject, not the ſubject itſelf, which conſtitutes the nature of this art.

2*do*, Though the ſubject be a matter of art or ſcience, it is not neceſſary, as I have obſerved, that the orator ſhould underſtand

* Rhetor, lib. 1. cap. 1.

that art or ſcience. And this was the great boaſt of the ſophiſts of old, that they poſſeſſed an art of ſuch univerſal uſe, that it applied to all ſubjects, and enabled them to talk more plauſibly, upon any matter of art, than the artiſt himſelf, and to convince whom the artiſt could not convince*.

But, 3*tio*, This can only be when the hearers do not underſtand the art or ſcience; for, if they underſtand it, it is impoſſible that any arguments, uſed by a perſon who does not underſtand it, ſhould convince them. But if, on the contrary, they do not underſtand it, they will be more readily convinced by this artificer of perſuaſion, than by any thing the man who underſtands that art or ſcience, but not the rhetorical art, can ſay to them. What, therefore, Plato ſays of rhetoric in general, will certainly apply to this caſe;—That the orator not underſtanding, among thoſe who likewiſe do not underſtand, will

* Plato, ibid. p. 313.

ſpeak more perſuaſively than he who underſtands *.

4*to*, It follows from what is ſaid, that as rhetoric does not require any ſcientific knowledge of the ſubject of which it treats, and ſpeaks to people who have not that knowledge neither, it may perſuade what is falſe as well as what is true; ſo that truth and falſehood appear to be indifferent to this art, as well as the ſubject of which it treats. The profeſſion, therefore, of Gorgias the ſophiſt, that he could make the worſe reaſon appear the better, though it was thought a very impudent profeſſion, was nothing more than profeſſing that he underſtood the rhetorical art, and could make that uſe of it if he would.

And, laſtly, from all that has been ſaid, it is evident that it is a moſt dangerous art, of which the worſt uſe may be made;

* Plato's words, ſpeaking of the orator, are, ὁ ἐκ εἰδὼς ἀρα τε ἰδότος ἢ ἐκ εἰδοτι πιθανωτερος ἐσται. p. 313. *ibid.*

and it was therefore no wonder that Gorgias, by letting the full extent of his art be known, brought diſgrace upon himſelf in the opinion of the people, and upon all his brother ſophiſts, and which Ariſtophanes, in his comedies, endeavoured to turn againſt philoſophy itſelf. But I think it is true, what the ſame Gorgias in Plato ſays in defence of his art, that it holds of all other arts as well as of rhetoric, that an ill uſe may be made of them: And he mentions the art of boxing *, or fighting of any kind, of which the worſt uſe has been made, and is daily made. But, ſays he, a good uſe may likewiſe be made of it; and the ſame uſe may be made of the rhetorical art. And he gives an inſtance of patients, whom he himſelf perſuaded to take medicines, or to ſuffer any operation to be performed upon them, when his brother, who was a phyſician, could not perſuade them. And the people may be conſidered as ſick or diſeaſed perſons, that

* Plato, ibid. p. 312.

cannot be directed by art or ſcience, but muſt be led by good words and fine ſpeeches; and therefore, in all caſes where the people are to be perſuaded, the rhetorical art appears to be very uſeful. And in the ancient ſtates, particularly thoſe of Athens and Rome, where not only the fate of the nation, but the life and fortune of every private man *, depended upon the reſolutions of the people, it was of abſolute neceſſity; ſo that we are not to wonder that it was ſo much cultivated among them. And in the modern popular governments, it muſt likewiſe be of great influence, and the greater, the leſs corrupt theſe governments are: For of a popular

* This was the conſequence of their courts of juſtice being ſo popular, as to conſiſt ſometimes of a thouſand perſons, which was the caſe of one of the courts of Athens, and theſe draughted out of the body of the people by lot. It may be obſerved in paſſing, that all the courts in this country, and in all the other feudal kingdoms of Europe, were, in antient times, likewiſe popular, conſiſting of all the *pares curiae*, or vaſſals of the king or lord.

aſſembly, there are only two things which can determine the reſolutions, eloquence, and faction or corruption. It is in vain, therefore to inveigh againſt eloquence, as Plato does, repreſenting it not as an art, but rather as a thing of experience and obſervation, whoſe object is what is pleaſant, not what is good, being with reſpect to the mind what cookery is with reſpect to the body; for it was of neceſſary uſe in his time, and ſtill is in all free governments: And though no doubt a bad uſe may be made of it as well as a good, that is what it has in common with all other arts. In the hands of a wicked man, it is indeed the moſt dangerous of all inſtruments; and accordingly it is a certain fact, that almoſt all the republican ſtates of Greece were ruined by the corruption and venality of their demagogues; but in the hands of a wiſe and good man *, it may be,

* It may be obſerved, that Gorgias in Plato runs himſelf into a contradiction, and is ſilenced, by admitting two things, neither of which he ought to have admitted; 1*ſt*, That an orator ſhould know what juſtice is, which, if he did not know before, Gorgias

and often has been, productive of the greateſt good. Nor ſhould it diſparage the art ſo much, as at firſt ſight it may ſeem, that by its nature it may be employed to maintain falſehood as well as truth; for even that may not be a bad uſe of it, becauſe it is ſometimes as neceſſary to deceive

profeſſes to teach. 2*dly*, That he who knows juſtice is juſt, that is, practices juſtice. For by theſe two admiſſions he contradicts what he had ſaid before, that an orator might make a bad uſe of his art, for which he that taught him the art is not anſwerable. Ibid. p. 312, and 314. The firſt of theſe, erroneous admiſſions is obſerved by Polus, the friend of Gorgias, who ſays, that Gorgias made it through ſhame, becauſe he would not admit that a man, poſſeſſed of his art, did not know what juſtice was; or that he did not teach it at the ſame time that he taught rhetoric. Ibid, p. 315. But the other, which is as much a paralogiſm, is not obſerved. It is with this attention that we ought to examine many of the reaſonings which Plato puts into the mouth even of Socrates, and to diſtinguiſh betwixt ſuch as he uſes for the inſtruction of his followers, like thoſe in the books De Republica and De Legibus, and ſuch as he uſes againſt the Sophiſts, as in this caſe againſt Gorgias, which are often not concluſive, but ſerve the purpoſe of confuting the Sophiſt.

the people for their good, as to deceive children, ſick perſons, or thoſe that are diſordered in their ſenſes. Ariſtotle therefore, I think, did nothing unworthy of a philoſopher, when he wrote a ſyſtem of rhetoric; for as it is an inſtrument that will certainly be uſed by the bad, the good muſt be armed in the ſame way, otherwiſe the match will not be equal. And though it may be ſaid, as it was by ſome of the antient philoſophers, that it was no art or ſcience, but a thing only of obſervation and experience, and that an orator was no better than a mere empyric; yet it cannot be denied that it will be better practiſed by certain rules and obſervations, collected and digeſted, than without rule: For even cookery, to uſe Plato's compariſon, is better practiſed by a book of receipts, than at random and by mere gueſs and conjecture.

CHAP. II.

Of the importance of Rhetoric—it perſuades not by words only, but by arguments.—Theſe arguments of three kinds, viz. arguments from the perſon of the ſpeaker, from the perſons to whom he ſpeaks, and, laſtly, from the ſubject itſelf.—This laſt kind admits of a ſubdiviſion; for the arguments may be only applicable to that ſubject, or they may be applicable to many others.—Theſe of the dialectical kind, and may prove both ways.—Of the diviſion of Rhetoric, according to its ſubject, into the Deliberative, Judicial, and Epideitic.

FROM what has been ſaid in the preceding chapter, it appears, that the ancient Sophiſts did not much exaggerate the importance of their art, when they repreſented it to be of ſuch extent, as to comprehend, in ſome ſort, every other art,

and the orator to triumph over all other artiſts, at leaſt in the opinion of the people; nor do I think it undeſerving of the magnificent title which Cicero gives it, of *Queen of Arts.* It remains now to be inquired, by what means it performs ſuch wonders.

And, in the firſt place, it muſt be obvious, that it is not by ſounds only, or by mere words, that it produces ſuch effects; for though theſe no doubt have a great influence upon the people, yet they muſt neceſſarily, for that purpoſe, have ſome meaning; becauſe it is true what Cicero ſays, even in the judgment of the people, *Nihil tam furioſum eſt quam verborum, vel optimorum, inanis ſonitus, nulla ſubjecta ſententia aut ſcientia.* It is therefore not ſtile and compoſition only, that will convince even the people; but it is argument chiefly, of one kind or another: And for that reaſon I begin, following the example of Ariſtotle, with the arguments belonging to rhetoric, as being the principal part of the art; after which I will ſpeak of the ſtile.

As there is no author more accurate in his diviſions than Ariſtotle, I will adopt the diviſion he has given of rhetorical arguments into three heads. They are all, ſays he, drawn either from the perſon of the ſpeaker, from the perſons of the hearers, or from the ſubject itſelf; for no argument can be conceived that is not from one or other of theſe topics. The arguments of the two firſt kind are clearly rhetorical, not belonging to any particular art or ſcience. But with reſpect to the arguments of the third kind we muſt make a diſtinction: For ſome of them may be drawn immediately and directly from the ſubject, being of ſuch a nature as to be applicable only to that ſubject; and if the ſubject be a matter of art or ſcience, ſuch arguments will not be rhetorical, but belonging to that art or ſcience: And in ſome caſes they may be demonſtrative; nor is there any thing to hinder the orator to uſe arguments of that kind, if they be ſuited to the capacities of the people, which ſome things in morals and politics are when well explained. The other kinds are general, and

belonging to many other ſubjects; and ſuch arguments are all of the rhetorical or dialectic kind. For with reſpect to ſuch arguments, there is no difference in ſubſtance betwixt rhetoric and dialectic, but only in the ſtile and manner, as ſhall be afterwards more fully explained. And this ſort of argumentation is particularly to be attended to, becauſe it explains what hitherto muſt have appeared inexplicable to many readers—How the rhetorical art can enable a man to argue upon a ſubject, even though it be a matter of art or ſcience, which he has never learned, and of which, conſequently, he can have no particular knowledge, and this too more plauſibly, if he ſpeak to the people, than even the artiſt or man of ſcience himſelf, who has not ſtudied or practiſed the rhetorical art. What makes this thing the more ſurpriſing is, that all reaſonings, as well as the dialectical and rhetorical, muſt be from general propoſitions. But what makes the difference is, that the arguments uſed in particular arts and ſciences are drawn from general propoſitions indeed, but

which apply only to that particular art or ſcience; whereas the propoſitions, from which dialectic and rhetoric argue, apply to many different ſubjects. And another difference is, that the propoſitions, from which we infer the concluſions in particular arts and ſciences, muſt be ſelf-evident truths, or truths demonſtrated: Whereas the principles, from which the rhetorician argues, are neither ſelf-evident nor demonſtrated propoſitions, but ſuch as are generally admitted to be true, by thoſe to whom the orator addreſſes himſelf. Arguments of this kind are the only arguments that can be properly uſed with men who are not ſuppoſed to underſtand any art or ſcience; and therefore it was in this way, chiefly, that the Sophiſts of old, and the orators, argued. But, though the practice was univerſal, it was not reduced to any art or method, till Ariſtotle, to whom arts, as well as philoſophy, has been ſo much obliged, compoſed his books of Topics, which contain thoſe general propoſitions, applicable to ſo many ſubjects, from which the Sophiſts and ora-

tors drew their arguments: And the name of Topics was given to the work, becauſe it was the place or ſeat of arguments, *ſedes argumentorum*, as Cicero has explained the word. But although the Sophiſts of old, and many of the orators, made a very bad uſe of thoſe topics, we are not to ſuppoſe that Ariſtotle, when he wrote this book, meant to form an art of ſophiſtry or deceit, which would have been unworthy of a philoſopher: But he inſiſts, that from the propoſitions laid down in the Topics, thoſe who uſe them ſhould argue fairly, and not infer concluſions which the premiſes do not warrant. Upon this ſubject I have ſaid a good deal more in the firſt volume of Ancient Metaphyſics *, and have illuſtrated what I have ſaid by examples, in one of which Ariſtotle ſhews, that an argument, drawn from a certain topic, was ſo far from being concluſive, that the contrary might be inferred from it.

* Book 5. chap. 4. p. 405.

Having thus ſhewn what the end propoſed by rhetoric is, of what kind the arguments it uſes are, and from what ſources thoſe arguments are drawn, it remains only, in order to give a general view of the nature of this art, that I ſhould give ſome account of the ſubjects upon which it is employed. And firſt, it is employed in matters of deliberation to perſuade thoſe, to whom it is addreſſed, to act in the buſineſs, about which they deliberate, in one way rather than in another; and this is called deliberative eloquence. The ſecond is employed in determining controverſies among men about their lives and fortunes, before judges, who are to decide upon the ſpeeches of the orators: And here we may obſerve, from what Ariſtotle has told us, that the ſubject of this kind of rhetoric was not queſtions of private property among the citizens, but public trials, in the form of accuſation and defence; for queſtions of the other kind do not appear to have been at all debated by orators or lawyers in Greece, nor in Rome, till the Romans had done what no other nation of an-

tiquity did; I mean, had formed a ſyſtem of the law of private property, which though they did not get from the Greeks, they got the principles of philoſophy, upon which they founded it. And this is eloquence of the judicial kind. The third and laſt uſe of it is to praiſe or diſpraiſe, ſo that it is either panegyric or invective. It is ſaid, in Greek, to be of the Epideictic kind; becauſe it is for ſhow and oſtentation, and not for buſineſs. This name is, I think, very improperly tranſlated by the word *demonſtrative*, by which one ſhould have thought, that the tranſlator had underſtood, that the Greek word Epideictic, meant the ſame thing as Apodeictic. And yet I obſerve that not only Quintilian, but alſo Cicero, uſes this improper tranſlation, for want, I ſuppoſe, of a more proper word in Latin: But they had better, I think, have uſed the Greek word, as they have taken many other terms of art from the Greek, and even the word *rhetoric* itſelf, as I have obſerved in the beginning of this volume.

From what is ſaid in this and the preceding chapter, the definition of rhetoric may be collected to be, 'An art of perſuaſion without ſcience or demonſtration, upon ſubjects of deliberation, of judicial deciſion, or of praiſe or diſpraiſe, by arguments taken either from the nature of the ſubject, from the perſon of the ſpeaker, or the perſons of the hearers.'

CHAP. III.

Of Rhetorical arguments taken from the ſubject itſelf.—Difference in this reſpect betwixt Rhetoric and Science.—In what reſpect Rhetoric is different from Sophiſtry—different alſo from other arts, in this reſpect, that the ſubject of other arts is limited.—The ſubject of Rhetoric, things that every body is ſuppoſed to know more or leſs.—Rhetorical arguments all general, and applicable to many different caſes.—Rhetoric applicable to arts and ſciences; but they muſt be treated in a Rhetorical manner.—The wonderful extent of the Dialectic art.—No man, but one of ſo great genius and learning as Ariſtotle, could think of reducing it to rule and method.—Some other things, he had ſtudied, prepared him for ſuch a work—particularly what he has written upon Rhetoric.—Difference betwixt Rhetoric and Dialectic.—General diviſion by Ariſtotle into four heads—This a moſt comprehen-

ſive diviſion, including all the topics of argument upon every ſubject.—Some inſtances of the topics, as arranged under theſe ſeveral heads.—The invention of the art of Dialectic does more honour to the genius of Ariſtotle, being intirely his own, than any other of his works.—The philoſopher and grammarian may both find matter of inſtruction in this work.—Cicero's judgment of the ſtile of it.—Of Alexander Aprodiſienſes's commentary upon the Dialectic of Ariſtotle—The greateſt uſe of this work is to correct the text of Ariſtotle—It is a wonder that there are not many more errors in Ariſtotle's text, conſidering how providentially his works were preſerved—If they had not been preſerved, we ſhould have had no complete ſyſtem of philoſophy, ſuch as is to be found in Ariſtotle's writings.—Of Cicero's topics—addreſſed to Trebatius the lawyer—illuſtrated by examples from the law.—Cicero's ſkill in the law.—The ignorance, not only of Trebatius, but of almoſt all the philoſophers of that age, in the philoſophy of Ariſtotle.—That phi-

loſophy would have been loſt, if it had not been preſerved in the Alexandrian ſchool.

BEFORE I come to ſpeak of the three kinds of eloquence I have mentioned, the Deliberative, the Judicial, and the Epideictic, I will ſay ſomething of the arguments which rhetoric uſes upon all the ſeveral ſubjects of which it treats. Theſe alſo I have reduced to three claſſes, viz. arguments drawn from the ſubject of which the orator treats; from the perſon of the ſpeaker; and, laſtly, from the perſons of the hearers: And I will begin with the firſt, which ought certainly to be the principal in every oration.

From what has been ſaid in the former chapter, a diſtinction muſt be evident betwixt rhetoric and ſcience of any kind; for all ſciences are founded upon axioms, or ſelf-evident propoſitions, from which all their concluſions are deduced by demonſtrative reaſoning. On the other hand, the rhetorical art is founded in opinion,

and all its arguments are drawn from what is generally believed to be true, the το ενδοξον, as Ariſtotle calls it, or what is admitted to be true by your adverſary. If from theſe opinions, concluſions are by fair argumentation drawn, then it is not ſophiſtry, but truly rhetoric; for the rhetorician does not differ from the ſophiſt ſo much in the principles he lays down, as in his manner of arguing from them.

There may be alſo a difference obſerved betwixt rhetoric and other arts and ſciences in this reſpect, that the ſubjects of other arts are limited and determined, ſuch as the ſubjects of phyſic, geometry, arithmetic, &c. *; whereas rhetoric has for its ſubject every thing that can be deliberated upon, can be tried in a court of juſtice, or can be praiſed or diſpraiſed;—in ſhort, rhetoric comprehends all the affairs of men, and the whole buſineſs of human life. This Ariſtotle has obſerved, in the firſt chapter

* Ariſtot. lib. 1. Rhet. cap. 2. in initio.

of his rhetoric, where he has told us, that the ſubject of rhetoric is things which every body is ſuppoſed to know, more or leſs, without having ſtudied any particular art or ſcience; and therefore, ſays he, every body accuſes or defends, praiſes or blames, and reaſons about what is right or wrong, profitable or unprofitable, in actions.

And here we may ſee the reaſon why the arguments I am now ſpeaking of, that is, arguments from the ſubject, cannot be confined to that particular ſubject, but muſt be general, and applicable to many other ſubjects. There may, indeed, be arguments uſed by the orator, that are applicable only to that ſubject; but theſe, I ſay, are not rhetorical arguments, nor is it of theſe that Ariſtotle treats: And indeed it would be impoſſible to make any thing like a ſyſtem of them, or to reduce them to rule, all particular caſes being ſo different one from another; and accordingly Ariſtotle tells us, that neither rhetoric nor dialectic are converſant about particular things, but only about generals, nor has it,

like other arts, a definite ſubject *. Rhetorical arguments, therefore, are all deducible from general propoſitions, applicable to many particular caſes, quite different from one another. Theſe propoſitions Ariſtotle has reduced to certain heads, which he calls Topics, as I have obſerved, that is, *places* where arguments are to be found †.

And rhetoric not only may be applied to all the affairs of human life, but to philoſophy, arts, and ſciences. Theſe, however, muſt not be treated as matter of ſcience, but matter of opinion: And the arguments uſed muſt not be deduced from the principles of that art or ſcience, but from the common apprehenſions of men; in ſhort, they muſt be rhetorical arguments. To the definition, therefore, which I have given of rhetoric ‡, it may be added, 'It is an art of perſuaſion, not only in mat-'ters of deliberation, of judicial deciſion, 'and of praiſe or diſpraiſe; but upon the

* Lib. 1. Rhet. cap. 2.

† See p. 26.

‡ See p. 29.

'ſubject of any art or ſcience, though not 'by arguments from the principles of thoſe 'arts and ſciences, but from the common 'opinions of men.'

From what has been ſaid, the reader may perceive the wonderful extent of the ſubject, which Ariſtotle has reduced to art and method in his books of *topics*, and given it the name of *Dialectic*; a word, before his time, of very indeterminate uſe, and applied by Plato to logic, metaphyſics, and all kinds of reaſoning. The ſubject, as we have ſeen, comprehends not only all the affairs of life, but every queſtion of philoſophy, arts, or ſciences. Accordingly, Ariſtotle, in his books of topics, has mentioned ſeveral queſtions of philoſophy, ſuch as the famous diſpute betwixt him and his maſter concerning ideas, and alſo concerning virtue, whether it was nothing elſe but ſcience, as Plato makes it to be. To form a ſyſtem of reaſoning upon ſo many various ſubjects, and to reduce to certain heads all the variety of arguments that may be uſed upon theſe ſubjects, muſt appear at firſt ſight

ſo amazing a work, that we can hardly believe that any man ſhould have ſo much as thought of reducing it to any form or order; ſo that we need not wonder that no man before Ariſtotle performed it. Some ſophiſts, indeed, mentioned by Ariſtotle, had particular topics that they were very fond of, and drew many arguments from them; but none of them ever thought of reducing all this kind of reaſoning into a ſyſtem, and dividing it into certain heads. This was reſerved for a man of the genius and learning of Ariſtotle; nor could even he have executed it, if he had not before ſtudied logic ſo much, and formed a ſyſtem of it, where he has ſhewn what rules are neceſſary to make reaſoning demonſtrative. In this way he laid the foundation of all ſciences, and indeed ſhewed us what ſcience was: And this I think may naturally have led him to think whether reaſoning, not demonſtrative, might not likewiſe be formed into a ſyſtem, ſuch as would facilitate the uſe of it: For that this reaſoning is of much more general uſe than demonſtrative rea-

ſoning, ſuch as we employ in ſciences, is evident; and therefore Ariſtotle, by reducing it to order and method, and ſo facilitating the uſe of it, has certainly performed a very uſeful work, ſuch as no man could have executed, but one who had ſtudied reaſoning ſo much as he had done, and who, beſides, had acquired a more extenſive knowledge of all arts and ſciences than any other man ever was poſſeſſed of. Moreover, the ſtudy of eloquence, which, it appears, from his *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, that he ſtudied and wrote upon at the deſire of his pupil, would naturally lead him to ſtudy dialectic, which is ſo nearly connected with rhetoric, that it furniſhes to us all the arguments of the kind I am now ſpeaking of, that is, arguments drawn from the ſubject of the oration; and very many arguments alſo upon the other two branches of the art I mentioned may be drawn from the topics. Ariſtotle, in the beginning of his Rhetoric, has very properly obſerved the ſimilarity betwixt rhetoric and dialectic; and indeed, the great difference betwixt the two arts, is more in

the ſtile and manner than in the matter: For rhetoric goes on in a continued diſcourſe, and in a ſtile different from common ſpeech; whereas the dialectic went on in the way of converſation, as the name imports; and the reaſoning was conducted in the Socratic method, by queſtion and anſwer; and it was from the propoſitions granted by the perſon who anſwered the queſtion, that the other party formed his arguments, not from propoſitions that he aſſumed himſelf, or borrowed from any art or ſcience; and accordingly Ariſtotle employs his eighth and laſt book of topics in giving directions how the queſtion ſhould be put and anſwered. And, laſtly, the ſtile of dialectic being no other than the ſtile of common ſpeech, is quite different from the ſtile of rhetoric.

As order and method were abſolutely neceſſary in treating an art of ſo great extent, Ariſtotle has begun his treatiſe upon it, by dividing it into four different heads, more general than the topics, which are to be conſidered as only the ſubdiviſions of

thoſe general heads; for as accurate diviſion is the great organ of philoſophy, and of all arts and ſciences, no man has employed that organ more ſucceſsfully than Ariſtotle. The four general heads are, 1*mo*, The definition of the thing which is the ſubject of the inquiry;—2*do*, The genus, under which Ariſtotle, in this diviſion, includes the ſpecies and the difference; and they are certainly both virtually included in the genus;—3*tio*, What is proper or peculiar to the ſubject;—And, *laſtly*, What is only accidental, that is, may or may not be a quality of the ſubject. And that every propoſition or problem of dialectic falls under one or other of theſe claſſes, he has proved both by induction and ſyllogiſm*. And he begins his work with the topics relating to *accident*, being more general and comprehenſive than any of the other heads, becauſe, with regard to it, there is nothing to be proved, but that it exiſts in the ſubject,

* Lib. 1. *Topicorum*, cap. 8.

without conſidering whether it makes any part of the eſſence of the ſubject, which is the caſe of the other three.

In order to give the reader a general idea of the method that Ariſtotle has followed in the execution of this great plan, I have, in the firſt volume of my Ancient Metaphyſics *, given ſome examples of theſe Topics, and of Ariſtotle's manner of arguing from them, from which, and particularly the laſt example there mentioned, it appears how cautious Ariſtotle was that there ſhould be no deception in the arguments drawn from theſe general topics. How little he was diſpoſed to teach an art of ſophiſtry, is apparent from a work which he has ſubjoined to his Topics, intitled, *De Sophiſticis Elenchis*. In this work he has ſhewn all the art which the Sophiſts made uſe of, to deceive men into an opinion of their great learning and abilities, by endeavouring to

* Lib. 5. chap. 4.

convince men of the greateſt paradoxes, of which it appears that they made a very profitable trade. In this work he has ſhewn, not only the art of the Sophiſts in making uſe of thoſe topics to deceive men, but he has taught how we are to guard againſt that deception, and refute ſuch ſophiſtical arguments.

This work of Ariſtotle upon the Topics is ſuch as to give me a greater idea of the extent of his genius and learning than any one other work that he has executed. That he got a great part of his philoſophy from the philoſophers before his time, I have no doubt; and I think I have made it very probable that he owed that great diſcovery of the analyſis of the operations of the human intellect in reaſoning, contained in his books of Analytics, to the Pythagorean ſchool *. But if his Logic was not his own, I think there is not the leaſt reaſon to doubt that his Dialectic was his

* Preface to vol. 3d of Ant. Metaph. p. liii. and following.

own; and if ſo, I think I have ſhown that it was a moſt wonderful diſcovery, and which I think may be made very uſeful: For, as Cicero has obſerved in the beginning of his treatiſe upon the Topics, the invention of arguments is the firſt and moſt neceſſary thing in ſpeaking. Now I think I can venture to affirm, that there is not an argument of the rhetorical kind, upon any ſubject, which may not be found in one or other of thoſe *places*, or ſeats of argument, with which Ariſtotle has furniſhed us. Now, let a man's genius be ever ſo great, and his knowledge as comprehenſive as any man's can be, yet, when he comes to invent arguments upon any ſubject, he would, I ſhould think, be much the better for having an index, ſuch as Ariſtotle has given us, directing him to the place where they are to be found, ſo that he has nothing more to do, but to apply them to the caſe he is ſtudying.

Beſides the copiouſneſs of argument which this work furniſhes to the rhetorician, the philoſopher and the grammarian

muſt be much pleaſed with the accurate diſtinction of things and of words, which he finds there; and though we have in it the elegant Attic brevity in perfection, yet there is no obſcurity for want of words; and his ſtile, upon the whole, deſerves the commendation which Cicero gives it in the beginning of his Topics, where he ſays, that a judicious reader ought to be allured not only by the matter of this work, *ſed dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cum copia tum etiam ſuavitate.*

We have upon this work a commentary of Alexander Aphrodiſienſis, the firſt commentator upon Ariſtotle of the Alexandrian School. It is very full and accurate, and ſhews that the author perfectly underſtood the meaning of Ariſtotle. But he has explained his meaning ſo well himſelf, and illuſtrated it by examples ſo much, that I think he does not need a commentator; and the beſt uſe that can be made of the Aphrodiſian's commentary, is to correct ſome errors in the manuſcript, of which, however, there are not many in

this work. And indeed I wonder that there are not many more in this, and every other work of Ariſtotle, as many as are in his book upon Poetry, conſidering the fate of Ariſtotle's writings, which lay ſo long under ground, but were at laſt diſcovered and brought to light*,

Haud equidem ſine mente, reor, ſine numine Divum;

for if it be true what Plato ſays, that philoſophy is the greateſt gift of the gods to mortal men, we muſt think this a remarkable inſtance of a good providence, by which ſo complete a ſyſtem of philoſophy was reſtored to the world.

And here I think it may not be improper to give the reader a general view of this great ſyſtem of philoſophy, which Ariſtotle has left us, and which may be ſaid

* See an account of this given in the preface to vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph. p. xxxviii. See alſo the Life of Ariſtotle by Diogenes Laertius, with a quotation from Strabo, and another from Plutarch, concerning his writings, prefixed to Du Vall's edition of his works

to have been miraculouſly preſerved to us. What we have firſt in the editions of his works, and which is very juſtly ſo placed, being a proper introduction to all philoſophy, and indeed to all ſcience, is his Logical works, of which the firſt may be called the Doctrine of Ideas, without which there can be no philoſophy or ſcience of any kind. Of theſe he has given a moſt comprehenſive ſyſtem in his book of Categories, ſo grand and comprehenſive, that thoſe among us, who think proper to philoſophiſe without the aſſiſtance of the antients, cannot have ſo much as an idea of it. Nor is it poſſible it could have been produced in any other ſchool than that of Pythagoras, who had learned in Egypt that wiſdom of the Egyptians in which Moſes was inſtructed: For it is a ſyſtem that takes in the whole of things exiſting in the univerſe; and therefore the work of Archytas upon the ſubject, is very properly intitled, περι του παντος, that is, *Of the whole of things:* And the work is as uſeful as it is grand and comprehenſive; for,

as I have ſhewn elſewhere *, without it there could be nothing perfect in philoſophy or ſcience of any kind, becauſe there could be no perfect definition.

But ideas are no more than the materials of reaſoning, the firſt ſtep of which is Propoſitions. Upon theſe Ariſtotle has very properly beſtowed a whole book, which he has intitled, περι ἑρμηνειας, or, *De Interpretatione*, and indeed they required nothing leſs, conſidering the wonderful variety of them, and all the ſeveral ſpecieſes of them, according to the difference of the ſubject, the praedicate, the matter, and the manner of the propoſition; the number of them all together amounting to no leſs than 3024, a number which muſt appear incredible to thoſe who have not made a ſtudy of logic †.

Of propoſitions, ſome, but very few, are ſelf-evident; and if we were to go

* Origin and Prog. of Lang. p. 72 and following of the 2d edition of vol. 1ſt.

† See preface to vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph. p. 49.

no farther in reaſoning, than to perceive the connection betwixt the ſubject and praedicate of ſuch propoſitions, no art or ſcience ever could have been invented. At the ſame time, it was of abſolute neceſſity that there ſhould be ſome ſelf-evident propoſitions; for if every thing was to be proved, nothing could be proved: And therefore we ought to admire the goodneſs of God, who has enabled us by nature, without any art or teaching, to perceive the truth of ſuch propoſitions, upon which all ſcience is founded, and without which, in this our fallen ſtate, we never could have brought our intellectual part to any degree of perfection.

And here begins the great proceſs of reaſoning, and which only is *reaſoning* in the Engliſh ſenſe of the word. It is performed by that diſcurſive faculty of the mind, in Greek called διανοια. By it, from certain propoſitions, we deduce others, and from theſe others; and ſo we go on, till we arrive at the concluſion we deſire: And if the pro-

poſitions with which we begin are ſelf-evident propoſitions, or propoſitions that have been demonſtrated, and the deductions from them properly made, then is the reaſoning Demonſtrative. And this is the reaſoning which Ariſtotle has explained with ſuch wonderful accuracy in his *firſt* and *laſt* Analytics. Every reaſoning of this kind, and indeed of every kind, muſt be in ſyllogiſms. The ſubject, therefore, of theſe books of Analytics is the ſyllogiſm, which he has annalyſed into three propoſitions, and three terms; by which theſe propoſitions are ſo ſyllogiſed or brought together, as to infer the concluſion. But of this I have ſpoken at more length elſewhere *, where I have ſhewn, that Ariſtotle, in order to explain perfectly the nature of the ſyllogiſm, has divided it into three figures, and theſe again he has ſubdivided into fourteen modes. All this intricate work I know thoſe of this age,

* See the preface to Ant. Metaph. p. 49 and 50.

who think themſelves philoſophers, will deſpiſe: But I can aſſure them, that without the ſtudy of this logic of Ariſtotle, they can only reaſon as vulgar men do, without knowing what truth or ſcience is; And they will reaſon as illiterate men ſpeak, who can, by mere practice and habit, put their words together ſo as to expreſs their meaning; but not having learned the grammatical art, they cannot tell by what rule that is done. Our philoſophers, therefore, of this age, though they inquire much about truth and ſcience, do not ſo much as know what ſcience is: Nor do they appear to have the curioſity which Pontius Pilate, the Roman governour of Judea had, who aſked of our Saviour what truth was; which proves to me, that although the Ariſtotelian philoſophy was very little known in Rome, as I ſhall afterwards ſhow, Pilate had got ſome idea of this work of Ariſtotle, as much, at leaſt, as to excite his curioſity to know what truth and ſcience was, which to diſcover, is the profeſſed intention of Ariſtotle's works *.

* See the beginning of his Firſt Analytics.

In theſe books of analytics, Ariſtotle has explained moſt accurately the nature of demonſtrative reaſoning, and enabled us to argue with men of ſcience upon ſubjects of ſcience. But by far the greater part of mankind have no ſcience, yet they have opinions, and form propoſitions upon different ſubjects, and from theſe propoſitions they argue; for otherwiſe they would not be rational creatures. With ſuch men our chief intercourſe in life is; and if we were not taught to argue with them in their own way, I ſhould think the reaſoning art imperfect and defective. To collect all the opinions of the vulgar upon the ſubject of every art and ſcience, or of every occurrence in human life, would have been an endleſs work and of little or no uſe, if it could have been accompliſhed. But to digeſt theſe opinions in order, and to rank them under certain heads, ſo as to make them of ready uſe, was a moſt uſeful work, and does the greateſt honour to the author of it. Now this Ariſtotle has done in his Dialectical works or Topics, and in his Rhetoric. In

the firſt of theſe he has given us topics, which apply chiefly to arts and ſciences: In the ſecond we have the topics, from which we argue in political matters, or in the common affairs of life. And he has not only given us the topics upon theſe ſubjects, but he has ſhewn how we are to argue from them; and has taught us that moſt important leſſon in logic, to know *what is conſequent*, *what is repugnant*, and *from what being given what follows*. And to theſe two he has ſubjoined his treatiſe *De Sophiſticis Elenchis*, in which he has detected the arts of the ſophiſts, and ſhewn how we are to guard againſt them. All theſe works I have mentioned, viz. his Categories, his book upon Propoſitions, his *Firſt* and *Laſt* Analytics, his Dialectic or Topics, and his work againſt the Sophiſts, are all of the logical kind, and make all together a moſt wonderful ſyſtem of the operations of the diſcurſive faculty of the human mind; for in them are contained all the forms of argumentation that can be imagined; and there is a variety of knowledge ſhewn, not only in arts and

ſciences, but in the buſineſs of human life, ſuch as one can hardly believe could have fallen to the ſhare of any one man. And thus Ariſtotle has had the honour to complete the laſt part of the philoſophy of Egypt, which came to Greece from the School of Pythagoras; for before Ariſtotle wrote, it appears that a conſiderable part of the moral philoſophy, the natural, metaphyſical, and theological, belonging to this ſchool, was known in Greece. But he firſt taught the Greeks to know what ſcience was, about which we ſee ſo much diſputation in the *Theætetus* of Plato, but nothing decided *.

If Ariſtotle had never written any thing elſe except this great logical work, I ſhould have thought that he had employed his time very well, and that philoſophy was very much indebted to him. But beſides his logical works, he has given us a ſyſ-

* Who deſires to know more upon this ſubject, may read what I have written in the *fifth* volume of this work, p. 356, and following.

tem of morals, the beſt extant, and alſo of politics, which, ſo far as it has gone, I think excellent: Then he has given us the Philoſophy of Nature, the only philoſophy of that kind which I know: And he has concluded with that philoſophy which goes beyond nature and the material world, and is therefore called Metaphyſics. And not content with all this, he has given us a work upon Poetry, of which only *one* book is come down to us, of *three* which he is ſaid to have written. And thus mutilated and imperfect, yet I think it a moſt valuable work, as it gives us the philoſophy not only of poetry, but of all the fine arts. And I am not aſhamed to own, that without ſtudying it, I ſhould not have known what poetry was; but ſhould have thought, as many others do, that verſification and fine diction make poetry *. Beſides theſe great works, there are ſeveral detached pieces preſerved

* Who would deſire to know more of the writings of Ariſtotle, may read what I have ſaid in the third chap. of the 2d book of vol. 5.

to us, ſuch as his Problems, a work of great curioſity; his *Quaeſtiones Mechanicae*, and his book upon Phyſiognomy, and others: For he wrote altogether, as Diogenes Laertius informs us, four hundred books, of which only about one hundred and thirty are preſerved to us*. But even in theſe we have a complete ſyſtem of philoſophy ſuch as is not to be found in the writings of any other ancient author. What appears to me more extraordinary than any thing I have yet mentioned of this philoſopher, is, that he lived no more than ſixty-three years, eight of which he employed in educating the Conqueror of the World; and yet he found time, not only to write ſo many books, but to eſtabliſh the beſt ſchool of philoſophy in Greece, which he taught walking in the Lyceaum.——But to return to the Topics from this degreſſion, which though long, I hope the reader will not think foreign to the purpoſe.

There is a book of Topics written by

* See Du Vall's edition of Ariſtotle, in the introduction, p. 7.

Cicero, and addreſſed to Trebatius the lawyer. It was written, as he tells us, aboard a ſhip, in his return from Greece, without the uſe of any books; and allowances being made for that, I think the work has a good deal of merit, as it ſhews that he had ſtudied Ariſtotle's Topics very diligently. As he addreſſed it to a lawyer, he has taken his illuſtrations and examples chiefly from the civil law of the Romans, which I ſuppoſe Trebatius would underſtand much better than if he had taken his examples, as Ariſtotle has done, from philoſophy. And it appears from theſe examples, that Cicero underſtood the civil law very well; ſo that we need not wonder of his boaſting, that if he was provoked by the lawyers, he would profeſs himſelf a lawyer in three days. Cicero tells us, in the beginning of this treatiſe, that he put Ariſtotle's work into the hands of Trebatius, but he did not underſtand it: And what is more extraordinary, a very learned rhetorician, into whoſe hands Trebatius put the book, did not underſtand it neither. Cicero adds, what I think ſtill

more extraordinary, that the philoſophers themſelves, at that time were, a very few excepted, quite ignorant of Ariſtotle's works. And I am perſuaded, that if his philoſophy had not been revived in the Alexandrian School, it would have been again loſt; or if the manuſcripts had been preſerved, a great part of them would not have been intelligible to us without the aſſiſtance of the commentators of that ſchool.

CHAP. IV.

All the arguments belonging to the ſubject are taken from the Dialectic art; and the Topics from which they are to be deduced are to be found there.—Thoſe arguments are only in *the cauſe.—The others from the perſon of the ſpeaker or hearer* out *of the cauſe.—Yet theſe only inſiſted on by the writers on rhetoric before Ariſtotle.—The arguments from the ſubject are all Enthymemas, that is, imperfect ſyllogiſms.—All reaſoning of every kind reducible to ſyllogiſm.—The Enthymema called a Dialectical Syllogiſm, but uſed in all kinds of reaſoning.—The complete ſyllogiſm very ſeldom uſed by any writer;—but thrice by Ariſtotle.—No inference from thence of the inutility of the doctrine of the ſyllogiſm.—Ariſtotle's obſervation concerning the invention of Dialectic and Rhetoric, applies to all arts,—and likewiſe to all ſciences.*

IN the preceding chapter I enlarged ſo much upon the dialectic art, becauſe it is from it that we get all thoſe arguments of the kind of which I am now ſpeaking, that is, arguments which ariſe from the ſubject itſelf; for whether they be taken from the caſe as ſtated, or whether they ariſe from the teſtimony of witneſſes, evidence of writings, the authority of authors, or from examples of what has happened in former times, they are all to be found in the dialectic art. The other two kinds of arguments, which are taken either from the perſons of the hearers or ſpeakers, are all, as Ariſtotle has obſerved, out of the cauſe: And therefore in the courts of juſtice in ſome ſtates, and particularly in the Areopagus in Athens, the pleaders were forbid to uſe any arguments of that kind, as being foreign to the ſubject in diſpute*. And yet, ſays he, thoſe, that have written upon the art before me, have

* Aup. Rhetoric, cap. 1.

ſaid very little upon the arguments of the firſt kind, which only can be ſaid to belong to the cauſe; but inſiſt very much upon the other kinds of arguments, which are foreign to the cauſe.

In this chapter he obſerves, that the arguments which ariſe from the ſubject itſelf, and are properly in the cauſe, are all *Enthymemas*, that is, imperfect ſyllogiſms, or ſyllogiſms in which one or other of the two propoſitions, from which the concluſion is drawn, is not mentioned, as being well known to the hearer, and being ſuppoſed to be in his mind, from which ſuppoſition the name is given to the ſyllogiſm. It is commonly called the Dialectical Syllogiſm; but it is uſed in all kinds of reaſoning: For there can be no reaſoning without ſyllogiſm; and even the demonſtrations in mathematics conſiſt all of this imperfect kind of ſyllogiſm. The complete ſyllogiſm, conſiſting of three propoſitions, the major, minor, and concluſion, is very ſeldom to be found in any writing or ſpeaking. I have heard of a doctor in

England, who had the curioſity to go through Ariſtotle's writings, in order to find there complete ſyllogiſms; and I was told he could find but three. And indeed my wonder is, that in a writer, who has ſo little ſuperfluity of words, he ſhould have found ſo many. From thence the Doctor would no doubt infer the inutility of the doctrine of the ſyllogiſm, which Ariſtotle has laboured ſo much in his books of Analytics. He might have as well argued, that becauſe in ſpeaking or writing we do not mention the diſtinction of letters and ſyllables, therefore the analyſis of ſpeech into theſe component parts was quite uſeleſs. There is another obſervation made by Ariſtotle in this chapter, which applies equally to dialectic and rhetoric, and is worthy of being taken notice of, as it accounts for the origin not only of theſe arts, but of every other. Rhetoric, ſays he, and dialectic belong to no particular art, and therefore they are practiſed more or leſs by thoſe who have learned no art; for all men prove or diſprove, praiſe or blame, accuſe or defend. But the greater

part of men do this from mere cuſtom and habit, without rule or method; and when it is ſo done, ſays he, we obſerve that ſome do it well, and others not well. And when we obſerve for what reaſon ſome do it well, while others do it ill, this is the beginning of the art; and I will add, that it is the beginning of all arts: For the firſt eſſays in them all have been from nature; and by obſerving what is well or ill done in them, the art has been begun, and, by degrees, very ſlow degrees at firſt, has been perfected; ſo that Ariſtotle has here given us the progreſs of the human mind in the formation of all arts, and, I think I may add, of all ſciences. For the firſt attempts of the mind in ſcience, as well as in art, muſt have been rude extempore eſſays of our intellectual faculty, upon ſubjects of ſcience, without order or method, definition or diviſion, the neceſſity of which would only be diſcovered in proceſs of time, when we begin to diſcover what rude and imperfect work we make without theſe.

CHAP. V.

Of the arguments taken from the perſons of the ſpeaker or hearers.—In all cauſes that are argued of every kind, the hearers muſt judge or form an opinion.—That muſt depend, in a great meaſure, upon what they think of the ſpeaker, and upon their own affections and paſſions.—The judgment they form of the ſpeaker, reducible to three heads.—What influences the minds of the hearers is of four kinds, their paſſions, their habits, their ages, and their fortune.—Of the paſſions, and particularly of Anger.—Of the appeaſing of Anger.—Of Love—Hatred—Fear—Shame—Want of ſhame—Gratitude—Pity—Indignation—Envy—Emulation.—What Ariſtotle has written here upon the paſſions the moſt valuable thing of the kind to be found.—He quotes Homer very much to the purpoſe upon this ſubject.—In this Rhetorical work he ſhows not only the greateſt knowledge of

human nature, but of the world, and the affairs of life, much more than could be expected from a man ſo much engaged in philoſophy.—Of ſententious ſayings and Enthymemas with reſpect to the paſſions.

I COME now to ſpeak of the laſt kind of arguments I mentioned, thoſe which ariſe from the perſons of the ſpeakers or of the hearers, and which muſt have their weight in all the three kinds of Rhetoric I have mentioned; for in all the three, as Ariſtotle has obſerved *, the hearers judge: When they deliberate, they judge; when they hear cauſes tried, they judge; and when any perſon or thing is praiſed or diſpraiſed, they alſo form a judgment one way or another. Now theſe judgments muſt depend very much, not only upon their opinion of the ſubject which the orator treats, and from which thoſe intrinſic arguments I have ſpoken of

* Lib. 2. Rhetoric. cap. 1.

are derived; but alſo upon the characters, manners, and diſpoſitions of the hearers; and likewiſe upon the opinion they may have of the ſpeaker. Their opinion of the ſpeaker muſt depend upon the judgment that they form of three things concerning him; firſt, his wiſdom and his underſtanding of the ſubject; next, his virtue and good diſpoſitions; and, laſtly, his good will and affection towards the hearers. If he want the firſt of theſe, he cannot argue the cauſe properly; if the ſecond, he may miſlead the hearers deſignedly; and although he want neither of theſe, but have not good will to the hearers, he may not be at ſufficient pains to inform them. For the moral character of the ſpeaker or hearers, and their prudence and underſtanding, Ariſtotle refers us to what he has ſaid in his books of Morals. But, as to their affections and paſſions, he has treated of them very fully in his ſecond book upon Rhetoric.

Ariſtotle, in the 12th chapter of this ſe-

cond book, mentions four things which influence the judgment of men; *1mo*, their παθη, or Paſſions; *2do*, their ἑξεις, or Habits; *3tio*, their Age; and, laſtly, their Fortune or Condition in life: And he has told us what he means by each of theſe. The Paſſions, he ſays, are ſuch as anger, indignation, envy, and ſuch like. By Habits, he ſays, he means diſpoſitions virtuous or vitious, and which are called in Greek th τα ηθη, as diſtinguiſhed from the τα παθη. By Age he means youth, manhood, or old age: And by Fortune he means birth, wealth, and power, or the oppoſite of theſe; and in general, good or bad fortune. The paſſions he has explained at great length, beginning with Anger, on which he has beſtowed a pretty long chapter, explaining the diſpoſitions of men who are liable to anger, with whom they are angry, and for what reaſon *. In the next chapter he explains what he calls πραϋνσις, that is, the appeaſing and quieting

* Lib. 2. De Rhetor. cap. 2.

of anger. In the next chapter he proceeds to tell us what Love and Hatred is, and to explain the difference betwixt anger and hatred. In the fifth chapter he lets us know what Fear is, what things are frightful, and how thoſe who are afraid are affected. In like manner he, in the next chapter, explains what Shame is, and alſo what the want of it is. And in the two next chapters he explains what Gratitude is, and then what Pity is. After this he lets us know what Indignation is; what Envy, and what Emulation, in ſo many different chapters. All theſe ſeveveral paſſions he has explained and defined with philoſophical accuracy: Nor indeed do I think that all that has been written upon the paſſions in antient or modern times will give ſo much pleaſure and inſtruction to the philoſopher, as theſe few chapters of Ariſtotle* And I think it

* He has obſerved in our paſſions that wonderful mixture of things ſo oppoſite as pain and pleaſure; and I am much pleaſed with his quotations from Homer, which prove that he knew this mixture as well

may be ſaid in general of theſe books of Rhetoric, that there is no work extant from which we can learn ſo much of human nature, and even of what is called the knowledge of the world: For Ariſtotle appears to me to have ſtudied with wonderful attention the affairs of men, and the buſineſs of human life, much more than could be expected from a man engaged in ſuch philoſophical ſpeculations, and who has formed the moſt compre-

as Ariſtotle; particularly with reſpect to anger, which is certainly a very uneaſy paſſion; yet he ſays at the ſame time it has a ſweetneſs like that of honey.

'Ος τε πολυ γλυκιων μελιτος αλειβομενοιο
Ανδρων εν στηθεσσι αεξεται;

for which Ariſtotle has accounted very well, lib. 2. cap. 2. and lib. 1. cap. 11. And even as to grief and lamentation, in which one ſhould think there was nothing but pain and affliction, Homer, he obſerves, (ibid. lib. 1. cap. 11.) has found out that there is a certain pleaſure in the indulgence of grief,

'Ως φατο, τοισι δε πασι επ' 'ιμερον ωρσε γοοιο.'

So that it appears Homer was acquainted with all the movements of the human mind, even thoſe the moſt removed from common apprehenſion.

henſive ſyſtem of philoſophy that I believe ever was formed by any one man. Theſe books I would alſo recommend to the ſtudy not only of the philoſopher, but of the ſcholar and grammarian, who will there learn the propriety of all the Greek words that are uſed upon the ſubject of the characters, ſentiments, affections, and paſſions of men, a ſubject of very great extent, comprehending what is moſt pleaſing and intereſting in human life. And, if he is a man of taſte, he will be extremely pleaſed with the ſtile, which well deſerves the character that Cicero has given of it *, and is, I think, a perfect model of the Didactic.

In the ſecond chapter Ariſtotle has given us a great many γνωμαι, or ſententious ſayings, applicable to the paſſions and characters of men: And he obſerves very juſtly, that the uſe of theſe makes the ſtile what the Greeks call *ethical*, that is, expreſſive of the manners of men †. He

* P. 44. of this vol.

† Rhetor. lib. 2. cap. 21.

gives us alſo a great number of Enthymemas, or arguments upon this ſubject: But they are all included in thoſe general topics mentioned in the dialectic; ſo that here in his Rhetoric he does no more than apply them to the ſentiments and paſſions of men.

CHAP. VI.

Of the diviſion of Rhetoric into Deliberative, Judicial, and Epideictic.—This diviſion was firſt made by Ariſtotle, and ariſes from the nature of ſpeech, in which there muſt be a ſpeaker, hearer, and ſubject.—Ariſtotle firſt made a ſcience of Rhetoric, as well as of other things.—The ſubject of the three kinds of Rhetoric explained.—A threefold diviſion of Rhetoric, taken from the end which it propoſes.—Rhetoric addreſſed not only to many, but to one.—Therefore of univerſal uſe in human life.—Of the ſubjects of which deliberative Rhetoric treats, and the things neceſſary to be known by an orator of that kind.—Under the head of Deliberative Eloquence, he treats of happineſs, which is the end of all deliberation.—Every advantage of mind or body to be wiſhed for, there enumerated.—Of the idea of good, *without which there can be no happineſs.—That*

belongs to the intellectual part of our mind.—The ſubject of the Epideictic is the το καλον.—*Two definitions of that given;—but they are only popular deſcriptions.—Under that head, and in the chapter upon Happineſs, every thing is enumerated that is beautiful and praiſe-worthy in human life.—Of the Judicial kind of Rhetoric.—The ſubject of it Injury and Injuſtice.—Here every thing that is bad in human nature is ſet before us.—His threefold diviſion upon the ſubject of Injury and Injuſtice.—This diviſion moſt accurate and complete.—Of the motives to Injury.*—What is pleaſant *is the chief motive.—Definition of Pleaſure.—Of the pleaſures of ſenſe.—Imagination a weaker kind of ſenſe.—It makes things both paſt and future give us pleaſure, as if they were preſent;—even things diſagreeable that are paſt.—The pleaſure in grief and hope accounted for in that way.—Self-love, and the pleaſure we take in ourſelves, in that way accounted for.—The ſecond thing to be conſidered with regard to Injury, is the character and diſpoſitions*

of the perſon who injures.—Here a complete character of a villain is given.—The third and laſt thing belonging to Injury is an account of the perſons moſt liable to be injured.—And thus is completed his account both of the villain and of villainy.—Concluſion of this book, and of what is to be ſaid upon the matter *of Rhetoric.*

I COME now to ſpeak of the three kinds of Rhetoric I mentioned in the beginning of this book, the Deliberative, the Judicial, and the Epideictic; a diviſion taken from the ſubject of Rhetoric, and firſt made by Ariſtotle, as well as the diviſion of the arguments uſed upon theſe ſubjects. And indeed it appears to me, that Ariſtotle firſt made a ſcience of rhetoric, as well as of dialectic; and I believe I may add of morals, natural philoſophy, and metaphyſics. This diviſion of the ſubjects of rhetoric he has explained moſt accurately and philoſophically in the third chapter

of his firſt book of Rhetoric, where he tells us that there are three things to be conſidered in all ſpeech, namely, the ſpeaker, the perſon to whom he ſpeaks, and the ſubject upon which he ſpeaks; and all the three are of abſolute neceſſity, ſo that no ſpeech can be conceived without them. Beſides, there is the end or purpoſe of ſpeaking: And this neceſſarily refers to the hearer, who is either only to form an opinion of what he hears, and is ſimply what Ariſtotle calls θεωρος; or he is to determine and act, and him Ariſtotle calls Κριτης. And it is either upon things paſt or things to come that he is to determine. If it is upon things paſt, he is what we call a judge; if upon things to come, he is a ſenator, or a member of any aſſembly that deliberates upon ſuch things. If again he does no more than ſpeculate, and only forms opinions, it muſt be upon the ſubject of qualities, powers, and faculties; all which Ariſtotle has expreſſed by the ſingle word of Δυναμεις. And thus, ſays he, we have of neceſſity three kinds of rhetorical ſpeech, the deliberative, the ju-

dicial, and the epideictic or demonſtrative, as it is improperly called *. Then he goes on, ſtill dividing with his uſual accuracy, and tells us that the deliberative conſiſts either of Exhortation or Dehortation, προτροπη or αποτροπη, as he expreſſes it, that is, *adviſing* or *diſuading*. The judicial conſiſts of Accuſation or Defence, that is, κατηγορια or απολογια; for, as I have obſerved †, it was not the cuſtom in Athens to plead upon matters of civil right, or points of law, as we call them. And, laſtly, the ſubject of the epideictic is either praiſe or blame.

Rhetoric, as well as every other art, muſt propoſe ſome end. The general end of Rhetoric, as I have ſaid ‡, is to perſuade. This is divided according to the three different kinds of rhetoric. The end of the deliberative is to perſuade what is uſeful, and diſuade what is hurtful: And to inforce this, it inſiſts up-

* See p. 28. of this vol.

† P. 27. ‡ P. 20.

on what is juſt or unjuſt, what is honourable and praiſe worthy, or otherwiſe. The end of the Judicial Rhetoric is the juſt or the unjuſt; and to inforce this, it aſſumes the other things I have juſt now mentioned. In praiſing or diſpraiſing, our object is the beautiful and honourable, or the contrary, and whatever has any reference to theſe *.

Having thus accurately divided and ſubdivided the ſubjects of rhetoric, he proceeds to explain the firſt kind of rhetoric, namely, the *Deliberative*. But, before I ſay any thing particular of it, it is proper to obſerve, that all the three kinds of rhetoric may not only be addreſſed to many hearers, but to one; though commonly in Greece, where the governments were popular, they were addreſſed to the many. But, that they may be addreſſed alſo to one, he has expreſsly told us in the eighteenth chapter of his ſecond book. With reſpect to judicial proceedings, they are often, a-

* Lib. 1. cap. 3.

mong us, before one judge; and as we plead before one ſingle perſon, ſo we may alſo adviſe a ſingle perſon, and likewiſe appeal to his judgment when we praiſe or diſpraiſe any perſon. And thus it appears, that the rhetoric of Ariſtotle is of univerſal uſe in human life.

Our author, in his firſt book, has given us ſeveral chapters upon deliberative rhetoric; and, as that which deliberates upon public affairs is of the greateſt importance, he mentions the ſeveral ſubjects of public deliberation, which, with his uſual accuracy, he divides into five claſſes *, and ſhortly mentions what it is neceſſary that a ſpeaker ſhould know with reſpect to each of theſe articles, in order to be able to give good advice concerning them. But he tells us what is very true, that the knowledge of theſe things belongs to the political ſcience, and not to rhetoric.

The next chapter treats of a great ſub-

* Lib. 1. cap. 4.

ject—Happineſs; which, he ſays, is the end of all deliberation and conſultation about what we are to do or not to do. And here we have a moſt full enumeration of all the things that make a life happy and proſperous, belonging either to mind or body, and every thing moſt accurately defined and explained. And particularly with reſpect to the body, we have explained, better than any where elſe that I know, what a παλαιστικος is, what a πυκτικος, what a παγκρατιαστικος and what a πενταθλος. All theſe exerciſes were very much practiſed by the Greeks, and gave a ſtrength and vigour to their bodies which is unknown in modern times.

With the ſubject of this chapter is much connected the ſubject of the next, which is the το αγαθον, or *what is good;* without which there can be no happineſs. It is a more determined and more philoſophical idea than that of Happineſs; for, as Ariſtotle has explained it, it belongs entirely to the intellectual part of our nature, and to that governing principle in us which

directs the conduct of our lives, and provides for every thing that is conducive to the welfare of mind or body. And as we often debate about what is the greater good, which must always be the case when two things both good are presented to us, he has given us a long chapter upon the subject of the comparison of good things, where he has furnished a great number of topics to enable us to determine what is the greater, and what is the lesser good *.

The next kind of rhetoric, he considers, is the Epideictic, the subject of which is praise or dispraise. And here we have a very long and fine chapter †, wherein we have all the Virtues enumerated, and shortly, but very accurately defined and explained. As Virtue belongs to the το καλον, or the beautiful, and is inseparable from it, according to the notions of the ancients, he speaks a great deal of it, and has given us two definitions of it. The first is,

* Lib. 1. cap. 7.

† Lib. 1. cap. 9.

That, which being eligible for its own ſake, is praiſe-worthy. The other is, *That, which being good, is pleaſant becauſe it is good.* The laſt I like the beſt, becauſe it mentions a quality of the το καλον, which diſtinguiſhes it from every thing elſe belonging to man, namely, that it gives pleaſure, not pleaſure of every kind, but a pleaſure ariſing from what is good. They are both, however, rather deſcriptions than definitions properly ſo called: For they only tell us certain qualities and effects of the thing, not what it is itſelf, or what conſtitutes its eſſence *; but they are ſufficient for the purpoſe of this work, of which the ſubject, as he has more than once told us, is not any particular ſcience, ſuch as that of morals. There is, however, in this chapter, what may be called an abridgment of his work upon morals. And in it, and the other chapters of this

* See what I have ſaid on this ſubject, in vol. 2d. of Ant. Metaph. p. 105, and following; where, I think, I have mentioned that which is of the eſſence of the *Beautiful*, and without which it cannot be conceived to exiſt.

book upon the ſubject of happineſs, and the το αγαθον, you have every thing enumerated and deſcribed that is beautiful, praiſe-worthy, pleaſant, and agreeable in human nature or in human life, more accurately, though ſhortly, than is any where elſe to be found: Nor is there any thing that I read with more pleaſure or more inſtruction.

The laſt kind of rhetoric is the Judicial, the ſubjects of which, among the Greeks, was only, as I obſerved, accuſation and defence. Injury, therefore, and Injuſtice, were in this kind of rhetoric the topics of argument. And here we have diſplayed to us, by our author, all the crimes and vices of men, as in the former part of the work we had exhibited to us all their virtues and good qualities; ſo that in this work of Ariſtotle we have the whole of human nature, what is good and what is bad in it, ſet before us.

The ſubject of Injury and Injuſtice he

has divided as accurately as any other ſubject which he treats: For having told us what injuſtice is, he inquires, firſt, from what motives men commit injuſtice; ſecondly, in what ſituation, in what circumſtances, and how diſpoſed they are when they do ſo; and, thirdly, Who are the perſons that are moſt liable to be injured? And this is a diviſion which undoubtedly exhauſts the ſubject *. In his inquiry into the motives of injuries, he has enumerated all the cauſes of the actions of men; and he tells us, that every thing, we do voluntarily, proceeds from our apprehenſion of its being either good or pleaſant. What is Good he had already explained, in what he had ſaid upon deliberative rhetoric; and he now explains, in one of the longeſt chapters of the whole work, what Pleaſure is.

Pleaſure he defines to be 'a certain motion of the mind;' but as all our motions, both of mind and body, muſt be in con-

* Lib. 1. cap. 10.

formity to our nature, he adds, 'That it is a 'conſtituting or placing of our mind, by a 'movement quick and ſenſible, into a na-'tural ſtate,' that is, a ſtate ſuch as the nature and diſpoſition of our mind at the time requires: 'And the oppoſite of this is 'Pain *.' As all pleaſure, therefore, is according to nature, and as cuſtom is, according to a common ſaying, a ſecond nature, it follows from thence, that what we are accuſtomed to is pleaſant. But he tells us at the ſame time, that change is alſo pleaſant: For always the ſame becomes at laſt an exceſs of the habit or diſpoſition of the mind, from which a change relieves it.

* Ariſtotle's words are, Ὑποκειϭθω δ' ἡμιν, ειναι την ἡδονην, κινησιν τινα της ψυχης, και καταϭταϭιν, αθροαν και αιϭθητην, εις την ὑπαρχουϭαν φυϭιν· λυπην δε, τουναντιον. *Rhetoricor.* lib. 1. cap. 11. Here the reader will obſerve the expreſſion ὑπαρχουϭαν φυϭιν, where according to the propriety of the Greek language, the word ὑπαρχουϭαν denotes, as I have tranſlated it, the ſtate of the mind at the time the pleaſure is felt. So that this definition will comprehend what we would call the moſt unnatural pleaſures, if, at the time, they be deſired by the mind.

The pleaſures of ſenſe he juſt mentions, being well known to every body: But he adds what is not commonly known, that the Phantaſia, or imagination, is a kind of weaker ſenſe; and therefore what our imagination preſents to us, whether it be paſt or to come, if it be a pleaſant object, gives us pleaſure. And even things which were not agreeable, when they were preſent, after they are paſt, give us pleaſure in remembering them, ſuch as dangers that we have eſcaped, eſpecially if we have eſcaped them by prudence and reſolution; and here, as upon other occaſions, he very properly quotes two lines of Homer *. It is imagination, too, that makes the pleaſure of grief above mentioned, as he has very well explained it: For, ſays he, a man, that grieves for the loſs of a friend, has that friend ſo repreſented to him by his imagination, that he ſeems to ſee him, and enjoys, in ſome ſort, the

* ——Μετα γαρ, και αλγεσι τερπεται ανηρ,
Μεμνημενος, ὁστις πολλα παθη, και πολλα ἰωχμη.

pleaſure that he enjoyed in his company, converſation, and actions. From the imagination of things to come, he accounts for the pleaſure of anger, above mentioned; and in general, of all things which we deſire and hope for: For, ſays he, if we hope for a thing, we ſee it as preſent. In ſhort, he gives a philoſophical account of all our pleaſures, and even of the pleaſure we have in ourſelves, or what is commonly called ſelf-love: For, ſays he, all animals love and delight in what is congenial to them, thus a man has pleaſure in a man, a horſe in a horſe, and ſo on with reſpect to other animals. Now nothing can be more congenial to a man than himſelf: Therefore he loves himſelf, and every thing belonging to himſelf; ſuch as his works and his productions of every kind, and among others, his children.

The next chapter preſents to us the worſt face of human nature; for it de-

* Lib. 1. cap. 12.

ſcribes thoſe diſpoſitions of the mind which form the character of an unjuſt and wicked man. This was the ſecond thing he propoſed to ſpeak to, upon the ſubject of injury and injuſtice. And here he has given us a moſt accurate portrait of the character of a villain, ſo full and complete, that I think it is impoſſible to add any thing to it*.

In the ſame chapter he deſcribes the perſons who are moſt liable to be injured, which was the third thing he propoſed upon this ſubject. And on this head, as in every part of this work, he has ſhewn a wonderful knowledge of the world, and of the ways of men. When we join with what he has ſaid upon this head, the deſcription of a villain under the former head, we have a full and moſt accurate picture of villainy, as well as of a villain.

To enter into all the particulars under

* Lib. 1. cap. 12.

thoſe two heads, would carry me much farther than is neceſſary or proper in a work, of which the intention is, as I have ſaid, not to give a complete treatiſe of Rhetoric, but only a general plan of this fine work of Ariſtotle, and to direct the attention of the reader to the ſeveral parts of it, which I think are of the greateſt importance. And indeed my chief deſign, in all that I have written upon the philoſophy or the learning of the antients, is to revive, if poſſible, the ſtudy of antient arts and ſciences, *veteres revocare artes*, as Horace expreſſes it, and to ſhew the reader that he cannot perfectly underſtand any art or ſcience without the ſtudy of thoſe unfaſhionable books to which I refer. Without that ſtudy, I think I have ſhewn, in my books of metaphyſics, that no man can be a philoſopher; and, in the ſecond volume of this work, I think I have alſo ſhewn, that no man can be a complete grammarian, nor perfectly comprehend in what the art of language conſiſts; and from what I have ſaid, and will further ſay in this volume, I hope to make it ap-

pear, that he cannot underſtand the principles of any of the fine arts; and in ſhort, that without the ſtudy of theſe antient books, he cannot be a ſcholar, a critic, or a man of true taſte, any more than a philoſopher.

And here I conclude this book, and all that I think it is proper to ſay upon the *matter* of Rhetoric. The ſubject of the next book will be the *ſtile* of Rhetoric.

BOOK II.

Of the Stile *of Rhetoric.*

CHAP. I.

The ornaments of Stile neceſſary for an orator who ſpeaks to the people.—If the audience are wiſe men, they will mind nothing but the matter; and all they will require, will be to underſtand the matter.—The Stile of the orators at firſt poetical;—but this corrected in later times.—Stile *conſiſts of words and the compoſition of words.—The laſt of theſe moſt difficult.—This illuſtrated from other arts.—Words divided into* proper *and* tropical.—*The proper ſignification muſt be well underſtood, otherwiſe we cannot know whether it be properly*

transferred to another ſignification.—Of proper words—there ſhould be a variety of them, ſignifying the ſame thing;—but not too great a variety, as in Arabic.—Of Homer's language;—more rich in ſynonymous words, only diverſified a little by ſome change in the ſound, than any other language in Greek.—Homer's language not compoſed of different Dialects, but the different Dialects made out of it.—An account how it comes to be ſo rich a language.—It is a dialect of the Shanſcrit which was the antient language of Egypt, that went both to India and Greece.—More variety of derivation, compoſition, and flection, in Homer, than in the other Greek Dialects;—but more variety ſtill in the Shanſcrit.—The definition of a Trope.—*Philoſophical account of Tropes given by Ariſtotle.—Of the* Metaphor.—*This word uſed in a large ſenſe by Ariſtotle;—but is only uſed in Rhetoric in the common ſenſe of the word, to denote a ſimilitude betwixt two things.—It is a Simile in one word.—*

Of the proper uſe of Metaphor, and of the abuſe of it.

THE Stile of Rhetoric, which is the ſubject of this ſecond book of mine, is the ſubject of Ariſtotle's third book, which he begins with obſerving, That if the hearers of rhetorical ſpeeches were ſuch as they ought to be, there would be no need of ornaments of ſpeech: They would require no more of the orator, than that he ſhould make himſelf underſtood, and not offend their ears; for it would be the matter they would mind, and not the words. But the hearers are ſuch, that they are not to be convinced by reaſon and argument only, without the blandiſhment of fine language. And if Demoſthenes and the other orators of Greece had ſpoken in the ſame way that Socrates did in his trial, who, as Plato and Xenophon inform us, diſdained to uſe any ornament of words, they would have been as unſucceſsful as he was. We muſt therefore add, to the definition I have given

of Rhetoric*, 'That the ſtile of it ſhould 'be different from common ſpeech.'

Ariſtotle, in the firſt chapter of this third book, tells us that the poets, by their diction, as well as by their numbers, pleaſed the people very much, and were much admired, though there was often very little ſenſe or matter in their works. In imitation of them, he ſays, the ſtile of the orators was at firſt very poetical; and he mentions Gorgias as ſpeaking in that ſtile. And, ſays he, there are many who ſtill admire this poetical ſtile of eloquence: But among the learned the diſtinction is clearly eſtabliſhed. And even the tragic poets, he ſays, write in a ſtile much more familiar, and liker to common ſpeech; ſo that it would be ridiculous to imitate thoſe who, themſelves, do not now compoſe in that ſtile.

Stile neceſſarily conſiſts of two things;

* P. 35 and 36.

Words, and the Compoſition of theſe words into ſentences or periods *. Of theſe two the laſt is the moſt difficult: And it is ſo in all arts, as well as in the writing or ſpeaking art. In painting, for example, it is more difficult to put together figures properly in a piece, than to paint the ſingle figures. In poetry, it is much more difficult to put together properly the ſeveral parts of a drama, or of an epic poem, than to invent particular incidents, and to adorn them with characters and manners. And every compoſer as well as performer in muſic, knows how much more difficult it is to put together properly the notes, ſo as to make a good piece of muſic, than to uſe the fineſt notes. But, as ſingle words are the materials of which all writing or ſpeaking is compoſed, we muſt begin with explaining the nature of them.

Words, with reſpect to ſtile and compoſition, are divided into proper, and tro-

* Vol. 3d. of this work, chap. 1.

pical, or figurative, as they are commonly, but improperly called. Theſe I have defined and diſtinguiſhed from one another, in the beginning of the third chapter of the third volume of this work: And from the definition there given, it is evident they are ſo connected, that the one cannot be underſtood without the other: For, if I do not know what the proper word ſignifies, it is impoſſible I can apply it juſtly in a tropical ſignification, by which it is transferred from its proper ſenſe to another which has a connection with that ſenſe. It is therefore a capital defect in Dr. Johnſon's Engliſh Dictionary, as I have elſewhere obſerved *, that he has not diſtinguiſhed the proper ſignification of words from the tropical uſe of them. This is an error which the French Academy has carefully avoided, and which makes their dictionary one of the moſt valuable dictionaries that we have in any language.

As there can be no beauty in any work,

* Vol. 5th. of this work, p. 274.

whether of nature or of art, without variety in a certain degree, ſo there can be no real beauty in language without a variety of words, and not of tropical words only, but of proper. For a language is much more agreeable and pleaſant to the ear, when it is not obliged to expreſs the ſame thing even by the ſame proper word, but can diverſify the ſpeech by ſome variety even of theſe words. At the ſame time this variety may be carried too far. For I have heard it obſerved of the Arabic, if my memory does not fail me, that it has very often ſix or ſeven words expreſſing the very ſame thing, without trope or figure. This, I think, makes the language too bulky and cumberſome. But the Greek, in this reſpect, as well as in every other, is more perfect than any language that I know: For it has a very conſiderable number of ſynonymes, but not too many.

The language of Homer is in this reſpect, as well as in every other, the moſt perfect that is to be found in Greek,

or in any other language that I underſtand: For he has not only many ſynonymes; but, by various terminations and flections, by adding, taking away, and inſerting letters, he has made the ſame word different from itſelf, without any change of the ſenſe; yet not ſo different, but that it is eaſily known to be the ſame by thoſe who have ſtudied the art of his language. Now we are not to ſuppoſe, as many do, that this variety of words was taken from the ſeveral dialects of the Greek, ſuch as the Doric, Ionic, Attic, &c.; for, in the firſt place, there is no evidence that thoſe dialects exiſted at the time that Homer wrote; or, if they did exiſt, they muſt have been formed out of the ſame language in which Homer wrote, not that language out of them. And, ſecondly, ſuppoſing thoſe dialects to have exiſted at the time Homer wrote, we cannot believe that any author, much leſs ſuch an author as Homer, would have written a mongrel Babyloniſh dialect, made out of the different dialects, then ſpoken in Greece, and which would not have been intelligible to any of the nations that ſpoke any one of thoſe dialects.

The fact, therefore, appears to be, that the language, in which Homer wrote, was the learned language of Greece, and the language of their poetry, the firſt writing among them *. Nor are we to wonder at its being ſo rich and copious, that it ſeems not to be one, but many languages; for there is a language ſtill exiſting, and preſerved among the Bramins of India, which is a richer, and in every reſpect a finer language than even the Greek of Homer. All the other languages of India have a great reſemblance to this language, which is called the Shanſcrit: But thoſe languages are dialects of it, and formed from it, not the Shanſcrit from them. Of this, and other particulars concerning this language, I have got ſuch certain information from India, that if I live to finiſh my hiſtory of man, which I have begun in my third volume of Antient Metaphyſics, I ſhall be able clearly to prove, that the Greek is

* It is upon record, that Phercydes was the firſt writer of proſe in Greek.

derived from the Shanſcrit, which was the ancient language of Egypt, and was carried by the Egyptians into India, with their other arts, and into Greece by the colonies which they ſettled there. This is a moſt curious and important fact in the hiſtory of man; but for our preſent purpoſe it is ſufficient to obſerve, that it is a great beauty of a language, to have ſuch a variety in the ſound of the ſame words, if that introduces no confuſion, and is agreeable to the rules by which the language is formed.

But though the Greek of later times has not that variety of ſound of the ſame word without any change of the ſignification, yet it has a great number of words which are ſimilar both in their ſound and ſignification, though not exactly denoting the ſame thing. Theſe are words formed by derivation, compoſition, and flection, the three great arts of language, without which it would have been impoſſible to have connected together millions of words, ſo that they could be comprehended in the

memory and readily uſed *. All theſe words, however different in their ſound and ſignification, come all under the denomination of words *proper*; for there is nothing in them that can be called trope or figure. But even in theſe the language of Homer is more rich than any other language in Greek, but not ſo rich as the original language, the Shanſcrit, in any of the three articles I mentioned, derivation, compoſition, or flection: And particularly it has in it words of wonderful compoſition, ſome of which I have been ſhewn.—And ſo much for proper words.

As to *tropical* words, it is not the difference of ſound merely that makes a trope, but there muſt be a change of the word from its native and genuine ſignification, to another that is different. In this way I have defined a trope, in the third volume of this work †, where I have

* Vol. 5. p. 434.

† Book 4. chap. 3. p. 24. and chap. 4. p. 32.

explained, at great length, the ſeveral kinds of tropes, very various and different one from another. But Ariſtotle has reduced them all to rule, and made philoſophy of them as well as of every thing elſe of which he has treated. See his definition of them, and his diviſion of them into four different kinds, which I have given in the laſt chapter quoted of the third volume *.

In poetry all the different tropes are uſed, and particularly by Homer, as I have ſhewn in the fourth chapter above quoted; but in the rhetorical ſtile there is hardly any other trope uſed except what is commonly called Metaphor, a word uſed by Ariſtotle to comprehend all tropes; and that, no doubt, is the true etymological ſenſe of the word. But we uſe it to denote only one of the four kinds of trope mentioned by Ariſtotle, and which he calls κατα το αναλογον, being taken from the reſemblance, ſimilitude, or

* Book 4. chap. 3. p. 37.

analogy that one thing has to another *. It is a trope not only much uſed in poetry and rhetoric, but in common ſpeech; and the reaſon is, that it both adorns the ſtile, and expreſſes the thing in a more lively and forcible manner; for a metaphor is a ſimile in one word. And, if it be taken from any great ſubject, it magnifies the thing ſpoken of: But, on the other hand, if it be taken from a low ſubject, it leſſens and vilifies the thing. And as extolling or depreciating is uſed in all the three different kinds of rhetoric, it is of very general uſe in the art; and Ariſtotle ſpeaks of it as the only trope proper to be uſed in proſe compoſition †.

I have ſaid a good deal about the proper uſe of this trope, in the fourth chapter above referred to, where I have inculcated what I have before obſerved, in this chapter ‡, that we muſt perfectly underſtand

* Ibid. p. 37 and 38.

† Lib. 3. Rhet. cap. 2.

‡ P. 94.

the meaning of the proper word, and alſo the meaning of the tropical word which we uſe in place of it. The knowledge, therefore, of both, is abſolutely neceſſary, and they muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed one from another: So that, as I have obſerved *, a dictionary of any language, which does not accurately diſtinguiſh the two, beginning with the proper, and from thence deducing the metaphorical uſe of the word, is very imperfect of its kind. I have alſo ſhewn the abuſe of metaphors, by making them too frequent, and ſo making either a riddle of the compoſition, if the metaphors be not clear; or though they be clear, too many of them make a ſtile of ſimiles. And ſo much for ſingle words, which are the materials of compoſition.

* Vol. 3. p. 41 and 42.

CHAP. II.

Of Compoſition—*it gives a variety and beauty to Stile, which no choice of words can do;—is of greater difficulty than the choice of words—therefore neglected in modern times, and in later times among the antients.—All Stiles now of the ſame kind, affecting what is called* fine language.—*In Compoſition a progreſs as in other arts.—The ſteps of this progreſs, from the ſhorteſt ſentence to a period of ſeveral members.—There muſt have been a time for this progreſs—and the firſt compoſition muſt have been in ſhort ſentences.—This progreſs proved by facts, as well as by reaſoning.—The writings of Moſes an example of ſhort compoſition.—This kind of Stile imitated in later times by Saluſt and Tacitus among the Romans, and by ſome French and Engliſh writers.—A very bad Stile, eſpecially when it affects obſcurity.—Of*

the pleaſure that ſome have in decypher-ing ſuch a Stile.

I COME now to ſpeak of the ſecond part of Stile, namely, Compoſition; it is of ſo much greater power and influence than ſingle words, that the whole ſtile, as I have obſerved elſewhere *, is in Engliſh not improperly, I think, denominated from it: It is of ſo great variety as to make different ſtiles of the ſame words: And in the ſame ſtile it gives a variety which it is impoſſible any choice of words can give. It gives ſuch beauty to the ſtile, too, as well as variety, that in a paſſage that I have quoted from the Halicarnaſian †, he compares it to the rod of Minerva in Homer, which could tranſform a beggar into a king or hero, or, *vice verſa:* By which he means, that, of the moſt common words, good compoſition will make fine poetry or proſe; and con-

* Vol. 3. chap. 5. in the beginning.

† Ibid. p. 46.

trary ways, bad compoſition will diſgrace the beſt words: And he gives examples of both.

As compoſition, therefore, is of ſuch power and influence, and of ſuch beauty and variety, it is no wonder that it is of ſuch difficulty,—of much more difficulty than the choice of the words, which are only the elements of compoſition. This it has in common, as I have obſerved *, with compoſition in all arts. And this difficulty of the practice is the reaſon why not only in our times, but in the times of the Halicarnaſian, compoſition was ſo much neglected, and nothing ſtudied but the choice of words; and, as we all at preſent affect to write fine language, and think we cannot make it fine otherwiſe than by poetical words, metaphors, and figures of different kinds, the conſequence is, that we have no difference of ſtile ſuited to the different ſubjects, but all

* P. 93. of this volume.

write a language that is, as I have obſerved elſewhere, a motley mixture of the froth of rhetoric and the flowers of poetry *.

There muſt have been a progreſs in this art ſo various and ſo difficult; and it is a matter of ſome curioſity to trace this progreſs, which, I think, we can do from monuments yet exiſting. But before we do that, we muſt recollect that there is no compoſition, properly ſo called, but of words, more or fewer, making ſome ſenſe by themſelves: For if any number of words be collected together, but make no ſenſe of any kind, it is not compoſition, any more than a diſorderly collection of the materials of any other art. Compoſition, therefore, neceſſarily conſiſts of a certain number of words, having a certain meaning; and this is what we call, in Engliſh, a *Sentence*. Now this compoſition may conſiſt of more or fewer words.

* See what I have ſaid further upon this ſubject, in the third diſſertation which I have annexed to the 2d. vol. of this work.

It cannot be of fewer than two: But it may be of many more. When the words are few, it is a ſhort ſentence; when they are many, it is a long ſentence: And when that long ſentence is divided into what we call members, which make by themſelves ſome kind of ſenſe, but an imperfect one, and dependent upon the ſenſe of the whole ſentence, then there begins to be beauty and variety, if theſe members be well compoſed, and fitly put together; and if there be in the whole ſentence a certain roundneſs and circumduction, making what we call a period, then is the compoſition complete, and truly rhetorical.

But was this perfection of compoſition attained at once? Or was there not a progreſs in it, as in other arts? And I think there was, as well as in every thing elſe belonging to language; unleſs we are to ſuppoſe that a language, ſuch as the Shanſcrit or the Greek, and fine ſpeaking and writing, came down to us from Heaven directly: But my opinion is, that, whatever aſſiſtance we may have got at firſt

from ſuperior intelligencies to enable us to invent the firſt elements of ſpeech, the reſt was left to our natural ſagacity. I therefore do not ſuppoſe that men, when they firſt began to ſpeak and write, did put together many words in ſentences; nay, I do not believe that when they firſt began to articulate, they put together many ſyllables in words. And I think the Chineſe language is a living proof of this: For it conſiſts entirely of monoſyllables, and without any change, in theſe monoſyllables, of the order or poſition of the letters, or any thing reſembling what we call flection; and the only variety they give them, is by different tones, ſo different, that they make the ſame monoſyllable ſometimes ſignify nine or ten different things. Now the Chineſe language, as well as the nation, is certainly of very great antiquity; and, I believe, it was the original language of Egypt long before the Shanſcrit was invented; and from Egypt it travelled into India, and from India came with ſome other Egyptian arts

into China *. Nor ſhould this ſlow progreſs of language appear wonderful to thoſe who conſider the imperfect ſtate of languages at this day, many of which have not all the elemental ſounds; or rather there are few that have them all. The Chineſe language wants ſeveral of them; and even our Engliſh wants one of them, namely, the Greek *ypſilon*, or French *u*, inſtead of which we pronounce the Greek diphthong ευ.

Such being the progreſs, therefore, of the invention of letters, ſyllables, and words, there muſt, I think, have been a ſimilar progreſs in the compoſition of words. The ſenſe muſt have been at firſt concluded in a few words; and the compoſition would conſiſt of a number of theſe ſhort ſentences, not connected toge-

* See Salmaſius *Hellenijtica*, p. 390. and 391. where he maintains, as I do, that the moſt antient languages conſiſted of words only of one, or very few ſyllables. Of this he gives ſeveral examples from the antient Greek.

ther by the ſenſe, but independent of one another. If this were only conjecture, I ſhould think it a moſt probable one, and I think even neceſſarily deducible from the nature of the thing. But it is proved by fact as well as by reaſoning: For the moſt antient book extant is the writings of Moſes, which are compoſed almoſt all in that ſtile, without long ſentences, or any thing that can be called a period, keeping the ſenſe ſuſpended through many words. For proof of this, we need go no farther than the firſt verſes of the firſt chapter of Geneſis, where we have the creation of the world deſcribed in ſhort ſentences, without any thing of what we would call compoſition.

This ſtile, which was neceſſary before the art of compoſition was invented, is ſimple and pleaſant. But when it was ſtudied, as a beauty, by Salluſt and Tacitus and their modern imitators, it is, I think, very bad writing; for it is impoſſible that it can be beautiful, wanting art and that variety which is eſſential to beauty.

But in Salluſt I think it is tolerable; and though I cannot praiſe it, it does not give me offence. But where there is point and turn affected, and a ſtudied obſcurity, which is the caſe of Tacitus *, and ſome of his modern imitators, I think it is the worſt ſtile that can be written. There are, I know, readers that delight in decyphering ſuch enigmatical ſentences †, and flatter themſelves that they not only read but invent. But for my part, I have no ſuch pleaſure; and any time that I may have beſtowed upon expounding thoſe oracles of wiſdom that are ſuppoſed to be contained in the ſhort ſentences of Tacitus, I have thought very ill employed, not

* See what I have written on the ſtile of Tacitus, in vol. 3d. of this work, chap. 12. p. 210.

† This appears to have been the taſte of ſome readers in the days of Quintilian, who ſays, in his *Inſtitutiones Oratoricae*, lib. 8. cap. 2. *Pervaſit quidem jam multos iſta perſuaſio, ut id jam demum eleganter atque exquiſite dictum putent, quod interpretandum ſit. Sed auditoribus etiam nonnullis grata ſunt haec, quae cum intellexerint, acumine ſuo delectantur, et gaudent non quaſi audiverint ſed quaſi invenerint.*

finding in them at all that wiſdom which ſome think they diſcover in him; but only a very common ſenſe, and perhaps not a true one, or not belonging to the ſubject.

CHAP. III.

Compoſition in ſhort ſentences does not deſerve the name of compoſition.—Of Compoſition in longer ſentences.—The figures belonging to that compoſition of three kinds;—figures of the Syntax—of the Senſe—and of the Sound.—The difference of the arrangement of words in the learned languages and in the modern.—Words at a diſtance from one another connected together, in the learned languages, by genders, numbers, and caſes.—This produces a great effect in compoſition.—Milton has availed himſelf of the few caſes we have in Engliſh, to compoſe ſome fine periods.—The artificial compoſition in the learned languages not introduced at once.—A ſimpler compoſition uſed at firſt.—Our language is ſo crouded with conſonants and monoſyllables, that no compoſition could make it ſo

pleaſant as the Greek and Latin.—Objection to the artificial compoſition, that it makes the ſenſe obſcure.—This anſwered, and ſhewn that it has the contrary effect.—This artificial compoſition, ſo very various, has its bounds.—A bad art in this matter, as well as in other things.—Of the Figures of Syntax.—Some of theſe only proper for poetry.—Three of them may be uſed in oratory.—Elipſis, Parentheſis, and Repetition.—The Elipſis much uſed by Demoſthenes, and other Attic writers;—it gives a terſneſs and neatneſs to the ſtyle.—Parentheſis, a beautiful figure—much uſed by Demoſthenes;—in ſpeaking it has a wonderful good effect.—Repetition, moderately uſed, has likewiſe a good effect.—Of the figures of the ſenſe.—Theſe divided into three kinds, ſuch as are Pathetic, Ethic, and, laſtly, ſuch as only vary the form of the ſtile, ſo as to make it different from common ſpeech.—Of the Pathetic kind are Exclamation, Hyperbole, Epithets, Proſopopoea, and painting the ſubject.—Of the different uſe of theſe by

Cicero and Demoſthenes.—Of the Ethic kind, as many figures as there are manners and characters to be imitated.—Difference betwixt Poetry and Oratory with reſpect to theſe figures.—Of the Figures of Senſe of the third kind, without paſſion or characters.—Theſe without number.—An example given of the variety of this figure.

AFTER having given an account of the firſt words that were uſed by men, when a language of art came to be formed, and of what nature the firſt compoſition of words in ſpeech or writing was, I come now to treat of the ſeveral figures which diverſify compoſition, after it was formed into ſentences of ſome length: For a compoſition in ſhort ſentences of a few words, though making a complete ſenſe, hardly deſerves the name of compoſition.

The figures obſerved by grammarians are divided into three kinds, the figures of

Syntax or conſtruction; 2*dly*, figures of the ſenſe, that is, ſuch as affect the ſenſe of the words; and, *laſtly*, thoſe which may be called figures of the Sound, relating to the rhythm and melody of ſuch languages as the Greek and Latin.

Before I begin to ſpeak of theſe ſeveral figures, I think it is proper to ſay ſomething of the order and arrangement of words in Greek and Latin, compared with the arrangement of them in modern languages, ſuch as the Engliſh. This arrangement of the words is no figure of ſpeech, except where the tranſpoſition is violent and uncommon, and then it is called *Hyperbaton**, and may be reckoned among the figures of ſpeech: But, even where it is not ſo violent, it is proper to be taken notice of, as it makes the ſtile very different from common ſpeech.

From the great excellency of the grammar of the learned languages, which have

* See what I have ſaid of the Hyperbaton, vol. 4. p. 221.

numbers, genders, and caſes, and thereby connect their words together, it is evident that thoſe languages are not under the neceſſity of placing the words beſide one another which are joined together in conſtruction, but may have them at a conſiderable diſtance from one another, and in different order, ſometimes the one before the other, and ſometimes after *; whereas our language, wanting theſe three ways of connecting words, is obliged to connect its words chiefly by juxta-poſition, which makes the compoſition in our language very much ſtinted, and tediouſly uniform, compared with the Greek and Latin †.

* See what I have further ſaid of the variety of antient compoſition, p. 218. and following, of vol. 4th. and p. 245. and following of vol. 5th. where I have treated pretty fully of the difference betwixt antient and modern compoſition.

† In the fine ſpeech of Satan, in the beginning of the ſecond book of Paradiſe Loſt, we have an example of what may be done in compoſition by the variety of caſes of nouns. In Engliſh we have that variety only in our pronouns, and Milton has availed himſelf of it to make one of the fineſt periods in

But this artificial compoſition in the learned languages, was like other things of art, not brought to perfection at once, but by degrees. A much ſimpler compoſition would at firſt be uſed, and which was preſerved, even in later times, in laws, edicts, and decrees, and in familiar epiſtles*, in which the ſtile is much ſimpler, in this reſpect, than the oratorial, hiſtorical, or even the didactic. But when writing and ſpeaking came to be formed into an art, it would, in proceſs of time, be diſcovered, that the tranſpoſition

Engliſh, and which otherwiſe could not have been near ſo fine. It begins thus,

> Me tho' juſt right and the fixt laws of Heaven,
> Did firſt create your leader,———

I will ſay no more of it here, becauſe I have commented largely upon it in the 3d chap. of the 3d book of vol. 2d. and alſo in the 9th chap. of vol. 3d of this work, except to obſerve, that if the pronoun of the firſt perſon *I* had not had an accuſative different from the nominative, it would have been impoſſible for Milton to have given the period that roundneſs and compactneſs which it has.

* See p. 218. and 219. of vol. 4.

of words from the natural order of ſyntax, produces an agreeable variety in the compoſition; and when melody and rhythm came to be ſtudied, it was in ſome ſort of abſolute neceſſity. But though our liberty of compoſition were as great as in Greek and Latin, we have ſo many monoſyllables in our language, and words with ſo many conſonants crouded together, and theſe ſo different from one another, as not eaſily to coaleſce together in the ſame ſound, that it would be impoſſible, by any arrangement, to make a compoſition ſo pleaſant as that of Greek and Latin *.

It may be ojected to this artificial compoſition, that though it no doubt give a great variety to the ſtile, it makes it obſcure. But this objection I think I have anſwered in the third diſſertation, which

* See what I have further ſaid upon this ſubject, in the 2d vol. of this work, book 3. chap. 5. and 6. where I have ſhewn at what pains the Greeks were to make their language ſmooth and pleaſant to the ear.

I have annexed to my ſecond volume, where I think I have ſhewn, that in the beſt Greek oratorial compoſitions, ſuch as thoſe of Demoſthenes, the words are ſo arranged, that they draw the attention of the hearer or reader, and have more weight and emphaſis than if they were placed in what we would call the natural order. It is true, that it is difficult for one, who knows only Engliſh or ſome other modern languages, to underſtand the words arranged in a manner ſo different from that to which he has been accuſtomed: And though he may underſtand the words ſeparately and by themſelves, he will not be able to make out the meaning of them compoſed in a ſentence, till they are put into the order to which he has been accuſtomed, that is, the order in which a ſchool-boy conſtrues them. But, according to the Greek proverb, 'Fine things 'are difficult.' Uſe, however, makes them eaſy; and, as we are commonly taught the learned languages when we are young, we are ſoon reconciled to a compoſition which at firſt appeared ſo unna-

tural to us. And it becomes at laſt not only more pleaſant to our ears, but it conveys the meaning more clearly and forcibly to us, eſpecially if the compoſition be in good periods, than any other arrangement of the words.

But we are not to imagine that this arrangement, however various it may be, (and it was certainly very various, eſpecially in their oratorial compoſitions), was without bounds and limits: For it is not every artificial compoſition that is claſſical; and there is bad art in this matter as well as good. To be convinced of this, we need only compare the compoſition of Ammianus Marellinus, or of the later Latin writers, with the compoſition of Cicero, Julius Caeſar, or any writer of the Auguſtan age. And if ſuch a compoſition as that of Ammianus is critically compared with theſe compoſitions of a better age and taſte, it will be found that what makes the difference chiefly is, the poſition of the words, which in the one

are ſo placed, as to anſwer beſt to the ſenſe, and at the ſame time to make the ſtile numerous and pleaſing to the ear.

I come now to ſpeak of what is properly called Figures of compoſition, beginning with the figures of conſtruction. Of theſe I have treated ſo fully, in volume 3d. chapter 6. that I have very little to add here, except that there are many Figures mentioned there, which are not at all proper for proſe compoſition, but are uſed by the poets, particularly Homer, which give a variety to the poetic ſtile, and yet at the ſame time do not make it obſcure, as I think I have ſhewn from the examples I have given. The *Paronomaſia*, and the *Pariſoſis*, are very much uſed by poets and by ſome orators, but I think ought to be very ſparingly uſed by thoſe who ſpeak upon buſineſs, and not for mere ſhow and oſtentation, which was the caſe of the Epideictic orators. And I think there are only three of the figures which I have mentioned that are proper for all orations: And theſe are, the *Ellipſis*, the *Parenthe-*

ſis, and *Repetition*: As to *Ellipſis*, it is a figure much uſed by the Attic writers of all kinds, as well as their orators. And indeed it is a diſtinguiſhing mark of that dialect, which gives it a terſeneſs and neatneſs, free from all kind of froth and ſuperfluity; and by Demoſthenes particularly it is very much uſed, and, I think, contributes not a little to that δεινοτης, as it was called, which condenſed his ſtile ſo much, and brought it ſo forcibly home to the hearers. The parentheſis, too, he has very much uſed; and ſometimes even parentheſis within parentheſis *, of which I have given an example †. It is alſo much uſed by poets, and particularly by Milton, from whom I have given moſt beautiful examples of it: And indeed I know no figure that adorns any kind of writing more. In ſpeaking it has a wonderful effect, if it be well compoſed and well pronounced. And even in writing, though not intended for ſpeaking, it varies the

* See vol. 3d. of this work, p. 74.

† Ibid.

ſtile agreeably: For the teſt of good writing, as I have elſewhere obſerved, is reading it, and what does not pleaſe the ear when well read, I ſay, is not well written. But beſides pleaſing the ear, if the matter of it be of weight, I ſay, that matter is more forcibly conveyed to the reader, ſtanding by itſelf, than if it was mixed with the reſt of the ſentence. But in our modern writing this figure is much out of faſhion: There is hardly a parentheſis to be found in the French books now publiſhed; and I have heard it obſerved of our faſhionable writer Mr Gibbons, that in his hiſtory, at leaſt in the firſt volumes of it that were publiſhed, there is not a parentheſis to be found. And I think it is likely to be true, as it is very well known that he has formed his taſte of writing upon the French authors.

The laſt figure I mentioned is *Repetition*, which is a figure uſed in all kinds of writing and ſpeaking. Of this, too, in the chapter above quoted, I have given ſome beautiful examples: But it may be intem-

perately uſed, as well as any other figure; and of this likewiſe I have given an example from Cicero *.

I come now to ſpeak of the figures of the ſenſe or meaning. Theſe, ſays Quintilian, are ſo many that they cannot be numbered: But I think they may be reduced to certain claſſes, and accordingly I have divided them into three; *firſt*, ſuch as expreſs ſome feeling or emotion of the mind; *ſecondly*, ſuch as expreſs the character or manners of the ſpeaker or writer; and, *thirdly*, ſuch as without expreſſing either of theſe, give a turn and form to the thought and expreſſion, different from what is uſual in common ſpeech. Under one or other of theſe heads may be ranked, as I imagine, every figure of this kind that can be deviſed †.

Of all theſe three kinds I have, in the chapter below quoted, mentioned different

* See vol. 3d. of this work, p. 80.

† Ibid. chap. 6. p. 107.

figures, beginning with thoſe belonging to the Pathetic, of which kind one is *Exclamation*, little uſed by the orators of Greece, and not at all by Demoſthenes, but very much by Cicero. Then I ſpeak of *Hyperbole*, not very much uſed by the beſt poets, and hardly at all by ſuch orators as Demoſthenes. Next I mention *Epithets*, more proper for the poetical ſtile than the oratorial, and therefore not much uſed by orators who write a chaſte and correct ſtile. Then I ſpeak of *Proſopopoea*, a figure entirely poetical, and not uſed by any Greek orator, as far as I can recollect: But Cicero has thought proper to adorn his ſtile with it *.

The laſt figure of the Pathetic I ſhall mention, is what is called in Greek διατυπωσις, that is, a particular and circumſtantial deſcription of a thing, ſuch as may be called painting it, for the purpoſe of exciting any paſſion. It is a figure belonging more to poetry than oratory. It is how-

* Vol. 3d. p. 115.

ever ſometimes uſed by orators, and I have given an example where it is uſed by Demoſthenes; but with a difference which I have obſerved betwixt the poetical and oratorial uſe of this figure *. But Cicero has not obſerved this diſtinction, as I have ſhewn, in a deſcription of his, which may be called a piece of Dutch painting †.

As to the figures of the Ethic kind, theſe I have explained in the eight chapter of the ſame third volume, where I think I have made the proper diſtinction betwixt deſcribing a character and imitating a character. It is a figure belonging both to poetry and oratory; but in different reſpects: For it is chiefly his own character which the orator repreſents; whereas the poet has nothing to do at all to appear himſelf in his piece. One ſpecies of this figure is very well known, viz. *Irony*; but there are as many ſpecieſes of it, as

* Vol. 3d. p. 118.

† Ibid. p. 119.

there are different characters and manners to be imitated *.

The laſt figures of the ſenſe, according to my diviſion of them, are ſuch, as without expreſſing either character or paſſion, give a turn or form to the thought and expreſſion, different from what is uſual in common ſpeech: Of theſe I have mentioned ſome particular figures, ſuch as interrogation, antitheſis, ſimile, and allegory †. But of the figures of this kind it may be truly ſaid what Quintilian ſays of all figures of the ſenſe, that they cannot be numbered. Of this I think I have given a proof from Milton, in Satan's ſpeech in the council of the devils ‡, which I have taken down and put up again in three different ways, ſhewing how the ſame ſenſe may be varied by different compoſitions.

* P. 136. of vol. 3d. and following.

† Ibid. chap. 9. p. 143.

‡ Ibid. p. 138. and following.

CHAP. IV.

Of the third claſs of the figures of language which affect the ſound, viz. the Melody and the Rhythm.—The meaſured Rhythm or verſification of the antient languages, to be treated of in the book upon Poetry;—but of the Rhythm of their proſe, ſomething to be ſaid in this book.—Of the melody of ſpeech.—The difference betwixt that melody and the melody of muſic.—It has a greater reſemblance to the Recitativo of the Italian opera, than any other muſic we know;—but differs from that alſo.—The Melody therefore of Language, a muſical tone flowing through the whole ſpeech, not riſing too often nor too high.—No language perfect without it.—Origin of the Melody of Language.—Singing more natural to man than

ſpeech.—This the moſt difficult of all human inventions.—Men therefore ſung before they ſpoke.—Language, as well as the race of men, came from the ſouth and eaſt.—People of theſe countries more muſical than the people of the north and weſt.—When men began to ſpeak, they joined muſic with their articulation. —Of the melody of the Chineſe language. —This a moſt wonderful language.—Particular information which the author had concerning that language.—The Chineſe firſt uſed muſical tones, before they learned to articulate.—This they learned from Egypt.—Progreſs of the art there. —Anſwer to thoſe who deny that ever a language exiſted with melody.—This proved from facts.—The melody of language loſt in all degenerate languages. —Of the variety of melody in the Greek language.—Not the ſame variety in the Latin.—Melody, therefore, not ſo much ſtudied in the Latin compoſition.

I COME now to ſpeak of the third claſs of figures of compoſition, according to the method in which I have ranked them; theſe have nothing to do with the ſyntax, or the ſenſe of the words, but relate altogether to the ſound; for they belong to the proſody of the learned languages, which makes what the Halicarnaſian calls the Melody of Language, and to the rhythm, of which the antients compoſed their verſe and numerous proſe. Of this laſt I propoſe to ſay ſomething in this part of my work, leaving what I have to ſay of the antient verſe to the laſt volume of this work, in which I am to treat of the Stile of Poetry. As to the proſody or melody of the antient languages, I have ſaid a good deal in the fourth chapter of the ſecond book of the ſecond volume of this work. But, as it is ſo little underſtood at preſent, even by thoſe who call themſelves ſcholars, that ſome deny even the exiſtence of it, and do not believe that any people ever ſpoke, or that they could ſpeak, as I ſuppoſe the Greeks and Ro-

mans did*, I think it is neceſſary to add here a good deal more upon the ſubject.

In the firſt place, as I have obſerved in the above mentioned fourth chapter, p. 271, there are many who value themſelves much upon their knowledge of Proſody, yet do not ſo much as know what the word means: For they confound it with rhythm, and think it denotes the quantity, or length and ſhortneſs of the ſyllables; whereas it has nothing to do with that, but relates to a thing quite different, viz.

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, in vol. 5th. of this work, p. 443, where I have ſhewn not only that it is poſſible to ſpeak in this way, but that there is a nation actually exiſting in North America, who do at this day ſpeak ſo. If the reader will not believe this fact, let him attend to the way in which the Cuckow pronounces his name, and he will find that there is both melody and rhythm in that pronunciation: For the accent upon the firſt ſyllable is a *third* above the tone of the laſt ſyllable, but which is longer than the firſt, and in the ratio of *two* to *one*, as far as my ear can judge. Now I think we may ſuppoſe, that ſuch muſical nations as the Greeks and Romans, had as much, or more, muſic in their pronunciation than the Cuckow.

the muſical tones which the Greeks and Latins gave to the ſyllables of their words, and which made their language truly melodious, and is therefore very properly called by the Halicarnaſian, the *Melody* of the Language. The Latins have a word compoſed in the ſame manner as the Greek word προσωδία, and denoting preciſely the ſame thing, I mean the word *accentus*, which does not mean, as ſome ignorant people may think, what we call *accent*, a thing ſo entirely unknown to the Greeks and Romans, that they had not ſo much as a name for it *.

There are others who do not diſtinguiſh betwixt the melody of ſpeech and the melody of muſic; ſo that they ſuppoſe the antients ſung or chaunted when they ſpoke. This miſtake I have alſo taken notice of in p. 286, of the ſecond volume, and have ſhewn, from authority which cannot be diſputed, that the difference betwixt the two was, that the melody of

* See vol. 4th. p. 32.

ſpeech was συνεχης or εν ῥοῃ, that is, *proceeded by ſlides*, whereas the melody of muſic was *diaſtematic*, as they expreſſed it, that is, *the notes did not run into one another, but were diſtinguiſhed by perceptible intervals*. The likeſt thing we have in modern times to the antient melody of ſpeech, is the Recitativo of the Italian opera, which I hold to be a very valuable remain of the antient theatrical muſic. But it differs from that Recitativo in this material point, that the notes of the recitativo are diſtinguiſhed from one another by perceptible intervals, and not running into one another like the melody of antient ſpeech. It is therefore no more than muſic more ſimple than the muſic of the ſongs of the opera, and therefore better accommodated to narrative, for which purpoſe it is chiefly uſed; whereas the ſongs are expreſſive of ſentiment and paſſion.

The melody, therefore, of Greek and Latin conſiſted of muſical tones, which flowed through the whole compoſition, with the variety of high and low, without

which there can be no muſic of any kind, but the high never riſing above *a fifth*, and being not too frequently repeated; for there is never more than one acute accent upon the ſame word, though conſiſting of ſeveral ſyllables. This, I think, muſt have made a ſweet and ſimple melody, with variety enough, as the high tone does not always return at the ſame interval. I will only add further upon this ſubject, that without a melody of one kind or another, no language can be perfect; for the voice, as Ariſtotle has obſerved*, is the moſt imitative faculty belonging to us, and therefore it ſhould be employed to its full extent; and ſhould not only imitate ſentiments and paſſions, but alſo muſical tones.

And, if we ſtudy the hiſtory and philoſophy of man, and can aſcend to the origin of this wonderful art of language, we ſhall find that the firſt language ſpoken by man muſt have been muſical; for ſinging is natural to man as well as to ſome birds;

* *Rhetor.* lib. 3. cap. 1.

whereas language is ſo far from being natural to man, that it is a work of the greateſt art, and moſt difficult invention (if it was invented by men) of all the arts we practiſe. For ſetting aſide the grammatical art, even articulation, which furniſhes only the materials of language, is of itſelf not only of difficult invention, but ſo difficult in the practice, requiring ſo many various poſitions and actions of the organs of pronunciation, that nothing but continued practice from our infancy can make it eaſy for us: And therefore, as I have obſerved elſewhere *, language is the moſt wonderful of all the arts we have invented, as we have produced not only the art, but furniſhed the materials of it; whereas, in the other arts we practiſe, nature has given us the materials.

If, therefore, there ever was a natural ſtate of man, and if he did not come into this world practiſing all the arts that he now practices, it is evident that he did not,

* Vol. 4th. p. 176. and following.

in his natural ſtate, ſpeak: But he ſung; for having a voice capable of variety of tones, and being naturally pleaſed with thoſe tones put together, though in the moſt rude and artleſs manner, he would make ſome kind of muſic with his voice, that is, he would ſing: Or, if we will not believe that inſtinct would direct him to do that, we may ſuppoſe, as Lucretius does, that he learned it by imitating the birds *.

Further, hiſtory informs every man who ſtudies it in the grand and comprehenſive view of the hiſtory of the ſpecies, that language and the race of men came from the ſouth and eaſt. Now, the people there are much more muſical than in the north and weſt, where they appear to have almoſt quite loſt thoſe muſical talents,

* This notion of Lucretius was confirmed to me by what the wild girl, whom I ſaw in France, told me: For ſhe ſaid, the muſic in her country was an imitation of the ſinging of birds.

which they brought with them from the ſouth and eaſt: And the further north they have gone, the more they have loſt of thoſe talents; ſo that, as Lemmius, the Daniſh miſſionary among the Laplanders, informs us, theſe people, though undoubtedly they came from a country far to the eaſt *, could hardly be taught the common

* This is evident from the language they ſpeak, which is now known, with great certainty, to have come from a very remote country in the eaſt, lying betwixt the Euxine and Caſpian ſeas; for there is a book written by one Sainovicks, a member of the Royal Society of Denmark, printed in 1770, (it is a rare book, of which I had the uſe from the King's library, when I was laſt in London), where the author proves, I think demonſtratively, by comparing the two languages together, that the Hungarian and Lapland languages are both dialects of the ſame language, and conſequently, that the people muſt be originally the ſame. The affinity of the two languages he proves, not only by their having ſo many words in common, not leſs than an hundred and fifty, (p. 35.) but by idioms of ſyntax and compoſition, which could not be accidental, (p. 61.) Now, if they were originally the ſame people, it is the greateſt migration of men that we read of in the hiſtory of man, greater than the migration of the Cimbers from the Tauric Cherſoneſe to the Cimbric, or of the Goths from

church tunes. But there is a ſouthern and eaſtern nation, with which we are pretty well acquainted, I mean the Chineſe, who retain the muſical genius of their country ſo much, that they have a much greater variety of muſical accents upon their ſyllables than the Greeks had: For the ſame

Crim Tartary to Germany and Sweden: For the Hungarians, who call themſelves *Majars*, came from a country betwixt the Euxine and Caſpian ſeas, where there is a people of that name (ſee the ſecond edition of vol. 1ſt. of this work, p. 594. in the note) and who, we muſt ſuppoſe, ſpeak the ſame language, as they bear the ſame name. Now what a migration this was, from the Caſpian ſea, at leaſt from beyond the Euxine, to Lapland, whether we ſuppoſe them to have come directly from their parent country to Lapland, or, what I think more probable, from Hungary to Lapland. This ſhews how much the ſtudy of language is connected with the hiſtory of man; ſince by it we diſcover the connection of nations with one another, and their migration from the moſt diſtant countries to the countries which they now inhabit. I will only add, concerning the language of theſe two nations, that it is a language of art, having one art belonging to language, which no other language in Europe at preſent has, that of forming caſes of nouns by flection. This is a proof, that not only the race of men came from the eaſt and ſouth to the weſt and north, but that they brought with them a language of art.

monoſyllable among them, by being differently accented, ſignifies nine or ten different things; ſo that their language, conſiſting of no more than three hundred and thirty words, ſerves all the purpoſes of a highly civilized life. Mr Bevin, the gentleman whom I have mentioned in my fifth volume *, was ſo obliging as to let me hear him ſpeak ſome Chineſe, and, as far as I could obſerve, their tones did not riſe ſo high as the acute accent of the Greeks; but the notes were very much divided, and the intervals very ſmall, ſo that the muſic of their language reſembled, in that reſpect, the ſinging of birds. Whether they did not vary their monoſyllables, by pronouncing them longer or ſhorter, I forgot to aſk him; but I think it certain, that as rhythm is an eſſential part of muſic, they could not have had ſo much muſic in their language without rhythm; and I am perſuaded that they diſtinguiſh in that way the ſenſe of ſeveral of their monoſyllables, as we know the Greeks diſtinguiſhed

* P. 444.

ſome of their words, by the length or ſhortneſs of the ſyllables.

Of the Chineſe language I have ſpoken in page 108. of this volume; and I will only add here, that it is the greateſt phenomenon of the language kind that is to be found on this earth: For it is a language without any of the three arts of derivation, compoſition, and flection, without one or other, or all of which, I ſhould have thought it impoſſible to have formed a language, which could ſerve the purpoſes of a life of civility and arts, ſuch as that of the Chineſe. It is, as I have obſerved in the paſſage above quoted, in that infantine ſtate of articulation, when men had only learned to articulate ſingle ſyllables, but not to put them together in words; for there muſt be a progreſs in all arts, from what is ſimpleſt and eaſieſt, to what is compound and more difficult.

The firſt words, therefore, were as ſimple as poſſible, being only monoſyllables;

and there, I think, it is natural to ſuppoſe that they would ſtop a while; and by giving tones and rhythms to thoſe ſyllables, expreſs their wants and deſires, and ſo keep up an intercourſe with one another. In this ſtate, I imagine, the language remained for ſome time, even in Egypt, where I ſuppoſe it to have been firſt invented: And while it was in that ſtate, it found its way to China, with other Egyptian arts, and particularly hieragryphical writing, which M. De Guignes has ſhewn came from Egypt to China. See vol. 34. of the Memoires of the French Academy. The Chineſe, who, I believe are, as Dr. Warburton has ſaid, a dull uninventive people, have preſerved both the language and the writings of the Egyptians as they got them. But in Egypt I do not believe that either of theſe arts continued long in ſo infantine a ſtate. That alphabetical characters were invented there I think there can be no doubt, and alſo the three great arts of language, derivation, compoſition, and flection. When they had got ſo far in the art of language, words of many

ſyllables became abſolutely neceſſary: The tones and rhythms of the monoſyllables were nevertheleſs ſtill preſerved; and in this manner was formed ſuch a language as the Shanſcrit, which is now diſcovered to have been the antient language of Egypt, and of which the Greek is a dialect. Thus was completed the moſt wonderful of all human arts, by which about five millions of words were ſo connected together, as to be comprehended in the memory, and readily uſed *, and at the ſame time pronounced with a beautiful variety of melody and rhythm.

But to return to the muſical accents of the Chineſe language. The queſtion is, Whether they firſt learned to articulate their monoſyllable, and then learned theſe muſical notes by which they diſtinguiſh them one from another? or, whether they firſt practiſed muſic, and then learned articulation? And it appears to me very much

* See vol. 5th. p. 434.

more probable, that having firſt ſung, whether by inſtinct, or having learned it from the birds; and after that, having learned from ſome nation with which they had an intercourſe, to articulate a few ſounds, they ſtill continued to ſing, and, as it was very natural, joined their muſical tones to their articulate ſounds, and ſo formed a muſical language, and at the ſame time ſupplyed the defects of their very ſcanty articulation.

But we muſt ſuppoſe, that the melody of the Greek language was far ſuperior to that of the Chineſe, and I think we are very much obliged to the Halicarnaſian, for explaining, ſo accurately as he has done, the nature of the Greek accents. He is the only author, as far as I know, that has done ſo; and but for the account he has given of them, I might have thought them as much without rule, and as little muſical, as the Chineſe accents. But the Halicarnaſian has told us that they riſe to a fifth, and every ſyllable of the word has either a grave ac-

cent, an acute, or both, which is called a circumflex, and this is all the variety which the nature of the thing will admit. This variety, however, is not without rule; for I know an Engliſh ſcholar, who, if you give him the accentuation of any one word, will tell you how all its derivatives, and all its different flections are to be accented. I thought the paſſage in the Halicarnaſian of ſuch importance, that I have given a tranſlation of it at full length, which I very ſeldom do; and he makes the matter ſo clear, though a good deal removed from common apprehenſion, that no man who underſtands the language, and has learned the firſt principles of muſic, can have any doubt in the matter.

If we could have any doubt that the Greek language was pronounced with the melody which the Halicarnaſian has ſo well explained, the example of a ſavage nation of North America, who at this day pronounce their barbarous language in the ſame manner that the Greeks did their

polite and highly cultivated language, puts the matter out of all doubt, and ſhews, that not only ſuch a pronunciation is practicable, but that melody and rhythm are coeval with language, and had been brought to ſome degree of perfection, while the grammatical part of the language continued ſtill very imperfect; which is the caſe of the Iroquois language. Of this language I have ſaid a good deal in my fifth volume, p. 443 and 444.

If, therefore, no language ever was ſpoken by a whole nation with melody and rhythm, thoſe who have heard the Chineſe ſpeak in that way muſt have been miſtaken, or willingly impoſed upon us. Dr. Moyes muſt have lied concerning the Iroquois, for he could not have been miſtaken; and ſo muſt the Halicarnaſian, in what he has told us with ſo much accuracy concerning the Greek accents. But theſe teſtimonies are all rejected by ſome, ſingly for this reaſon, that they have no idea of any people ſpeaking in that way; and they hold it to be impoſſible that

there ſhould be any beauty in ſpeaking, or in any other art, of which they have no idea. I will not pretend to enlarge the ideas of ſuch men, or make them leſs fond of themſelves; but, if they will not be convinced by facts that are told them, I think they ſhould be convinced by the teſtimony of their own ſenſes. Let them liſten to that common bird the Cuckow, who, as I have ſhewn *, articulates his name of two ſyllables with both melody and rhythm. The Cocketoo pronounces his name of three ſyllables in the ſame way; but whether he riſes higher, or not ſo high as the Cuckow, I cannot tell. Now, is there any abſurdity or impoſſibility in ſuppoſing, that a muſical nation, ſuch as the Greeks certainly were, ſhould do what we ſee the Cuckow does—join to their articulation both melody and rhythm. Nor ſhould we be ſurpriſed that the Greeks practiſed an art that we cannot practiſe, and indeed can hardly have an idea of: For it would have been

* P. 132.

the ſame with their ſtatuary, had not the monuments of that art come down to us, without which we ſhould have hardly had an idea of the grace and beauty of ſuch figures as the Apollo of Belvidere or the Venus of Medicis. But the melody of their ſpeech has not come down to us, except in the accurate deſcription of it which the Halicarnaſian has given us. From him, indeed, we may learn the ſcience of it; but there is a great difference betwixt the ſcience of any art and the practice of it: For, from knowing merely the rules of an art, we cannot judge truly of the effects it will produce, except we know alſo how it anſwers in practice. For the ſame reaſon, as we have no practice of the antient muſic, nor know any thing of it, except from the accounts given of it by antient authors, we can have as little idea of the beauty of it, as of the melody of their ſpeech. All we know of it is, that beſides the Diatonic muſic, which is our only muſic, but which, among them, was no more than the muſic of the vulgar, they had two other kinds of muſic, the Chromatic

and the Enharmonic; both which, proceeding by much ſmaller intervals, muſt have been more refined. And, as we know that they cultivated and practiſed muſic more than any other art, we may reaſonably ſuppoſe that they carried it to greater perfection than any other art.

It may be obſerved that in a degenerate nation, among the firſt arts that are loſt is the muſic of language. In modern Greece they have loſt both the melody and rhythm of their language. And the language of the philoſophers of India, commonly called the Shanſcrit, though the grammar of it (and a moſt wonderful grammar it is) be preſerved among the Bramins, who alſo ſpeak it among themſelves, yet the melody of it is loſt in common uſe. But the Bramins preſerve the knowledge of it likewiſe, and uſe it when they read their ſacred book, the Vedum, in which the tones are marked, as in our Greek books *. The nations

* This fact, as well as many others concerning the

that migrated from the eaſt and ſouth to the north, have alſo, as I have obſerved, loſt the melody of their language, which I think may partly be aſcribed to their climate, which has not only ſhrivelled and contracted their bodies, but has more or leſs impaired all their ſenſes.

Though theſe ancient accents are all together diſuſed in the modern languages, yet they made a great part of the beauty of the compoſition in Greek, ſo that the Halicarnaſian has made the ευμελεια of the compoſition of Demoſthenes, one of its greateſt praiſes *; and he tells us,

Shanſcrit language and the Bramins, I learned laſt time I was in London from Mr Wilkins, a gentleman who was ſixteen years in India, and all that time ſtudied the Shanſcrit language under Bramin maſters, and I believe knows more of it than any European now living. He told me a fact concerning their ſacred book, the *Vedum*, which I thought very curious. That this book, with the accents marked in it, they called their *Pſalm* Book; which ſhews, as well as many other inſtances he gave me, the connection betwixt the Shanſcrit and the Greek.

* See what I have ſaid further upon this ſubject, vol. 2d. p. 380. and following.

that the tones of the words ought to be varied as well as the rhythms, and words accented in the ſame way ought not to be placed together, in order that there may be a proper variety in the melody. The Romans, however, do not appear to have made a ſtudy of that part of the art of compoſition: And they certainly had not that variety of accent which the Greeks had; for they never accented the laſt ſyllable of a word: Nor do I believe, that in pronouncing their language, they were ſo attentive to melody as the Greeks were; for they certainly were not ſo muſical a nation as the Greeks. We are therefore not to wonder, that in a paſſage from Cicero, which I have quoted *, in his *Orator ad M. Brutum*, cap. 44. he requires only three things relative to the ſound of oratorial compoſition, viz. the order or arrangement of the words; the period; and, laſtly, the numbers or rhythms. Nor indeed do I remember that he any where ſpeaks of the

* Vol. 3d. p. 48.

melody as making any part of the beauty of compoſition.

Before we leave this ſubject of ancient accents, I think it may not be improper to obſerve how they were loſt, and what came in place of them. As it is not eaſy to pronounce any number of ſyllables, or words, with a perfect monotony, or without any variation of the voice of any kind, it was natural that the people who had loſt the melody of their language, ſhould ſubſtitute, in place of it, what we call *accents*, by which we pronounce one ſyllable of a word louder than the reſt, and which is the only kind of accent now uſed in the languages of Europe. If this were only conjecture, I thiuk it muſt be allowed to be a probable one: But it is proved by fact; for the modern Greeks at this day have ſubſtituted this kind of accent in place of the antient accents; for not only in their common diſcourſe, but in reading their antient Greek books, they obſerve the accents as marked in them; but in place of ſounding them as muſical notes,

they only accent them as we do our ſyllables, by pronouncing one ſyllable louder than the reſt *.

I have been thus long upon the ſubject of the melody of the Greek language, as it makes a conſiderable part of the beauty of oratorial compoſition; and becauſe it is very little underſtood, nor has not been explained by any modern critic or ſcholar. This is a complaint that I obſerve is made by Taylor, in his notes upon the oration of Demoſthenes *De Corona* †, where he very candidly confeſſes that he knows nothing of the matter. And he there quotes a paſſage from a ſcholiaſt of Euripides, which ſhews that the Greek ear was ſo nice, that they could diſtinguiſh, by the pronunciation, whether two ſyllables were contracted into one, by what they called a συναλοιφη, or whether they were diſtinct ſyllables.

* See vol. 4. lib. 1. chap. 1. p. 297.

† P. 679.

CHAP. V.

Of Rhythm.—*This a word taken from the Greek—not uſed by Cicero, but by Quintilian.—Not well expreſſed by* numerus *in Latin, or* quantity *in Engliſh.—A definition of Rhythm.—We have no practice of it, any more than of the melody of language.—Difference betwixt muſic and language.—Muſic cannot be without melody and rhythm, but a language may be without either.—Of the rhythm in proſe.—Of this we have no perception; but it was an eſſential part of the antient oratorial compoſition.—Reaſon why the antients muſt have practiſed rhythm in their proſe.—The orations of Demoſthenes, pronounced by him with all the variety of rhythm, muſt have given the greateſt pleaſure to the learned ears of the Athenians.—The compoſition of Demoſthenes altogether different from common ſpeech.—There muſt have been a beauty in it;*

as pronounced by him, of which we can hardly form an idea —This would have been the caſe of other arts, if monuments of them had not come down to us.—We ſhould not by this be diſcouraged from the ſtudy of the antient arts.—By that ſtudy not only the beauty of Arts is to be learned, but the beauty of Manners and Characters.—A perfect character not otherwiſe to be formed.—Of Periods.— *Both the ſenſe and the ſound of them better than of ſhort ſentences.—Without Periods our Rhetorical Stile muſt be nothing but vulgar ſpeech.—A Period makes the ſound more beautiful, as well as conveys the ſenſe better.—This expreſſed in Ariſtotle's definition of a Period.—Periods muſt not be too long; nor muſt all be periodiſed.*

I COME now to ſpeak of the Rhythm of theſe languages; and what I have to ſay upon this ſubject will be confined to the rhythm of the proſe of Greek and Latin; for that only belongs to rhetoric.

As to the rhythm of their verſe, I will explain it in the next volume, in which I am to treat of poetry.

Of rhythm in general I need ſay nothing here, as I have treated of it very fully in the 5th chapter of vol. 2d. of this work, where I think I have, upon philoſophical principles, explained the nature of rhythm, and diſtinguiſhed the different ſpecieſes of it. It is a word which we have very properly borrowed from the Greek language: And I think the Romans, among many other terms of art which they took from the Greeks *, ſhould alſo have taken this, inſtead of uſing the generic word *numerus*, which is the only word that Cicero uſes to denote rhythm (though I obſerve that, when Quintilian wrote, the word *rhythmus* began to be naturalized among the Romans); and our word *quantity*, by which we expreſs the rhythm of language, is alſo a word much too gene-

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject in the beginning of this volume.

ral, applying to every thing having parts or dimenſions of any kind.

That the rhythm of language, or quantity as we call it, conſiſts of long and ſhort ſyllables, every man who has the leaſt tincture of claſſical learning muſt know, though he may not be able exactly to define what a long and a ſhort ſyllable is, and though he have no practice of it, any more than of their melody, neither in reading the proſe of the learned languages, nor even in reading the verſe, as I ſhall ſhew in the next volume upon the ſubject of poetry: For though we mark, as we ſometimes do, a long ſyllable by accenting it, that accent does not make the ſyllable longer, but only louder. Who, therefore, denies the exiſtence of the melody of thoſe languages, becauſe he has no practice of it, may, for the ſame reaſon, deny the exiſtence of their rhythm.

What makes the rhythm of long and ſhort ſyllables, is the ratio of the long to the ſhort, which is as *two* to *one:* For

without ratio or relation of one kind or another, there not only could be no ſcience of rhythm, or of any thing elſe, but there could be no beauty or pleaſure in the perception of it. It is therefore an agreeable mixture of ſyllables, having this ratio to one another, which makes what we call verſe in the antient languages, or numerous proſe.

From this definition it is apparent, that rhythm has nothing to do with the elevation or depreſſion of the voice in muſical cadence, and therefore is quite diſtinct from the melody of language. Every man who knows any thing of muſic, will readily make the diſtinction betwixt the two. But there is this difference betwixt muſic and language, that muſic cannot be without both melody and rhythm, but language may be without either, though not a perfect or complete language; but if a language has melody and rhythm, it agrees with muſic in this particular, that its rhythm is of more conſequence than its melody. For rhythm, as the antients ſay,

is every thing in muſic; and in language of the rhythm, as I have ſaid, verſe is compoſed, and numerous proſe.

That the antient verſe was made by the rhythm of long and ſhort ſyllables, though we do not pronounce it in that way, every ſcholar muſt acknowledge; but there are many ſcholars, at leaſt who think themſelves ſo, that have no idea of the rhythm of proſe. That we have no practice of this rhythm, nor any perception of it, any more than the other, is certain: But it is as certain that it was practiſed, and very much ſtudied by the antients; and it affected their ears ſo much, that Cicero ſays, 'He does not deſerve 'the name of a *man* who has no percep-'tion or feeling of it*.' And both he and the Halicarnaſian, and even Ariſtotle the philoſopher, have given us rules for the compoſition of this proſe rhythm, without which Cicero ſays, all compoſition

* See the paſſage quoted in vol. 2d. p. 410. See alſo p. 409. 411. where the effects of theſe oratorial

is looſe and diſſolute, and no better than the language of vulgar men *.

That numbers in proſe were ſtudied by the antients is not to be wondered; but, on the contrary, it would have been matter of wonder, if, in a language compoſed of long and ſhort ſyllables, and in which there muſt have been a concourſe of rhythms of that kind in their proſe as well as their verſe, they had not endeavoured to make that concourſe as agreeable to the ear as poſſible. And, indeed, if my ear were formed to that kind of rhythm, I believe I ſhould like it better than the rhythm of their verſe, as having more variety in it, and not regularly returning at certain intervals. I ſhould therefore have believed, even without thoſe great authorities of ancient au-

numbers, upon the people of Rome, are deſcribed, and an account given of the origin and progreſs of them.

* Vol. 4th. p. 258, and following—p. 262.—265. in which laſt page I have mentioned examples of this proſe rhythm, given us by the Halicarnaſian, by Demoſthenes.

thors, that the antients did ſtudy thoſe numbers in their proſe as well as in their verſe.

The orations of Demoſthenes are ſo much varied in the compoſition, by an arrangement of words very different from that of common diſcourſe, and ſo much adorned with variety of rhythm and melody, that when they were pronounced by him, with all the grace of action, in which he excelled ſo much, they muſt have given a delight to the learned ears, and even the eyes of the Athenians, (ſetting aſide the weight of matter in them), of which we can hardly form an idea; and for my own part, if I had lived in thoſe times, I am perſuaded that I ſhould have been more pleaſed with the ſpeeches of Demoſthenes than with the verſes of Homer recited by the rhapſodiſts, or even with their fineſt theatrical entertainments.

It was this variety in his compoſition, by which not only the arrangement of the

words was ſuch as I have mentioned, but the melody and rhythm was ſo varied, that words accented in the ſame way were not joined together, nor words of the ſame rhythm or quantity *; which has made the Halicarnaſſian ſay, that it was acknowledged by every body, that there was no part of the orations of Demoſthenes that was not ſome way adorned and varied from common ſpeech †.

* See vol. 2d, p. 382. where I have tranſlated a paſſage of the Halicarnaſſian, in which he informs us of this wonderful variety of the antient compoſition, and which muſt appear almoſt incredible to men ſuch as we, who have no practice of melody or rhythm of language, nor ever heard any language pronounced in that way.

† The words are, Ουδεις ἁπλως τοπος ὡς ουχι πεποικιλται ταις τε ἐξαλλαγαις, και τοις σχηματισμοις. (Περι της του Δημοσθενους δεινοτητος, cap. 50. *in fine*). Where I underſtand by ἐξαλλαγαι, not figures of ſpeech, which are denoted by the word σχηματισμοι, but an uncommon order and arrangement of the words: For it is impoſſible to maintain that every paſſage in Demoſthenes is adorned with tropes and figures; but, on the contrary, the ſtile of Demoſthenes is for the greater

As it is impoſſible to vary our ſtile, as Demoſthenes has done his, by an artificial arrangement of the words, or to adorn it with a noble melody, or a rhythm of dignity, as the Halicarnaſſian expreſſes it *; and, as we have no practice of that kind, nor ever heard a language pronounced in that way, I do not much wonder that even ſcholars can hardly believe that in any age or nation men ſpoke in that way; and indeed it is impoſſible for us to form any

part very ſimple, and, more than any other author, he has diſtinguiſhed himſelf, by making of common words an uncommon ſtile. Now this was chiefly done by the uſe of that figure which rhetoricians call *Hyperbàton*, which, as the term implies, was the tranſpoſition of words from their natural order to an artificial one:— See vol. 4th of this work, p. 221.; and alſo p. 218. and 219. where I have obſerved the difference betwixt this artificial arrangement of words, and the common arrangement in converſation and familiar epiſtles, and a difference ſtill greater in the ſtile of their laws and decrees. See alſo what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, in my third volume, book 4. chap. 5. p. 102. 103.

* Μιλος ευγενης, ρυθμος αξιωματικος. See vol. 2. p. 382. of this work.

very clear or diſtinct idea of ſuch ſpeech. But we ought not for that reaſon to diſbelieve what ſo many authors tell us of the Greeks ſpeaking in that way, nor to reject that part of the Greek grammar, which treats of proſody and quantity, not only as quite uſeleſs to us, but which was never uſed even by the Greeks themſelves. For, as I obſerved before *, there were other arts practiſed by the Greeks, of the beauty of which we never could have had any idea, if monuments of them had not come down to us. And I gave for inſtances their ſculpture, to which may be added their architecture, and I may further add, the art of their language: For, if their writings had been all loſt, as many of them are, I deny that any man of modern times could have formed ſo much as an idea of a language ſo perfect as the Greek. Now, as the pronunciation of that language has not, nor could not come down to us, I ſay it is impoſſible that we

* P. 148. of this volume.

can form any perfect idea of the melody and rhythm of their language, any more than of their muſic, of which I am perſuaded our idea is very imperfect, for the ſame reaſon *.

But we ſhould not be diſcouraged from the ſtudy of antiquity, becauſe there was a beauty in ſome of their arts which we cannot imitate, nor form any perfect idea of. By thoſe arts, of which monuments have come down to us, we are ſure that they had ideas of beauty which we have not; and not of arts only, but what is more important, of manners and characters. Theſe we ought carefully to ſtudy and imitate; for I hold, that no perfect character can be formed, any more than a fine ſtatue, picture, or ſtile, except in imitation of the antient models. And this is a beauty of which we may certainly at leaſt form an idea, and imitate as far as

* See what I have ſaid further of their muſic, ibid.

our natural faculties will admit. But for this purpoſe we muſt live in the antient world; for we can only imitate men with whom we live and are intimately acquainted *.—But to return to our ſubject.

With the antient rhythm, I think, is very much connected the compoſition in periods, which was of abſolute neceſſity in the rhetorical ſtile: For the rhythm would certainly pleaſe the ear more, when the ſentence was rounded and compacted into a period, which, as I obſerved, is the completion of the art of compoſition, the beginning of which is firſt ſhort ſentences, then longer ſentences, and laſt of all periods †. Of theſe I have ſpoken pretty fully in ſeveral paſſages of this work ‡, and

* See what I have ſaid upon the ſubject of antient arts and manners, vol. 4th, p. 257. and 258.

† Of the progreſs of compoſition, ſee p. 109. 110.

‡ Vol. 3d. chap. 5. p. 57, and following, where I have given Ariſtotle's definition of a period, compared with Cicero's. See alſo vol. 2d. p. 360. where I have given a philoſophical reaſon why a period conveys

have given ſundry examples of them. And I will only add here, that a man, who pretends to ſpeak as an orator without periods, does not know what oratory is: For I have made it part of the definition of rhetoric, that its ſtile muſt be different from common ſpeech. Now, we cannot diverſify our ſtile by melody and rhythm, as the antients did, nor by various arrangements of the words, and therefore, unleſs we have a mind to make the ſtile poetical, we muſt compoſe in periods, otherwiſe our language will be common ſpeech. Nor will compoſition in long ſentences ſupply the place of periods: For, unleſs ſuch ſentences are compacted and rounded, ſo as to bring the ſenſe altogether to the hearer at the end of the period, they become obſcure; and I have heard ſeveral ſpeakers in ſuch long ſentences, whom I thought

ſenſe and argument, better than if it were broken down into ſhort ſentences. An example of this, from Demoſthenes, is given in p. 574. of the ſame volume. See further upon periods vol. 4th, p. 238. 408. and 409. where I have accounted why a period is more beautiful than a ſhort ſentence.

hardly intelligible, as you are apt to loſe the connection, and to forget the beginning before you come to the end. Whereas a period well compoſed and well pronounced, connects the beginning with the end, ſo that it is very properly made a part of the definition of a period by Ariſtotle, that it has a beginning and end. And not only does the period properly conclude the ſenſe, but if the period is well compoſed, the words, too, conclude with a proper cadence, ſo that the ear is filled, and finds nothing wanting in the ſound any more than in the ſenſe. But Ariſtotle concludes his definition with what ought carefully to be attended to in the compoſition of periods, 'That it be not too long, but of a moderate ſize *.' And I will add,

* Ariſtotle's words are, Λεγω δε περιοδον, λεξιν εχουσαν αρχην και τελευτην, αυτην καθ' αυτην, και μεγεθος ευσυνοπτον, *Rhetor.* lib. 3. cap. 9. where the reader will obſerve the words αυτην καθ' αυτην, which appears to me to apply particularly to what I have obſerved concerning the ſound of the period, and to diſtinguiſh this compoſition from what Ariſtotle calls the λεξις ειρομενη, which, with reſpect to the ſound, has nei-

that there muſt be a variety in this matter, as well as in every thing elſe belonging to ſtile; for the whole compoſition muſt not be periodiſed; but there muſt be thrown in, here and there, ſhort ſentences, commonly in the form of interrogations, after the manner of Demoſthenes.

ther beginning nor end in itſelf, but is only terminated by the ſenſe, as is evident from the examples of that kind of ſtile which Ariſtotle gives in the paſſage of his Rhetoric above quoted. Of this εἰρομένη λέξις he gives us this definition, Ἡ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὑτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πράγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ: Which I think explains the words αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτήν, in the definition of the period, to relate not to the ſenſe, but to the ſound.

CHAP. VI.

*A taſte for writing, as well as for other fine arts, to be formed only by the imitation of the antients.—Reaſon for this.—The Romans learned to write in that way, therefore we ought not to be aſhamed to do ſo.—We cannot learn properly at ſecond hand from the Romans.—They did not excel in any of the fine arts, though they learned them all from the Greeks;—could not even write their own hiſtory properly.—Reaſons why the Romans did not excel in the fine arts.—*First, *want of genius for them;—In this the Greeks excelled all the world, as the Egyptians excelled in ſciences and philoſophy:—*Next, *their manners and occupations;—great economy and penurious living, abſolutely neceſſary for them in the firſt ages of their ſtate;—That in proceſs of time produced the love of money, and the accumulation of it by the Patricians.*

—The conſequence of which was a diviſion in their ſtate.—Deſcription of their antient ſtate by Horace.—They did not apply to the arts till after the Punic wars were ended, when they had got money and could live at their eaſe;—began then by tranſlating.—Soon after that the wealth of Aſia came among them, with luxury and the love of money.—Their youth bred to count money.—The conſequence of this was, that no arts could flouriſh among them.—The pleaſures of the Romans, as well as their occupations, were ſuch, that arts could not flouriſh among them.—Of their Circus and Amphitheatre.—Compariſon of the occupation and manners of the Athenians with thoſe of the Romans.—War and arms the only occupation of the Athenians.—Their Theatre the fineſt entertainment that ever was.—No Amphitheatre among them.—Such being the caſe, impoſſible that the Romans could equal the Athenians in arts.—The Athenians, praeter laudem, nullius avari.—*Horace could not have been ſo great a poet, if*

he had not ſtudied in Athens.—He there learned Philoſophy, and to write Lyric Poetry and Dialogue better than any other Roman.—Degeneracy of the Roman taſte, after the days of Auguſtus, by their forſaking the imitation of the Greek models.—The Romans, therefore, Horace only excepted, models for no kind of writing—leaſt of all for the oratorial.—Their taſte in it entirely ſpoiled by the ſchools of declamation, which were unknown in the better times of Greece.—The Greek writings, therefore, are the models for ſtile.—There, both the ornaments of ſpeech, and the proper uſe of them, are to be learned.—The imitation of the Greek authors ſhould begin with tranſlation.—This more pleaſant from Greek to Engliſh than from Latin to Engliſh.—Of the Ridiculous Character of Stile.—The nature of the Ridiculous, and why Laughter is peculiar to man.—Not common among men who have a high ſenſe of the beautiful in ſentiments and manners.—This exemplified by the Indians of North America.—An account of the behaviour of thoſe Indians,

both in their public aſſemblies and in their private converſations.—The true objects of Ridicule are the vain of our own ſpecies.—Men addicted to laughter ſhould conſider how they look when they laugh, and what a noiſe they make.—This Character of Stile ſhould be very little uſed in oratory—is not conſiſtent with gravity and dignity.—Both Cicero and Quintilian ſay a great deal too much of it.—But the orator may be pleaſant and facetious, though not ridiculous.—That does not make men laugh, which is a pitiful ambition.—Wit, *if rightly underſtood, may be uſed in oratory; but there muſt not be too much of it.*—Humour *altogether improper.—Young orators apt to exceed in the ornaments of ſpeech.—The cure for this is the practice of buſineſs; but of real buſineſs, not fictitious.—The great art of an orator is to conceal art.—The attention of the hearers muſt not be drawn to words from things.*

I WILL conclude this book with ſome general obſervations upon *Stile*, to which every man, who would diſtinguiſh himſelf as a ſpeaker, ſhould attend.

And, in the firſt place, as writing is an art, and I think one of the fine arts, I hold it to be certain that no man can excel in it, any more than in painting, ſculpture, or architecture, except by ſtudying and imitating the antient models of thoſe arts; for it is not given to us, inhabitants of the north and weſt of Europe, to invent any thing of value in the fine arts. Nor ſhould we be mortified with this reflection: For we cannot pretend to be a finer people than the Romans, who got all their arts, as well as ſciences, from the Greeks *; for which, as I have obſerved elſewhere †, they had not ſo much as names,

* See what I ſhall ſay further upon this ſubject in this chapter.

† P. 8. of this vol. and alſo p. 156.

except what they got from the Greek language. And, as to the writing art, I think we ſhould not be aſhamed to form a ſtile, as Cicero did, by tranſlating from Demoſthenes, Plato, and Xenophon*: For as a man, who would be a ſculptor or painter, muſt not only ſee and admire the antient ſtatues, but muſt copy them moſt diligently and carefully; ſo I hold that a man, who would be a good writer, muſt exerciſe himſelf in a tranſlation from the antient authors, and particularly from Demoſthenes, whom I hold to be the greateſt artificer of proſe that ever wrote, and the moſt perfect model upon which he can form his taſte of the oratorial ſtile.

But there are many who think we may learn to write very well, at ſecond hand from the Romans, without ſtudying the Greek and the authors who write in that language; and this is a notion very preva-

* Taylor's notes upon the Orations of Æſchines and Demoſthenes, *De Coſona*, in the beginning, p. 593. and following of vol. 2d.

lent in a country ſuch as that in which I write, where the Greek language is very little underſtood, even by ſuch as think themſelves ſcholars. But I am of opinion that the Romans, though they were taught by the beſt maſters, and had the fineſt models in the world to imitate, excelled in none of the fine arts. That they never produced a ſculptor or painter of any value, is a fact that cannot be diſputed: And though they applied more to the writing art than to any other of the fine arts, yet I do not think they excelled in it, not even in a ſtile much eaſier than the oratorial, I mean the ſtile of hiſtory, in which they are very far inferior to the Greeks, as I have elſewhere obſerved *; ſo that though they performed the greateſt actions, and eſtabliſhed the greateſt empire that ever exiſted, they were not able to write properly their own hiſtory, which we learn better from the Greek hiſtorians than their own. And I think I have ſhewn, that even where they have tranſlated from the

* Vol. 5th. p. 223.

Greek, they did not perfectly underſtand the original *.

But it will be aſked, what is the reaſon that the Romans who had ſuch excellent maſters to teach them, and ſuch fine models to imitate, did not excel more in the arts? And I anſwer, firſt, that they wanted the *ingenium*, which, Horace ſays, the muſe had beſtowed upon the Greeks, in the verſes which I have choſen for the motto of ſome of my volumes of this work: For I hold that there is a great difference of genius, not only among individuals of the ſame nation, but of nations themſelves compared with one another. The Greek nation was more favoured by the Muſes and Graces, than any nation that I believe ever exiſted; and therefore they have produced the fineſt works of art in the world: Nor can any thing fine of that kind be produced, except in imitation of them. The Egyptians, on the other hand, excel-

* Vol. 5th. p. 64. and following.

led in ſcience; and I hold it is from that country that we derive ultimately all the ſcience and all the philoſophy that is now in Europe. The Romans, through the medium of the Greeks, got ſome of their philoſophy; but it was not carried far among them, not ſo far, I think, as the arts, and not near ſo far as the Greeks carried it; of which we need no other proof than this, that they had no ſchools of philoſophy among them, ſuch as the Greeks had.

But there was another reaſon, which perhaps contributed ſtill more to the little ſucceſs of the Romans in arts and ſciences, and that was their manners and their occupations. In the firſt ages of their ſtate their only buſineſs was war and agriculture. To this laſt they were obliged to apply themſelves moſt aſſiduouſly, having no more than two *jugera* for each man, that is, about an acre and a half, for the maintenance of themſelves and families; and which they were obliged to cultivate with their own hands. This penurious way of living

made great economy abſolutely neceſſary. Now, from great economy naturally ariſes the love of money, and the accumulation of it, which began among the Romans as ſoon as, by the ſucceſs of their arms, they had acquired more land and more wealth. Of theſe the Patricians, or chief men of the ſtate, as was natural, acquired moſt: And accordingly we ſee that they firſt began to accumulate, by lending money to the poorer ſort at a high intereſt. And this produced the firſt diſorder in the Roman government: For a warlike and free people could not bear to be thus oppreſſed; and therefore they became unruly and tumultuous, and at laſt made a feceſſion to the Sacred Mountain, as it was called. Nor could they be brought back again otherwiſe than by allowing them to have magiſtrates of their own to protect them, I mean the Tribunes; which divided them ſo much from the Patricians, as to make two ſtates of one.

Horace has very well deſcribed the antient manners of the Romans in theſe lines,

Romae dulce diu fuit et ſolenne, recluſa
Mane domo vigilare; clienti promere jura;
Cautos nominibus certis expendere nummos;
Majores audire, minori dicere per quae
Creſcere res poſſet, minui damnoſa libido.
Epiſt. 1. lib. 2. v. 103.

While the Romans were thus employed, labouring, as it might be ſaid, for their ſubſiſtence, they had not time to cultivate the arts, if they had had genius and inclination for them. They did not therefore begin to imitate the Greek arts, till they had acquired wealth by their conqueſts, and were living, as we would ſay, at their eaſe. This was not till after the Punic wars were ended, as Horace tells us,

Serus enim Graecis admovit acumina chartis:
Et, poſt Punica bella, quietus quaerere coepit
Quid Sophocles et Theſpis et Æſchylus utile ferrent.
Epiſt 2. lib. 2. v. 161.

But though they began late, they began in the proper way: For they began by tranſlating.

Tentavit quoque rem ſi digne vertere poſſet.
Ibid. v. 164.

And one of the beſt works, in my opinion,

that has come down to us from the Romans, are the comedies of Terence, which are, I believe, almoſt altogether tranſlations from Menander; for they have nothing Roman in them, the ſcene being in Athens, and the manners and names of the perſonages Greek.

But the interval was very ſhort betwixt the end of the Punic wars and the wealth of Aſia coming in among them, and with wealth, its neceſſary attendant luxury: Then money, which was before wanted for their ſubſiſtence, became ſtill more neceſſary for ſupplying the demands of a luxurious life. And, in this ſtate, I am perſuaded, their love of money was very much greater than when they were living upon their two *jugera*; for the love of money increaſes in proportion, and more than in proportion, to the accumulation of it. And accordingly, in the days of Horace, when they might be ſaid to be in poſſeſſion of the wealth of the world, their love of money was come to ſuch a height, that it appears to have been almoſt their only

paſſion: And they taught their children little elſe but to count money.

> Romani pueri longis rationibus aſſem
> Diſcunt in partes centum diducere: dicat
> Filius Albini, *ſi de quincunce remota eſt*
> *Uncia, quid ſuperat?* poteras dixiſſe, *Triens. Eu!*
> *Rem poteris ſervare tuam: redit uncia: quid ſit?*
> *Semis.*———
>
> *De Arte Poet.* v. 325.

And not only were the children of the vulgar educated in this way, but thoſe of the better ſort, *pueri magnis centurionibus orti**. When ſuch were the character and manners of the people, Horace very properly aſks the queſtion,

> ——An, haec animos aerugo et cura peculi
> Cum ſemel imbuerit, ſperamus carmina fingi
> Poſſe linenda cedro, et laevi ſervanda cupreſſo?
>
> *De Arte Poet.* v. 330.

And for the ſame reaſon he might have aſked, whether it was poſſible they could excel in any other art, or in any ſcience.

Such was the occupation of the Romans

* Lib. 1. ſat. 6. v. 70.

as late down as the days of Auguſtus, when it is ſuppoſed that arts and ſciences flouriſhed moſt among them.

Let us next conſider what their pleaſures and amuſements were, by which, as much as by any thing elſe, we may judge of the genius and taſte of a people. Theſe, among the Romans, were the horſe races in the Circus, and their combats of gladiators in their Amphitheatres. The entertainment of the theatre they learned from the Etruſcans. But it does not appear to me that ever the Romans took ſo much delight in theatrical repreſentations, as in the two entertainments I have mentioned.

Now let us compare the manners of the Romans with thoſe of the Athenians. Their occupation was arms and government; for they do not appear to have ever applied much to agriculture. What they practiſed of that was chiefly by their ſlaves. And as to their pleaſures and entertainments, theſe their theatre furniſhed them,

which I believe to have been the moſt elegant entertainment that ever was among men: For it conſiſted of three of the fineſt of the fine arts, poetry, muſic, and the imitation of paſſions and ſentiments by motion to muſic, which they called Dancing. They got, too, philoſophy from Egypt; which came to them through the Pythagorean ſchool in Italy, and alſo directly from Egypt by Plato, who was there ſeveral years. And they took to philoſophy ſo much, that it became a paſſion among their young men, who, inſtead of counting money, as the youth of Rome did, addicted themſelves to philoſophy ſo much, that among the frugal and induſtrious it became a praiſe for a young man not to frequent the ſchools of philoſophers: And accordingly Simo in Terence commends his ſon for not being addicted to horſes or dogs, nor to *philoſophers* *. As to bodily exerciſes, they had in their public or national games, ſuch as the Olympic or Iſthmian, chariot races

* Andr. act. 1. ſcen. 1.

and exercises of every kind, the victors in which were highly honoured, and entered the cities to which they belonged in a triumphal chariot drawn by four horses, in the manner a Roman general did, who had conquered a nation, or won a great battle, and were maintained all the rest of their lives at the public cost *. And they had in those games also exhibitions of genius and learning; but as to the barbarous spectacle of men killing one another, such as the Gladiatorian shows in Rome, it was utterly unknown in Greece.

Thus I think it appears, from the account here given of the occupations, manners, and taste of the Romans and Athenians, that it was impossible, by the nature of things, that the Romans should have excelled, or even equalled their masters the Athenians in any art or science. And there

* See the preface to book 9th of Vitruvius.

is one part of the Greek character which I have not yet mentioned, which of itſelf was ſufficient to ſet them above the Romans in arts and ſciences; and that is, that they were, as Horace tells us,

——praeter laudem, nullius avari.

which was juſt the reverſe of the Romans: So that, with the change of one word, we may apply the line to them, and ſay,

——praeter *nummos*, nullius avari.

for from the account that Horace, in ſundry paſſages, gives us of their manners in his age, money was every thing among them *: So that they deſerved no longer the praiſe which Livy beſtows upon them,

* O cives, cives! qùaerenda pecunia primum eſt;
Virtus poſt nummos: haec Janus ſummus ab imo
Perdocet; haec recinunt juvenes dictata ſeneſque,
Laevo ſuſpenſi loculos tabulamque lacerto.
Lib. 1. epiſt. 1. v. 53.

Scilicet uxorem cum dote, fidemque, et amicos,
Et genus et formam regina pecunia donat.
Lib. 1. epiſt. 6. v. 36.

of being the people among whom poverty continued longeſt honourable *; for in the days of Horace it was the greateſt reproach †.

When ſuch was the character of the Romans, even in the moſt learned age, which was certainly under Auguſtus Caeſar, it is not to be wondered that they produced nothing extraordinary even in the way of poetry, to which they appear to have applied more than to any of the fine arts, except Horace, who, in my opinion, is the greateſt poet they ever had. But he could not have been ſo eminent, if he had not been educated by his father in a manner very different from that in which peo-

Et genus et virtus, niſi cum re, vilior alga eſt.
Lib. 2. ſat. 5. v. 8.

* In procemio.

† Magnum pauperies opprobrium, jubet,
Quidvis et facere et pati,
Virtutiſque viam deſerit arduae.
Lib. 3. od. 24. v. 42.

ple of his rank were educated, as he tells us himſelf,

> Cauſa fuit pater his; qui, macro pauper agello,
> Nolluit in Flavî ludum me mittere, magni
> Quo pueri magnis e centurionibus orti,
> Laevo ſuſpenſi loculos tabulamque lacerto,
> Ibant octonis referentes idibus aera.
>
> Sat. 6. lib. 1. v. 70.

He began his Greek learning at Rome, where he was taught by a ſchoolmaſter, whom he calls *plagoſus Orbilius*,

> Iratus Graiis quantum nocuiſſet Achilles.
>
> Sat. 2. lib. 2. v. 43.

But if he had not proſecuted thoſe ſtudies in Athens, he never would have been the fine writer he was. There he not only formed his taſte in poetry, but he learned philoſophy; an obligation which he acknowledges to Athens,

> Adjicere bonae paulo plus artis Athaenae;
> Scilicet ut curvo poſſim dignoſcere rectum,
> Atque inter ſylvas Academi quaerere verum.
>
> Ibid. v. 44.

From Athens he brought the Lyric Poe-

try to Rome, and perfected himſelf in what I think ſtill finer writing, I mean *Dialogue*, which he learned from Plato and Menander *, and from

> Eupolis atque Cratinus, Ariſtophaneſque, poetae,
> Atque alii quorum comedia priſca virorum eſt.

And accordingly he has produced ſome of the fineſt pieces of that kind that are extant, particularly his dialogue with Damaſippus, where there is a fable or ſtory, and a very pleaſant one, which makes it truly a poem; and I do not heſitate to pronounce it the fineſt little poem in Latin.

After the days of Auguſtus they ſeem to have given up, in a great meaſure, their Greek maſters, and to have ſet up for ſtandards of fine writing ſome of their own authors, ſuch as Virgil for a poet, and Salluſt for an hiſtorian; and then they produced ſuch poems as the Pharſalia of

* Damaſippus mentions his carrying Plato to the country with him, in company with Menander which he calls *ſtipare Platona Menandro*. Lib. 2. ſat. 3. v. 11.

Lucan, and ſuch hiſtories as the Annals of Tacitus *.

In this manner I think I have ſhewn, that the Romans, Horace only excepted, ought not to be our ſtandard for fine writing of any kind, and particularly not of the oratorial kind. Their taſte in that ſort of compoſition was entirely ſpoiled by their ſchools of declamation, where they harangued upon fictitious ſubjects, and in a ſtile quite different from the ſtile of buſineſs, and fit only to draw the admiration of the vulgar. This was a practice entirely unknown in the beſt times of Greece, when Athens could boaſt of nine great orators, and did not begin, as Quintilian tells us, till about the time of Demetrius Phalerius. In Rome it was ſo much practiſed, that it infected the ſtile not only of their oratory, but of every other kind of writing, *ut ne vel carmen ſani coloris enituit*, as Petronius Arbiter ſays; and accor-

* See more upon this ſubject, vol. 5th. p. 222. and following.

dingly, in the ſpeeches of Virgil, we have a great deal of the quaint ſhort ſentences, the *vibrantes ſententiolae* of Portius Latro *.

Thus I think I have ſhewn, that though the Romans were the firſt people in the world in arms and government, it was impoſſible that they could equal the Athenians in any of the fine arts; and particularly in oratory they muſt have been much inferior to them. It is therefore by the ſtudy of the Greek authors that the ſcholar muſt form his taſte of ſtile and compoſition: For in thoſe authors he will not only learn all the ornaments of ſpeech, but he will learn to uſe them properly and diſcretely;

Deſcriptas ſervare vices operumque colores;

and not to mix them all together in every kind of compoſition; ſo that his proſe will

* Upon the ſubject of the ſchools of Declamation, and the influence they had upon the taſte of the age, ſee vol. 3. p. 258. and following.

not be poetry; and in his proſe he will diſtinguiſh betwixt the hiſtorical, the didactic, and the rhetorical ſtile, and not jumble all theſe ſtiles together, as is very common in our writings at preſent.

But we muſt not only ſtudy thoſe ancient authors, but we muſt imitate them, beginning, as the Romans did, with tranſlating: And we ſhall have more pleaſure as well as more profit, in tranſlating from the Greek than from the Latin, the idiom of our language coming nearer to the Greek than to the Latin; for we have that ſignificant and moſt emphatical part of ſpeech, the Article, which the Latins want; and, beſides that, we have a paſt participle active, formed indeed by an auxiliary verb, but the Latins want it altogether *. This makes our language fall more eaſily into the

* It is ſurpriſing that our Engliſh tranſlators of the Bible have not availed themſelves of this advantage, which our language has over the Latin. See what I have ſaid on this ſubject, in vol. 4th, p. 123.

Greek idiom: And for that reaſon I have always had more pleaſure in tranſlating from the Greek than from the Latin. And I am perſuaded the practice which Queen Elizabeth was taught by her preceptor, Roger Aſcham, of double tranſlation, or retranſlating, from the Greek or Latin to the Engliſh, and back again (at ſome diſtance of time no doubt) from the Engliſh to the Greek or Latin, will be very uſeful for making the young ſcholar perfectly acquainted with the idioms of theſe ſeveral languages, and their conformity or diſconformity with one another. But I believe this is practiſed by no body at preſent *.

Of the different characters of ſtile I have

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject in a note upon p. 389. of vol. 3d, where the reader may ſee how learned an age that of Queen Elizabeth's was, when kings and queens learned Greek with ſo much labour and care, and in which there was a lady not only that wrote the Greek very well, but ſpoke it; I mean Lady Jean Gray.

ſaid a good deal in the third volume, which I will not here repeat. I will only add ſomething to what I have ſaid on that character of ſtile I call *the Ridiculous* *. It is a kind of ſtile which, according to my obſervation, is becoming every day more and more common, both in private converſation and public ſpeaking: And people laugh now at ſo many different things, that it is not eaſy to ſay at what they laugh. Quintilian has beſtowed a long chapter upon the Ridiculous: But I think he has not explained it ſo well in many words as Ariſtotle has done in two, where he ſays that the γελοιον, or *Ridiculous*, is αισχος ανωδυνον, that is, *the deformed without hurt or miſchief* †. And with this definition of Ariſtotle Cicero agrees, when he ſays, that *Locus autem et regio quaſi ridiculi, turpitudine et deformitate quâdam continetur* ‡. It is

* Vol. 3d. book 4th, cap. 16. p. 228.

† Vol. 3d, p. 303.

‡ Lib. 2. *De Oratore* cap. 58.

therefore the oppoſite of the Beautiful; and as there is the ſame knowledge of contraries, ſo that we cannot know any one thing without knowing at the ſame time what is contrary to it, this accounts for Laughter being peculiar to our ſpecies, as no animal upon this earth, except man, has any ſenſe of the Beautiful, and conſequently of the Deformed. And the higher our ſenſe of beauty is, the more lively, and the more correct at the ſame time, will our perception of the Ridiculous be; whereas thoſe, who have not a correct taſte of the Beautiful, will be diſpoſed to laugh at they do not know what; and hence it is, that laughter is ſo common among vulgar men. But men of exalted minds, and who have a high ſenſe of the Beautiful and Noble in characters and manners, are very little diſpoſed to laugh; for, though they perceive the Ridiculous, they are not delighted with it. This we obſerve among the Indians of North America, whom we call Savages; for not only in their public aſſemblies, where they delibe-

rate upon ſtate affairs *, there is the greateſt gravity and dignity of behaviour obſerved, but in their private converſation there are none of thoſe violent burſts of laughter which we ſee among us; nor do you obſerve in a company of them ſo many people laughing and ſpeaking at the ſame time, that one can hardly underſtand what is ſaid, or what is the ſubject of the laughter. This I have been aſſured of by ſeveral perſons, who have lived for years among them, underſtood and ſpoke their language, and converſed familiarly with them †. Thoſe people, we muſt, I am

* Dr. Franklin in a pamphlet, which he has publiſhed, containing, among other things, *Remarks upon the Savages of North America*, ſays, that in theſe aſſemblies they behave with the greateſt order and decency, without having any need of a ſpeaker, ſuch as in our Houſe of Commons, who is often hoarſe with calling *to order*. Every ſpeaker in thoſe Indian aſſemblies is heard with the greateſt attention, and after he has ſat down, before another riſes they wait a while to know whether he has any thing to add.

† I know three gentlemen who were in the ſervice of the Hudſon's Bay Company, and lived in that

afraid, allow, have a higher ſenſe than we of what is beautiful, graceful, and becoming in ſentiments and behaviour. The generality of men among us are ſo much diſpoſed to laugh, that they do not diſtinguiſh properly betwixt the ſubjects of laughter and thoſe of admiration. Thus we commonly laugh at a witty or clever ſaying; whereas we ſhould admire it, and approve of it with a ſmile expreſſing pleaſure *. Such men do not appear to know, that the paſſion which excites laughter is contempt; and the proper object of contempt is vanity, without which the meaneſt animal

country, one of them twenty nine years, another twenty-four, and the third ſeventeen. The firſt gentleman I mentioned was three years by himſelf, without any other European, among a nation of Indians far to the weſt of Hudſon's Bay, who ride on horſeback, and are from thence called Equeſtrian Indians, by whom he was moſt hoſpitably entertained, provided with every thing he wanted for food and raiment, and all without fee or reward.

* See the chapter above quoted of vol. 3d, p. 306 and 307, where I have diſtinguiſhed betwixt a laugh and a ſmile.

that God has made is not contemptible: And therefore we do not laugh at the fooliſh abſurd things which an ideot ſays or does; but if he is vain, and thinks he is ſpeaking and acting very properly, we deſpiſe and laugh at him. The objects, therefore, of ridicule are confined to our ſpecies, as well as the ſenſe of it. And in this way I underſtand what both Ariſtotle and Cicero ſay of it.

I would have thoſe who indulge themſelves ſo much in laughter, look at themſelves in the glaſs when they laugh, and attend to the noiſe they make; for there are many people who have faces not otherwiſe diſagreeable, but which they disfigure very much when they laugh. And ſome of them make a noiſe upon that occaſion which is very diſagreeable, and indeed is hardly human. It is true that the *dulce loqui*, and the *ridere decorum*, qualities which Horace ſays he poſſeſſed when he was young, are the gifts of nature; but ſuch men, though they be obliged to ſpeak, whatever their natural

tone of voice may be, are not obliged to laugh. And they ſhould conſider that men of genius and an exalted mind are not at all delighted with the ridiculous, though, as I have obſerved, they muſt perceive it; but their delight is in the beautiful, which, as I have ſhewn elſewhere *, is the only pleaſure of our intellectual nature.

As to the uſe of this character of Stile in oratory, if it be true, as I think it is, that nothing adds ſo much weight to the councils and arguments of an orator as gravity and dignity, it ſhould be very ſparingly, if at all uſed. Quintilian, indeed, has recommended it much; but he confeſſes that it was his admiration of Cicero, who dealt ſo much in it, that made him ſo fond of it †. He has given us ſeveral of Cicero's jokes in his orations againſt Verres ‡: And he was ſo full of them in pri-

* Ant. Metaph. vol. 2. book 2. chap. 5. 6. and 7.

† Lib. 6. cap. 3. p. 242. edit. Rollin.

‡ Ibid. p. 251.

vate converſation, that his freed man Tyro publiſhed three books of his jeſts, or, as ſome ſay, he publiſhed them himſelf *. Whether that be true or not, if he had not been exceedingly fond of that kind of wit, it is impoſſible that he would have dwelt ſo long upon it, in his ſecond book *De Oratore*, longer than even Quintilian. But though I think the orator ſhould not be ridiculous, that is, ſpeak to make men laugh, (which, as I have obſerved in the chapter above quoted of the third volume of this work, is the claſſical ſignification of the word), he may, upon proper occaſions, be pleaſant and entertaining, and may have the *molle atque facetum*, which Horace commends in the Paſtorals of Virgil †. But it is a pitiful ambition to ſpeak to make men laugh. If, however, that be his aim,

* Ibid. p. 242. It is Macrobius who relates, that ſome ſaid the books were written by Cicero himſelf.

† See Quintilian's obſervations upon this expreſſion of Horace, p. 245. where he very well explains the word *facetum*, ſaying that *Decoris hanc magis et exculatae cujuſdam elegantiae appellationem, puto*,

and if he have any degree of parts or cleverneſs, he is ſure to ſucceed, as the taſte of the Ridiculous is ſo generally prevalent at preſent in Britain, in every popular aſſembly. But a great ſpeaker will think it below him to attempt it; and it is a great praiſe, I think, of the eloquence of our miniſter, that he never ſo much as aims at raiſing a laugh: And the antient Greek orators were ſo chaſte in this reſpect, that there is not in all the orations of Demoſthenes one jeſt to be found. And even in the comedies of Menander, which Terence has tranſlated, there is hardly any thing, as I have obſerved elſewhere *, that can provoke a laugh.

But what ſhall we ſay of *Wit?* Is it a proper ornament of the Rhetorical Stile? If it be confounded with the *Ridiculous*, as it is by many, I think it is not at all proper for an oration. But if it be diſtin-

* Vol. 5th, p. 23.

guiſhed from the *Ridiculous*, as I have done *, and made to conſiſt in great ſenſe expreſſed in few words, and with an uncommon turn of expreſſion, I think it may not be improperly uſed upon ſome occaſions; but not too often, leſt it ſhould appear like an affectation of *Wit*; which is offenſive to men of ſenſe and good taſte, and takes away both from the weight of the arguments and the credibility of the narrative. As to *Humour*, if it be as I have defined it †, *the imitation of characters ridiculous*, it is altogether improper in an oration, as it makes a mimic of the orator.

The young orator, if he have genius and fancy, and be likewiſe a ſcholar, will be apt to exceed much in the ornaments of ſtile. I know no better cure for this than that he ſhould be a man of buſineſs, and particularly ſhould apply to the buſineſs of the bar; for there he will ſoon

* Vol. 3d, p. 318.

† Ibid. p. 345.

learn that buſineſs is not to be carried on by figures of ſpeech. Demoſthenes and all the great orators of old were men of buſineſs: For, if they did not plead cauſes, which moſt of them did, they were employed in the buſineſs of the ſtate. But if, in place of real buſineſs, they had employed themſelves in pleading fictitious cauſes, as they did in the ſchools of declamation in Rome, they would not have been ſuch orators as they were; for I know nothing more proper for ſpoiling the taſte of an orator.

I will conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that the greateſt art in ſpeaking and writing is to conceal art, and particularly the art of words; which, if it be obſerved and ſtick out, (*extra corpus orationis eminet*, as Petronius expreſſes it), will take a great deal from the weight of the matter. The greateſt beauty, therefore, that I know in the ſtile of either writing or ſpeaking is, that the words ſhould not draw the attention of the reader or hearer from the ſenſe and matter.

BOOK III.

Of Action *or* Pronunciation.

CHAP. I.

Of Pronunciation, *or* Action, *as the antients called it.—Three things comprehended under Action.—One of them the moſt important of all, viz. the management of the voice.—The ſayings of Demoſthenes, and Antonius the Roman orator, upon the ſubject of Action.—To excel in Oratory both nature and art muſt concur.—Of the requiſites from nature.—Theſe divide into qualities of the mind and of the body;—and firſt, of the qualities of the body.—Rhetoric diſtinguiſhed from all the other fine arts by requiring theſe qualities.—The firſt bodily quality of a ſpeaker, ſize and figure.—Quotation from Milton on this ſubject.—A voice ſweet and expreſſive of feeling; or if not, ſtrong*

and commanding.—A good ſpeaker ought alſo to be well winded.—Of the qualities of the mind which the orator requires;—And firſt, a ſenſe of the Pulchrum *and* Honeſtum.—*This peculiar to human nature.—A quotation from Cicero on this ſubject.—The extent of this ſenſe—it goes to every word and every action.—Quotation from Milton and Tibullus on this ſubject.—The taſte of the French very elegant in this matter.—If not beſtowed by nature, no teaching can give it.—The Grave and Dignified alſo belong to the orator.—This likewiſe from nature.—Alſo genius and natural parts.—A perfect orator ought to be ſuperior to his audience.—This was the caſe of Pericles.—Recapitulation of the natural qualities of mind required to make an orator.—What Art beſtows, next to be conſidered.*

IN this book I am to treat of a moſt important part of the Rhetorical art, ſo important, that it gives to it the name of *Eloquence;* what I mean is the Elocution

or Pronunciation of Speech. It is a noted ſaying of Demoſthenes, than whom no man knew better in what the beauty and excellency of the art conſiſted, that the firſt, the ſecond, and third quality of an orator was Action; and if he had been aſked what the fourth was, I believe he would have made the ſame anſwer. Now, under action the antients comprehended not only what we call action, that is, the geſture of the body, but the look, the action of the features of the face in ſpeaking, and principally the management of the voice, the moſt important of all the things I have mentioned *. And it is as difficult as it is neceſſary; which made Marcus Antonius, the Roman orator, a cotemporary of Lucius Craſſus, ſay, *diſertos a ſe viſos eſſe multos, eloquentem autem neminem;* by which I underſtand he meant, that though he had ſeen many orators who excelled both in the matter and the diction of their ſpeeches, yet he never ſaw any whoſe elocution he could praiſe.

* Upon the ſubject of *Action*, ſee vol. 4th, p. 280. where I have given Cicero's definition of it.

To excel in this principal part of the art, there are many things required: And firſt there are certain talents which every great ſpeaker muſt have from nature; for we can excel in no art, if we are not fitted by nature for the practice of that art. But as nature alone will not make a man perfect in any art or ſcience, ſo in oratory we muſt join to nature, art and education, and aſſiduous practice under the beſt maſters we can find, and according to the beſt rules. I will begin with the qualities which we muſt derive from nature, and without which no art or teaching will make us great ſpeakers. Theſe I divide into qualities of mind and of body: For it is peculiar to eloquence, and diſtinguiſhes it from all the other fine arts, that certain qualities of the body, as well as of the mind, are neceſſary to make us excel in it: —With the qualities of the body I will begin.

And, in the firſt place, a great ſpeaker ſhould have ſize and figure; for a little deformed man can hardly be ſeen in a great aſſembly, if he could be heard. A great

ſpeaker, therefore, ſhould ſeem, when he riſes to ſpeak, like Beelzebub in Milton, *a pillar of ſtate*, and ſhould ſtand

> With Atlantéan ſhoulders, fit to bear
> The weight of mightieſt monarchies— .

He ſhould alſo have a look, which

> Draws audience and attention ſtill as night.

Such a figure and ſuch a look would prepoſſeſs an audience wonderfully in favour of the ſpeaker. There ſhould be alſo ſomething naturally graceful and becoming, and expreſſing a good and great character in the movement of his features while he ſpeaks, and in the geſture of his body. But above all his voice ſhould be ſweet and clear, ſtrong and commanding attention. There are ſome people who have a tone of voice ſo ſweet, pleaſant, and ſo expreſſive of their ſentiments, that every thing they ſay touches your heart. This is what Cicero calls *ſuavitas quae exit ex ore;* which he diſtinguiſhes from the *ſuavitas verborum* *. And it was by this ſweet tone of voice that the Athenians

* *De Oratore*, lib. 3. cap. 11.

were diſtinguiſhed not only from the Aſiatics, but from the other Greeks*. But this is a gift which nature has beſtowed upon very few; and I believe it is not to be acquired by any art or teaching, at leaſt in any great degree. There are ſome who cannot properly be ſaid to have any tone of voice at all; but ſpeak ſomewhat like the beating of a drum, by thumps and ſtrokes; and if they ſpeak very faſt, which often happens, it is like the ruff of a drum. But though a well-tuned voice is given to very few ſpeakers, a ſtrong commanding voice is neceſſary for any man who would excel in the art. He ſhould alſo be, like a good horſe, well winded; ſo as to be able to pronounce a long period in one breath, *una continuatione verborum*, as Cicero has expreſſed it.

Theſe are the qualities of body which a great ſpeaker muſt have from nature. But

* *De Oratore*, ibid.

in this art, as in every thing elſe belonging to man, mind is principal. And the firſt quality of mind which is required, is a ſenſe of what is Graceful and Becoming, or in one word, of what is *beautiful*, without which no man can excel in any of the fine arts, and leaſt of all in oratory. And I ſay further, that he cannot be a man of worth or goodneſs; and indeed I think that he hardly deſerves the name of a Man: For I hold, that a ſenſe of the *pulchrum* and *honeſtum* in ſentiments and in actions, diſtinguiſhes us more from the brute creation than any thing elſe *; and accordingly it appears in us before our reaſon begins to exert itſelf in any great degree. This doctrine,

* This is the opinion of Cicero, who, in the general definition which he gives us of the *decorum*, ſays, *in omni honeſtate verſatur*, and that it belongs to every thing that is *pulchrum et honeſtum*; and he adds, that it is that, *quod conſentaneum ſit hominis excellentiae, in eo, in quo natura ejus a reliquis animantibus differat: (De Officiis*, lib. 1. cap. 27. *in fine.)*: Which is juſt ſaying what I ſay, that it is the *honeſtum* and the *decorum* which principally diſtinguiſhes us from the brutes.

I know, will appear very ſtrange to thoſe who have learned the philoſophy of Mr Paley, in his book upon Morals, which is the only book of ſcience that has been publiſhed in England of a great while, but which, I think, does no honour to the nation; for it takes away not only the foundation of Virtue and of Morals, but it puts an end at once to all the fine arts; for if we have no ſenſe of what is Beautiful, Graceful, and Becoming in ſentiments and actions, I think it is impoſſible we can have it in outward forms, the chief beauty of which conſiſts in the expreſſion of what is Beautiful and Fine in the diſpoſitions and ſentiments of the mind *.

* From Mr Paley's book I could only learn one thing; that he himſelf had no ſenſe of the Beautiful and Graceful, any more than Mr David Hume, whoſe philoſophy of Morals he has endeavoured to revive, making the principle of it *utility*, or the computation of profit and loſs; for a man who has that ſenſe, which all men of genius muſt have, can no more doubt of the exiſtence of it, than of his own exiſtence. Nor is it an uncommon thing to ſee men in this age intirely void of it; for in a much better age,

As this ſenſe is congenial to our nature, and indeed predominant in it, it extends to every thing we do; *Status*, *inceſſus*, *ſeſſio*, (ſays Cicero), *accubatio*, *vultus*, *oculi*, *manuum motus*, *teneant illud decorum**. And a man, who himſelf poſſeſſes this ſenſe of the Graceful and Becoming in any high degree, will perceive it in another in every the the leaſt thing he does or ſays.

> Speaking or mute, all comelineſs and grace
> Attends thee, and each word each action forms;

ſays the Angel to Adam in Milton: And the poet ſays of his miſtreſs,

and even among the Greeks, a people more favoured by the Muſes and Graces than any other that ever exiſted, Ariſtotle tells us that there were many who had not the leaſt idea of the το καλον, though we do not find that there was any philoſopher, or any writer of any kind among them, who denied or doubted the exiſtence of it. See what I have ſaid on this ſubject in Ant. Metaph. vol. 2d, book 2d, and the three laſt chapters of that book.

* *De Officiis*, lib. 1. cap. 35.

Illam quicquid agit, quoquo veſtigia movet,
Componit furtim ſubſequiturque decor *.

where the reader of taſte will obſerve, how properly the word *furtim* is applied to expreſs that the Graceful muſt not be ſtudied or affected, or, as it were, ſticking out, but muſt animate every word and action; or, as Milton expreſſes it, *form them* †.

This ſenſe, therefore, of the Graceful and Becoming, muſt appear in every word, every look, and every motion of the ora-

* Tibulli lib. 4. carm. 2. v. 8.

† The French, who ſtudy grace more, I think, than any other nation in Europe, at leaſt in outward deportment, ſay of a woman that is very graceful, "Qu'elle eſt toute petrie de graces;" that is, *The graces are kneaded into her:* And ſuch is their taſte of beauty, that they think this a higher eulogium upon a lady than any thing they can ſay of her face or perſon: And ſpeaking of a man, they think the greateſt praiſe they can beſtow on his perſon is, that "Il a "l'air noble;" and the worſt thing they can ſay of his appearance is, "Qu'il a l'air ignoble." See p. 296. of vol. 4th.

tor. And though, no doubt, it, as well as every other ſenſe belonging to us, may be improved by culture and practice, if we have it not from nature, no art or teaching can give it us.

Connected with the Graceful and the Becoming, is the Grave and the Dignified. This, too, muſt be from nature; for an affected gravity and dignity, when the natural character is that of a buffoon or a vulgar man, is ridiculous.

To make an orator, nature muſt alſo furniſh genius and good natural parts. Theſe undoubtedly may be very much improved by art and culture; but nature muſt have laid the foundation.

Laſtly, to make a perfect orator, there is ſomething more, which nature muſt furniſh; and that is a great and elevated mind. And in this reſpect I maintain, that a perfect orator ought to be above the audience to whom he ſpeaks, and ſhould be in ſome degree a being ſuperior to them;

though it may be proper, in order to obtain what is the end of all oratory, perſuaſion, that he ſhould ſeem to ſubmit his judgment to theirs, and to court their approbation. Such an orator, I believe, Pericles was, the greateſt ſpeaker, by what we hear of him, that perhaps ever exiſted, whoſe ſuperiority, in the powers of ſpeech, is well expreſſed by what is ſaid of him, "That, he thundered and lightened when "he ſpoke."

Theſe are the qualities with which, I think, an orator muſt be born; and if ſo, I think we may ſay, *oratores naſcimur*, as we ſay *poetae naſcimur*; and I believe more of the gifts of nature are required to make an orator than to make a poet: For ſetting aſide thoſe talents of the mind which I have mentioned as neceſſary for the orator as well as the poet, there are qualities of the body which, as I have ſhewn, the orator requires, but with which the poet has nothing to do. In the next chapter I ſhall ſpeak of what it is neceſſary that education, art, and teaching ſhould furniſh to the ora-

tor; and in this reſpect I am perſuaded it will appear that the art of oratory is, as Cicero ſays, *incredibili magnitudine et difficultate**.

* See what I have ſaid further upon the difficulty of the art in vol. 4th, p. 285. and 286.

CHAP. II.

Education, *abſolutely neceſſary for making a ſpeaker.—Should begin early, even with the nurſe and the mother.—Examples of the advantage of a mother ſpeaking well.—All thoſe that are about children ſhould have nothing faulty in their pronunciation.—After the child is come to be a boy, his pronunciation muſt be formed with great care.—Our ſchools defective in that article.—The conſequence of that is, that men ſpeak ill, who would otherwiſe have ſpoken well.—To ſpeak well in private converſation, a neceſſary prelude to public ſpeaking.—This, in boys, ſhould be carefully attended to.—Natural defects by that attention may be corrected.—An affected tone and manner of ſpeaking to be carefully avoided.*

THAT a proper Education is neceſſary for a man that is to be a ſpeaker, every body will admit. I will add, that it ought to begin very early; Quintilian ſays with the nurſe *, who, he ſays, ought to have nothing faulty in her ſpeech. If the mother happen to be the nurſe, ſo much the better for the child in every reſpect: But though ſhe do not nurſe him, he is more with her after he is weaned than with any other; and for that reaſon it is of great importance that ſhe ſhould ſpeak well. It was to their education under their mother Cornelia, that the two Gracchi chiefly owed their reputation as orators. Some letters of hers were extent in Cicero's time, and from them, he ſays, it appears, *Filios non tam in graemio educatos quam in ſermone matris* †: And I had occaſion to know a very young boy, whoſe ſpeaking

* Lib. 1. cap. 1. paragraph 2.

† Cicero De Claris Oratoribus, cap. 58.

would have ſurpriſed me extremely, being very different from the language both of the family and country, if I had not known his mother, who ſpoke remarkably well. Both Cicero and Quintilian require alſo, that the paedagogues, that is, thoſe who attended children when they were very young, ſhould ſpeak well *. And I will add, that all the ſervants, and in general every body with whom they converſe, ſhould have nothing faulty in their pronunciation; for as it is by imitation that we learn to ſpeak, children of neceſſity imitate thoſe whom they hear. And it is true what Quintilian obſerves, that we are moſt tenacious of what we learn very young, and more tenacious of what is bad than of what is good; for what is good is eaſily changed for the worſt, but it is not eaſy to make the change contrarywiſe †.

When the child grows up, and becomes what we call a boy, the Romans employ-

* Cicero, ibid.—Quintil. ibid.

† Quintil. ibid.

ed men of genius, even poets, to form his pronunciation,

Os pueri tenerum balbumque Poeta figurat,

ſays Horace *. This buſineſs, among us, is committed to ſchoolmaſters, who ought to labour nothing more than to teach the boys to pronounce diſtinctly, neither too faſt nor too ſlow, and with proper variations of tone. And I maintain, that a boy incapable of learning any art or ſcience, may be taught to read or ſpeak any thing he underſtands, as well as it is poſſible, that is, as well as his natural faculties of ſpeech will admit. And the reaſon is, that ſpeaking is learned, as I have ſaid, by imitation. Now in that way we learn better in our childhood and early youth, than at any other time of our life. But I am afraid our ſchoolmaſters are at more pains to teach our children the grammar of the learned languages, than to pronounce well their own: And I doubt many of themſelves are not maſters of the art of pronun-

* Lib. 2. Epiſt. 1. v. 126.

ciation. But whatever be the cauſe, ſo it is, that I have known ſeveral boys who had their language made worſe at ſchool, though taught at Weſtminſter or Eaton, ſo far from being improved in their ſpeaking; and there are men, whom I have heard ſpeak in public, that, I am perſuaded, would have been orators, if they had been properly taught to ſpeak at ſchool.

Before a boy begins public ſpeaking, he ſhould learn to talk well in private converſation, without which no man ever was or ever will be a good public ſpeaker. His converſation, therefore, ſhould be carefully attended to; and he ſhould be taught not only to ſmile, but to laugh agreeably, which will make him a pleaſant companion, though he ſhould never be a public ſpeaker. The *dulce loqui* and the *ridere decorum*, which I mentioned above*, are very amiable qualities. And though nature muſt furniſh the materials there, and of every thing elſe belonging to us, yet art and

* P. 198.

teaching can do a great deal; for though we cannot alter the features of our face, nor the action of thoſe features in ſpeaking or laughing, yet we may correct, in ſome degree, their natural imperfections*. And, if we have the ſenſe of the Graceful and Becoming, we may make even an ugly face not diſagreeable.

* I knew a lady who was very handſome, and a celebrated toaſt, but whoſe ſmile was really a grimace. Now this, I am perſuaded, might have been corrected in ſome meaſure, if it had been early attended to, and her face would have been thereby much improved: For a ſmile is, I think, the moſt pleaſant action in the human face, and the moſt expreſſive of agreeable ſentiments. It is very different from laughing, which very often deforms the countenance, and very ſeldom expreſſes any ſentiment that is agreeable; yet the Latins have no word to diſtinguiſh it from the laugh. And in this reſpect not only the Greek, but even the Engliſh is a richer language than the Latin: For in Latin they could not expreſs what Sappho ſays of Venus,

Μιὶδιασας' αθανατω προσωπω.

Nor could they expreſs what the Engliſh poet has ſaid in his tranſlation of another ode of Sappho;

If we, naturally or from habit, ſpeak faſt and inarticulately, we may, by care and attention, correct that fault: And if we are addicted to immoderate burſts of laughter, we may certainly learn to laugh with more decorum, and not to ſpeak and laugh at the ſame time; or, what is worſe, to laugh, ſpeak, and eat all at once, as I have ſeen ſome people do. Boys ſhould alſo be carefully taught to repeat verſes well, and to try to procure that *ſuavitas oris* of Pomponius Atticus, which, as I have obſerved elſewhere, made him ſo agreeable to the great men of Rome *.

Before I quit this ſubject of private con-

" And hears and ſees thee, all the while,
" Softly ſpeak and ſweetly ſmile."

for a laugh may have decorum in it, like Horace's laugh, but it cannot have ſweetneſs. Of the difference betwixt laughing and ſmiling, and how properly Homer has marked that difference, ſee vol. 3d, p. 306, and 307.

* See vol. 4th, p. 301. See alſo what I have ſaid in general upon the Stile of Converſation, and what is neceſſary to make it agreeable. Ibid. p. 293, &c.

verſation, I muſt obſerve, that I have known ſome young people, who, ſtudying to ſpeak much better than others, have acquired a tone and manner of ſpeaking uncommon and unnatural. They ſpeak with a voice which the Italians call *voce finta*; and they appear as if they were acting a part, and ridiculing ſome body who talked in that affected way. Theſe gentlemen ought to know that nothing is good or pleaſant that is not natural; and even a rough ill-tuned natural voice, is better than ſuch a voice as they affect. Our young orator, therefore, ought to ſtudy to ſpeak, as Cicero directs, *ſono vocis recto et ſimplici, ut nihil oſtentationis aut imitationis afferre videatur* *.

* *De Oratore*, lib. 3. cap. 12.

CHAP. III.

Of the Education *neceſſary to make a ſpeaker.—Of action in ſpeaking, and what is comprehended under it.—Of the tone of Public Speaking.—The difference betwixt* Speaking, Talking, Prating, *and* Prattling.—*A voice and ear for Speaking as well as for Muſic.—The difference betwixt* Speaking *and* Talking *is in the tone of the voice.—What that difference is.—The young ſcholar to be exerciſed in ſpeaking, talking, and prating the ſame thing.—Of the tones of paſſion and ſentiment.—Without theſe there is a Monotony in ſpeaking.—Even where there is no variety of paſſion or ſentiment, difference of* matter *requires different tones —eſpecially in compoſition in periods with parentheſes.—Of Periods.—The ſenſe conveyed more forcibly by being ſuſ-*

pended, till it comes out at the end of the Period.—This Suſpenſe muſt be marked by the voice.—Practice of compoſing and ſpeaking Periods to be acquired by reading antient orations.—The ſtudent of oratory ſhould know the difference betwixt languages, and their excellencies and defects.—Our language ſuperior to the French, by having accents.—Thoſe accents too ſtrong in common uſe, ſo as to obſcure the following ſyllables.—They ſhould therefore be ſoftened by the ſpeaker.—Of Emphaſis.—*Uſe of it too common in public ſpeaking—it hurts both the ſenſe and ſound of a Period;—if very loud and frequent, it makes* barking *of ſpeaking.—Oratory ſhould not ſtudy too much the pleaſure of the ear by the uſe of the figure* Pariſoſis.—*The nature of this figure.—Intemperately uſed by Cicero.—Of the look, mein, and action of the features of the face in ſpeaking.—Art may do ſomething in that matter, but nature more.—Of the geſture of the body;—this from nature—but may be governed by art.—The orator muſt not be a pantomime, nor*

even a player.—Of the uſe of geſture among the French and Italians.—Among us not ſo much of it.—But there muſt be ſome.—It ſhould not be inſignificant nor too violent.—Of the appearance of Ulyſſes in Homer, when he began his ſpeeches;—this not an idea formed by Homer of a great ſpeaker, but a portrait of Ulyſſes.—Such an appearance not to be recommended to an orator.—The arts of Action and Pronunciation ought not to be neglected even in ſpeaking upon ſubjects of ſcience to men who underſtand the ſcience.

IN this chapter I am to treat of the Education which is neceſſary to form a ſpeaker, and particularly to make him excel in the moſt difficult parts of the art, I mean the Action; under which I include, as I have ſaid, not only the motion and geſture of the body, but the look and appearance of the ſpeaker, and above all the management of his voice *, which, as it is

* This is the definition given of Action by *Cicero de Oratore*, lib. 1. cap. 5. I have given the words in vol. 4th, p. 280.

the organ conveying to the hearer the ſenſe and ſentiments of the ſpeaker, muſt needs be principal in the art, as without it there could be no ſuch thing as an art of ſpeech of any kind.

The firſt thing, in my opinion, that a young ſpeaker ſhould learn, is to diſtinguiſh betwixt the tone of private converſation and Public Speaking, or betwixt *Talking* and *Speaking*; or, as the Latins expreſſed it, *Loqui* and *Dicere*, to which I think the Engliſh words *Talking* and *Speaking* correſpond. And, accordingly, when we ſay that a man is a ſpeaker, we mean that he is a public ſpeaker. And, I think, our young ſtudent ſhould learn alſo to make the diſtinction betwixt *Talking* and *Prating*, and alſo betwixt *Prating* and *Prattling*, which I hold to be the diminutive of Prating; ſo rich is our language in words expreſſing the different tones and manners of utterance, richer than any other language that I know.

That there is both a voice and an ear

for ſpeaking as well as for muſic, I think it is impoſſible to deny: And though a man may not have a voice that fits him for public ſpeaking, yet, if he has the ſenſe of hearing, and any degree of taſte or feeling, he will readily diſtinguiſh betwixt the tone of public ſpeaking and private converſation. To ſuch a man, if any one in company aſſumes the tone of public ſpeaking, it will give offence; and alſo, if a public ſpeaker ſhall deſcend to *talk*, and much more if he ſhall *prate* or *prattle*: But, however apparent theſe diſtinctions may be, there is nothing more common than to hear our ſpeakers *talk*, and, I am afraid, ſometimes *prate*: And ſo little is the art ſtudied and cultivated in Britain, that there are but few who have the tone of public ſpeaking, or are able to diſtinguiſh betwixt *talking* loud, or vehemently, and *ſpeaking*. Now, to make this diſtinction, is one of the firſt leſſons that our young ſpeaker ſhould learn: For he ſhould be taught to ſwell his voice, and to make it more deep and ſolemn, without making it louder; and his maſter ſhould exerciſe

him in reading or ſpeaking the ſame thing, firſt in the tone of public ſpeaking, then of talk or converſation, and laſt of all, to make him prate or prattle. And if he is well exerciſed in this way, his ear will ſoon be formed to perceive the difference, and he will neither declaim in private company, nor will he talk or prate in public.

The next thing that our young ſpeaker ſhould learn is the different tones of paſſion or ſentiment: For, as variety is required in every thing of which there is any art, a monotony is offenſive even in private converſation, and much more in public ſpeaking: For even where there is no paſſion or ſentiment expreſſed, yet, in conveying the ſenſe in a ſentence of any length, and of ſome variety in the matter, a change of tone is neceſſary to convey the ſenſe clearly. And if the compoſition be of the rhetorical kind, that is, in periods, with ſometimes a parentheſis, if the tone of the voice be not changed according to the variety of the ſentiment and the matter, it will not be intelligible. In place of vary-

ing the tone, many ſpeakers ſink their voice, and often when they mean to be very pathetic. But inſtead of expreſſing paſſion, they expreſs nothing at all; for they are not heard, at leaſt not diſtinctly.

As I have mentioned periods, I will ſay ſomething of them. To compoſe a Period well is not an eaſy matter; but, according to my obſervation, it ſhould ſeem, to pronounce them well is ſtill more difficult: For I have heard diſcourſes compoſed in periods, particularly ſermons, ſo ill pronounced, that I thought it would have been better if the periods had been broken down into ſhort ſentences. The great beauty of a period is, that it keeps the ſenſe ſuſpended, perhaps for ſome conſiderable time, till at laſt it brings it out at the end with more force than it could otherwiſe be conveyed; for by the ſuſpenſe it makes a greater impreſſion than it would otherwiſe do; and very often the impreſſion is made greater by ſurpriſe, ſomething not expected at the beginning of the Period, or even in the progreſs of it, being brought out in

the end. Now this ſuſpence muſt be expreſſed by the voice; and if the matter of the different members of the Period be various, ſo as to require different tones, and if the members be diſtinguiſhed from one another by proper pauſes, but ſtill preſerving the continuation of the ſenſe, it is the greateſt beauty of pronunciation, as it both pleaſes the ear, and conveys the ſenſe and argument in the moſt forcible manner; for it brings it all together to the mind, in which way only an argument can be rightly underſtood; for all argument is by ſyllogiſm. Now we cannot apprehend the truth of a ſyllogiſm, unleſs we have the premiſes and the concluſion in our view at the ſame time. And the δεινοτης of Demoſthenes, as they called it, was, I am perſuaded, chiefly owing to his collecting his arguments in Periods, and bringing them out ſo forcibly upon his hearers *.

To teach the ſcholar both to compoſe

* See what I have further ſaid upon Periods, vol. 4th, p. 408. and the paſſages there referred to.

and pronounce Periods, it is neceſſary that he ſhould be trained to read and to repeat antient orations, (for he can never be an orator if he is not a ſcholar), particularly thoſe of Demoſthenes, the beſt compoſed of any I know: And it muſt be his daily exerciſe; which in time will make both the compoſition and pronunciation of Periods eaſy to him, ſo that even when he ſpeaks extempore he will ſpeak in Periods. It was in this way, as I have elſewhere obſerved *, that the Duke of Wharton was trained by his father to be ſo great a ſpeaker.

Our young orator ſhould be taught to know the advantages and diſadvantages of the language in which he is to ſpeak. This is beſt known by comparing it, firſt, with the learned languages, and then with ſome modern languages, ſuch as the French. By comparing it with the learned languages he will find it defective in many things which adorn oratorial com-

* Vol. 4th, p. 244.

poſition, ſuch as melody and rhythm, and that variety of arrangement of words which the more perfect grammar of thoſe languages admits, and which gives a wonderful beauty and variety to compoſition in Greek and Latin. But the Engliſh has one thing in its pronunciation which the learned languages had not, and that is what we call Accent, by which the voice is raiſed and made louder upon one ſyllable of a word than upon another *. This I do not ſtate as a defect of thoſe languages; on the contrary, I ſhould have thought it a blemiſh in them, if with the melody and rhythm of their language they had mixed the beatings and thumpings of our accents, in which if there be any muſic, it is the muſic of a drum. But I think it is a defect in the French language, being without melody or rhythm, as well as ours, not to have them: For they give a variety to our pronunciation which the French have not, and enable us to make (what I think the fineſt compoſition in modern times) ſuch verſe as that of Milton, of which he has

* See vol. 4th, p. 32.

made the beſt orations that are to be found in any modern work. But this advantage of our language above the French, is attended with this diſadvantage, that it makes the pronunciation of it rough, and not unlike, as I have ſaid, the beating of a drum; and it makes the pronunciation of our words not clear and diſtinct, and indeed hardly intelligible to foreigners when they begin to learn our language; for the vehemence of our accents is ſuch, that it obſcures the following ſyllables of the word, of which we need no other example than the word *ſyllable* itſelf. This vehemence of accent is certainly not neceſſary in our language; for the Italians have accents ſuch as ours, and accordingly make blank verſe as well as we; but they pronounce diſtinctly the following ſyllables of the word, as well as the accented ſyllable *. I would therefore adviſe the young

* I have reaſon to think that this vehemence of accentuation, which diſtinguiſhes the Engliſh language ſo much from the Italian, and, I believe, from every other language in Europe, was not practiſed formerly in England ſo much as it is at preſent; for I have been

ſpeaker not to aggravate this blemiſh of the language, by ſounding our accents too violently, but rather to ſoften them in the pronunciation, and thereby give as much ſmoothneſs to his utterance as the language will admit of.

Beſides this violence of our accents, there is a thing very much practiſed by our public ſpeakers, and ſometimes even

told by ſome gentlemen who have been in America, and particularly by one who was there many years, that the people of New England do not accent ſyllables with near ſo much violence as the people of Old England do at preſent; and for that reaſon they ſpeak more clearly and intelligibly. The fact appears to be, that the people of New England have preſerved the language they brought with them, which was the language ſpoken in England in the days of Milton, when men both ſpoke and wrote better in England than they do now: For I am afraid that nothing is improved in England ſince that time, but, on the contrary, has grown worſe, and among other things language; and I have elſewhere obſerved, that ſince I was educated, among Engliſh gentlemen at a foreign univerſity, half a century ago, the language is worſe, both in the phraſeology and the pronunciation, particularly as it is ſpoken by the younger people. See vol. 4th, p. 116. 118. and 119.; and alſo p. 167. and following.

in private converſation, called Emphaſis, by which one word in a ſentence is ſounded much louder and ſtronger than the other words. Whether this was in uſe among the antients, I will not pretend to determine: All I know is, that it is not mentioned in any antient book upon the ſubject of grammar or rhetoric: And the Greeks had particles, ſuch as μεν, δε, γε, δη *, τοι, μεντοι, and the like, by which

* This particle δη is of great emphaſis, and is uſed to denote that, what follows deſerves the particular attention of the reader or the hearer. The Latins ſupply the want of it very clumſily, I think, by the word *ſcilicet*: As in a paſſage of Virgil, in the ſecond Georgic, where he ſays, ſpeaking of the life of farmers, and the way they paſſed their holidays,

Hanc vitam veteres olim coluere Sabini,
Hanc Remus et frater; hinc fortis Etruria crevit,
Scilicet et rerum facta eſt pulcherrima Roma.

which laſt line might be thus tranſlated into Greek,

Και ΔΗ εγενετο καλλιστη πολις Ρωμη.

The particles γε and τοι ſerve alſo to excite the attention of the reader. The others I have mentioned ſerve for the purpoſe of connection. See further upon the ſubject of theſe particles, vol. 4th, p. 63. and following.

they excited the attention of the hearers to certain parts of the ſentence more than to others, ſo that they did not need to excite that attention by raiſing their voice above the level of the ſpeech, and ſo making their language bound, as it were, and hop. But be that as it will, it is certain that our accents and our emphaſis, joined together, do deſtroy all ſmoothneſs and roundneſs in the ſpeeches of many of our orators, and make them reſemble barking rather than ſpeaking: And particularly they deſtroy altogether the pronunciation of a period; for they call off the attention of the hearer from that continuation of the ſenſe, which it is neceſſary he ſhould carry on to the end of the period. And beſides, it deſtroys the roundneſs and flow of the ſound of the period. This I have obſerved, particularly in hearing ſome men read the periods of Milton's Paradiſe Loſt, which they made hardly intelligible by their many and violent emphaſes, though they imagined that they made in that way the ſenſe much clearer and ſtronger, which,

I believe, is the reaſon that they are ſo much uſed: But where there are many emphaſes, even though they be not extraordinarily loud, there are truly none at all. I do not, however, adviſe our young ſpeaker to pronounce no words more emphatically than others. An emphaſis, upon ſome words in our language, is neceſſary, to call the attention of the hearer to the thing ſignified by them, and thereby to ſupply the want of ſuch particles in Greek as I have mentioned. But they ſhould not be too frequent, nor too loud or vehement, ſo as to deſtroy the roundneſs and ſmoothneſs of ſpeaking.

The oratorial compoſition, as it ſhould not be rough and unpleaſant in its ſound, ſo it ought not to ſtudy too much the pleaſure of the ear by the too frequent uſe of the figure which the Greeks call παρισωσις, by which *like* is referred to *like*, *contrary* to *contrary*, and words of the ſame form and ſtructure made to anſwer one to another. Of this figure of ſpeech I have ſpoken at ſome length in the third volume of this

work*, where I have ſhewn that Cicero has uſed it very intemperately, even in ſpeeches of buſineſs; for in epideictic orations, which are compoſed only to pleaſe and entertain, they may not only be tolerated, but conſidered as an ornament ſuited to the ſubject. But even Iſocrates (I have obſerved) in his panegyrical orations, has not been ſo immoderate in the uſe of them as Cicero. And thus much may ſuffice for what may be called the vocal part of Action.

As to the other part of Action, relating to the look, the air, the mein, and the action of the face in ſpeaking, nature muſt be the governing principle, and muſt do almoſt the whole. Yet art will do ſomething; for if we have a ſenſe of what is becoming and dignified, without which art can do nothing, the face and mein may be compoſed to expreſs gravity and dignity ſuitable to the ſubject of the oration. And if there be any thing aukward or un-

* P. 85. and following.

gracious in the action of our features when we ſpeak, that may in ſome meaſure be corrected, at leaſt ſo far as to expreſs nothing vulgar or mean. But if the ſpeaker have no natural gravity nor dignity, he had better not try to aſſume it; for an affectation of that kind is more offenſive, and makes the ſpeaker more contemptible than his native vulgarity. At the ſame time, if he be a man of abilities, and a good actor as well as ſpeaker, he may venture to imitate gravity and dignity, and, like Belial in Milton, ſeem at leaſt

"For dignity compos'd and high exploit;"

and *if his tongue drop manna*, and if he can, like Gorgias the Sophiſt,

——————— make the worſe appear
The better reaſon,———————

he will attain to great reputation as an orator, and will acquire wealth, and place, and power, which are the things now aimed at by ſpeaking.

As to Geſture, the laſt thing to be conſidered belonging to Action, nature certainly

no doubt prompts us to expreſs our ſentiments by ſome action of the body. But this, as well as other things that are natural to us, may be governed and regulated by art. There was a great art among the antients, by which all ſentiments and paſſions were expreſſed by the action of the body alone, without the voice. This was the art of the Pantomimes, once the great delight of the people of Rome. But in rhetoric the action of the body never can be ſeparated from the words; But theſe may be accompanied with proper geſtures, correſponding to the things ſignified by them. And this was beginning to be formed into an art among the Greeks, as Ariſtotle has informed us in the firſt chapter of his third book upon rhetoric; and he gives it the name of ὑποκριτικη, or the *Players Art:* And if the orator was not too much of a player, I am perſuaded it muſt have had a great effect upon the people to whom he ſpoke, and accordingly Ariſtotle tells us that it had.

That there was a great deal of this ac-

tion in later times, both among the Greeks and Romans, we are ſure. Quintilian ſpeaks a great deal of the geſtures of the orator, and particularly of the action of his hands, without which, he ſays, all other action is weak and imperfect. How many motions the hands have, he adds, cannot be expreſſed: For, ſays he, other parts of the body aſſiſt the ſpeaker, but they may be ſaid to ſpeak themſelves; for with them we aſk, we promiſe, call, let go, threaten, ſupplicate, abominate, interrogate, deny, expreſs joy, ſadneſs, doubt, confeſſion, and repentance, with a good deal more to the ſame purpoſe; and he concludes with ſaying, that in ſuch a difference of languages in different nations, this ſeems to be the common language of men *. In modern times there is a good deal of geſture among the French and Italians, and not only in public ſpeaking, but in private converſation, they expreſs a

* Lib. 11. *Inſtitutionum* cap. 3. p. 461. of the edition Roline.

great deal by geſture *. In Britain there is much leſs of it; but it is ſo natural a kind of expreſſion, that there muſt be ſome of it even in private converſation; and I think there ought to be more of it in public ſpeaking, in order to give life and animation to what is ſaid. If a man was to harrangue, with his arms hanging down by his ſides, like an Egyptian ſtatue, or ſuppoſe a little action with one hand, but the other in his breeches, which I have ſeen, he certainly would not move the paſſions of his hearers, nor engage their attention, at leaſt by his attitude and geſture. Or, if he were to claſp his hands, and move only his thumbs, which is the only action I have obſerved of a celebrated preacher, he could not, I think, much move his audience †. But though

* See concerning the action of the antient orators, and of the pleaders in Italy at this day, vol. 4th, p. 280.

† As our arms and hands are very uſeful, and indeed of abſolute neceſſity in the practice of the arts of life, ſo the action of them may be very graceful and

ſuch an action be ſo gentle as to be quite inſignificant, there is a rude and noiſy action which I like worſe, ſuch as that of beating upon any form or bench that

becoming; or, on the contrary, very awkward and ungraceful. Ovid adviſes a lady,

Si vox eſt, canta; ſi mollia brachia, ſalta.

And it is well known that the antients danced as much, or more, with their arms, as with their feet: And motion to muſic, expreſſing ſentiments and paſſions, was called by them *Dancing*. Now the grace of motion is, as I have obſerved elſewhere, (vol. 4th, p. 295 and following), much too little ſtudied in Britain. The faſhion was ſometime ago, (what it is now I know not), that the ladies danced even country dances, with their arms hanging down by their ſides, as if they had been pinned to them. The men, in walking, inſtead of making the motion of their arms correſpond with the motion of the legs and of the body, as it naturally ſhould do, diſpoſe of their arms and hands in various ways. Some I have ſeen hang their arms from their arm-pits by the thumbs: Others put their hands into their breeches; others into their waiſtcoat pockets, with the thumbs exerted, which they ſometimes move like the preacher above-mentioned; and I have ſeen ſome hide them in the pockets of their coats, which they make project before them as they walk. And all this, it is evident, they do from an affectation of what is graceful and becoming.

happens to be near the ſpeaker, (and I have known ſome of theſe orators who beat a ruff upon the bench); for if this be joined with a violent emphaſis, which is commonly the caſe, it is barking and thumping, not ſpeaking. The action, therefore, ſhould be moderate, natural, and graceful: And it ſhould have nothing of mimickry in it, as Quintilian, in the paſſage above quoted, has very well obſerved; for an orator ſhould not be a pantomime, nor even an actor. He ſhould not, therefore, endeavour to imitate by his geſture any thing that he may have occaſion to deſcribe. This Quintilian has very well illuſtrated by a paſſage from Cicero *.

With reſpect to this kind of action, there is a remarkable paſſage in Homer, deſcribing the appearance of Ulyſſes riſing to ſpeak among the Trojans, when he was ſent by the Greeks along with Menelaus to demand the reſtitution of Helen. It is in the ſpeech of Antenor to Helen,

* Ibid. p. 462.

in the third Iliad *. He ſays, when he firſt roſe, he looked down, fixing his eyes upon the ground, and ſtood without moving his ſceptre at all, either forward or backward. 'This (ſays Antenor) made 'him look like a man ſenſeleſs or out 'of his wits; but when he began to utter 'his great commanding voice, and the 'words fell from him, thick as a ſhower 'of ſnow in winter, then we found that no 'other man could contend with Ulyſſes 'in eloquence, and quite forgot his figure 'and attitude when he firſt roſe to ſpeak.'

This deſcription of Ulyſſes is, I am perſuaded, a portrait taken from an authentic account which the poet has had of the manner of Ulyſſes, and not an ideal figure, repreſenting what the poet thought beautiful and graceful in ſpeaking; for it is only Ulyſſes that he has deſcribed addreſſing himſelf to his audience in that manner, not any other ſpeaker either in the Iliad or Odyſſey: And I think it is very ſuitable to the character of Ulyſſes, who was the moſt

* Ver. 203.

artful of men, practiſed in all kinds of deceit and impoſition,

Εἰδὼς παντοίους τε δόλους καὶ μηδέα τυκνα.

And no doubt his ſtupid appearance, when he firſt roſe, would make his eloquence more ſurpriſing and ſtriking when he began to ſpeak. This, however, I would not adviſe any modern orator to imitate; nor do I know that it was imitated by any Greek or Latin orator in later times. At the ſame time I think the contrary extreme of appearing too bold, aſſuming, and arrogant, is more to be avoided.

I will conclude this ſubject of Pronunciation and Action, with obſerving, that though Action have ſo great an effect upon a popular audience, that it is the chief part of oratory, yet it is not to be neglected in ſpeaking upon any ſubject of art or ſcience, ſuch as law, even to a few judges who underſtand the ſcience; for though Ariſtotle ſay that the arts of oratory, relating to the ſtile and the pronunciation, are chiefly intended for the people, yet

we ſhould ſpeak even to men of ſcience, ſo as not to offend their ears*. But I will add, that we ought even to pleaſe their ears, though that to be ſure ought not to be our chief ſtudy; for an argument in flowing language, well pronounced, and coming from a graceful perſon, will affect the cooleſt judge more than the ſame argument in rough and unpoliſhed language, ill pronounced, and coming from a perſon that has neither dignity nor grace. The arts therefore of pronunciation ought not to be neglected by any ſpeaker of any kind, whether upon ſubjects Deliberative, Judicial, or Panegyrical.

* *Rhetoricor.* lib. 3. cap. 1.

BOOK IV.

Of those who have excelled in the Rhetorical Art.

CHAP. I.

Subject of this Book.—Examples of those who have excelled in this art, taken chiefly from the Greeks.—The first example from Homer.—The eulogiums upon Homer by the Halicarnassian, Hermogenes, and Quintilian.—Of the speeches in the Iliad—more in number than in any other poem.—Examples of them;—and first, Agamemnon's speech to the army, in the second book:—That a most artful speech:—The speeches of Ulysses and Nestor upon the same occasion—different, but well suited to their characters:—In the ninth book, containing the embassy by

the Greeks to Achilles, there is the fineſt ſpeaking to be found in the Iliad;—the ſpeeches of Ulyſſes, Phoenix, Ajax, very different from one another—but wonderfully ſuited to their characters and the occaſion:—The compoſition in the ſpeech of Achilles, remarkably diſtinguiſhed from any other compoſition in Homer.—The character of Diomede very well marked by his ſpeaking on two important occaſions:—The different effects of his ſpeaking, upon the Greeks, compared with the effect which the ſpeaking of Neſtor and Ulyſſes had upon them:—Diomede's character alſo marked by his not ſpeaking.

HAVING, in the preceding part of this work, delivered the precepts of the Rhetorical art, I come now to ſpeak of thoſe who have excelled in it. And, as I hold that the ancients have excelled us in all the fine arts *, and as it is from

* See what I have further ſaid upon this ſubject, vol. 4th, book 2. cap. 2.

them that I have given the precepts of the art, ſo it is by examples taken likewiſe from them, that I intend to illuſtrate thoſe precepts: And theſe examples will be chiefly taken from the Greeks; for I think I have given very good reaſons why the Greeks excelled the Romans in all the fine arts *.

I will begin with Homer, as the ſtandard of perfection not only in poetry, but in rhetoric, and indeed in every kind of compoſition. For he was the father of letters and the fountain of all learning among the Greeks: And they compared him to the ocean, from which, as Homer himſelf tells us, all fountains, all rivers, and all ſeas are derived †. And Hermogenes has ſaid, that he has excelled all poets, rhetoricians, and writers of every kind, in every ſpecies of writing ‡. And

* Chap. 6th of book 2d of this volume.

† Dionyſius περὶ συνθέσεως, cap. 24.

‡ Hermogenes, περὶ ἰδεῶν. tom. 2. περὶ πολιτικοῦ λόγου.

Quintilian has made an eulogium upon him, which I will give in his own words, as I think it is one of the beſt things that Quintilian has written: 'Igitur, ut Aratus ab Jove incipiendum putat, ita nos rite coepturi ab Homero videmur. Hic enim (quemadmodum ex oceano, dicit ipſe, amnium vim fontiumque curſus initium capere), omnibus eloquentiae partibus exemplum et ortum dedit: Hunc nemo in magnis ſublimitate, in parvis proprietate ſuperaverit. Idem laetus ac preſſus, jucundus et gravis, tum copia tum brevitate mirabilis; nec poeticâ modo ſed oratoriâ virtute eminentiſſimus.' And a little after, 'Quid? in verbis, ſententiis, figuris, diſpoſitione totius operis, nonne humani ingenii modum excedit? Ut magni ſit viri virtutes ejus, non emulatione (quod fieri non poteſt) ſed intellectu ſequi; verum hic omnes ſine dubio, et in omni genere eloquentiae procul a ſe reliquit*.'

* Lib. 10. cap. 1.

To ſhew that theſe authors are not miſtaken, in praiſing Homer ſo much for his excellence in rhetoric, I will give ſome few inſtances from the many ſpeeches that we have in the Iliad, more I believe than in any other narrative poem: For though in the Odyſſey Ulyſſes ſpeaks through five books, and Æneas in Virgil through two, theſe ſpeeches are not of the rhetorical kind, but of the narrative, and therefore are plainly hiſtorical.

The firſt ſpeech in Homer I ſhall mention is the ſpeech of Agamemnon to the army in the ſecond Iliad, which is the moſt artful ſpeech I ever read, and a perfect maſterpiece of the kind: For he there uſes arguments to perſuade the Greeks to leave Troy and return home, which ought to have perſuaded them to ſtay. Now this ſhews him to have been a king who knew perfectly well how to manage a popular aſſembly. He knew how unpopular a thing he had done by quarrelling with Achilles, and that if he had directly adviſed them to take the field without him,

they would not have been diſpoſed to liſten to him; and beſides, he would have made himſelf anſwerable for the ill ſucceſs of the war. At the ſame time to have uſed ſtrong and concluſive arguments to perſuade them to go, would have been imprudent: For they might have made ſuch an impreſſion upon them, that the other leaders could not, as was concerted, have perſuaded them to ſtay. This concert I think was a maſter-piece of policy, and ſhews that Homer underſtood the art of government as well as he did the art of war*.

* That he underſtood very well the art of *Tactics*, is evident from a paſſage in Iliad 13th, v. 711. and following, where he relates that the Locrians, who followed Ajax of Oïleus, not being heavy armed men, but only bowmen and archers, were drawn up in the ſecond line behind the heavy armed men, over whoſe heads they annoyed the Trojans ſo much by their miſſiles, that they broke their phalanx. This is an advantage, and I think a very great advantage, that the bow and arrow has over our fire arms: And by availing himſelf of this advantage, William the Conqueror gained the battle of Haſtings and the kingdom of England; for he himſelf, at the head of his

In the ſame book we have a ſpecimen of the eloquence of Ulyſſes and of Neſtor, the two greateſt orators among the Greeks. Ulyſſes, in his ſpeech to the people, diſſuading them from going, adviſes them, and argues with them, perſuading them to truſt to the omen he mentions, and the interpretation given of it by Calchas. Neſtor, on the other hand, aſſumes a tone very different, for he ſcolds them, and threatens them; and adviſes Agamemnon to uſe his authority, and to order and arrange them properly in the battle, by

horſe, charged the Saxon foot, who were drawn up in a very deep phalanx, upon which he could make no impreſſion; but he broke them by his Norman archers, who were drawn up in the ſecond line behind the cavalry, and over their heads poured down ſuch a ſhower of arrows upon the Saxon phalanx, that they could not keep their ground; and Harold their king was killed by an arrow. See a very accurate account of this battle in Lord Lyttleton's hiſtory of England. This coincidence betwixt the tactics of Homer and thoſe of William the Conqueror is the more remarkable, that I do not know that ſuch an order of battle has ever been uſed from the time of the Trojan war, till it was uſed by the Conqueror.

dividing them into nations and tribes. Such a ſpeech was ſuitable to the age of Neſtor, and the authority which it gave him; but it would have been improper from the mouth of Ulyſſes.

But the fineſt ſpeaking in the Iliad, and which beſt diſtinguiſhes the characters of the ſpeakers, is in the ninth book, where we have an account given us of the embaſſy to Achilles, and of the ſpeeches of the three ambaſſadors, and of Achilles to them. Ulyſſes's ſpeech there is of the ſame kind as that above-mentioned in the ſecond book, a ſpeech of reaſoning, containing many arguments to perſuade Achilles to join the army, ſuch as the imminent hazard both fleet and army were in of being totally deſtroyed—the glory he would acquire by ſaving them, when no other means of doing that could be deviſed—the preſents offered him by Agamemnon, which he enumerates very particularly—the regard he ought to have for the other Greeks, who honoured him like

a god, though he had none at all for Agamemnon—and, laſtly, he tells him, that if he now took the field, he would have the glory of killing Hector, who would now encounter him, being ſo elated with his ſucceſs, that he thought no Greek was a match for him. Achilles's anſwer is as much in character as poſſible. He ſets out with declaring, that he always ſpoke his mind freely, and that he hated every man who thought one thing and ſpoke another. This character which he gives himſelf, is directly oppoſite to that of Ulyſſes, who exceeded all men in artifice and cunning, and, as we ſee from the Odyſſey, where he is the hero, very frequently told ſtories that he knew to be falſe. Achilles then proceeds to relate his own ſervices to the common cauſe, and to expreſs, in the ſtrongeſt terms, his reſentment againſt Agamemnon, who had treated him ſo ill in return for ſuch ſervices. And here we may obſerve Homer uſes very properly a ſtile not only quite different from that of his narrative, but from that of any other of his ſpeeches; for

he has in one place a ſtring of interrogations, to the number of four, all following one another *. And in another place he has a ſtring of ſhort unconnected ſentences, to the number of ſeven, very uncommon in Homer †. The ſpeech of Phoenix follows that of Achilles, and is of a kind very different from that of Ulyſſes. He begins it crying; and the whole of it is ſupplicating more than reaſoning. He tells him that if he was poſitive to go, he ſhould not go without him: then he relates how his father Peleus had given him the charge to inſtruct him, and how accordingly he had done ſo, having taught him both to act and ſpeak. Next he relates his own ſtory, and how kindly he had been received by Achilles's father Peleus, and how he treated Achilles, when an infant, as if he had been his nurſe. Then he uſes religious motives with him, and concludes with the ſtory of

* Iliad 9. v. 337 and following.

† Ibid. 375. and following.

Meleager, who had quarrelled with his friends, as Achilles had done, but was appeaſed, and by his valour ſaved his country. The effect of this ſpeech was ſuch upon Achilles, that he deſired that Phoenix would ſtay with him when the other ambaſſadors went away; and inſtead of going to-morrow, as he ſaid to Ulyſſes he would do, he was to deliberate, when the morning came, whether he ſhould go or not.

After this Ajax ſpeaks; and it is as much in the character of a rough blunt ſoldier as can well be imagined. He addreſſes himſelf, not to Achilles, as the other ſpeakers had done, but to Ulyſſes; and adviſes that they ſhould go away and give an account of their ill ſucceſs to the Greeks. Then he ſpeaks of Achilles in the third perſon, and reproaches him with being more obſtinate and inexorable than a man whoſe brother had been killed by another. And he concludes with addreſſing himſelf to Achilles, and requeſting him to have a regard to his roof and to

his greateſt friends among the Greeks who were under it. This manner of ſpeaking of Ajax, ſo different from that of the other ſpeakers, makes a moſt agreeable variety: And it had an effect upon Achilles, very different from that of the ſpeech of Ulyſſes, and ſuch as might be expected from his character, which reſembled much more the character of Ajax than of Ulyſſes *.

* There is an excellent obſervation on the different characters of theſe ſpeakers in a *Scholium* of Victorius, a Florentine, a great Greek Scholar of the 16th century, to be ſeen in Barnes's edition of Homer, p. 366. upon v. 618. of Iliad 9. All his *Scholia* upon this 9th book of Homer, are well worth the reading, not only for the matter, but for the ſtile, which is excellent Greek: For Greek in that very learned age, the moſt learned that has been ſince the reſtoration of letters, was commonly written, and even ſpoken by men of letters, who converſed in that language with the refugee Greeks, that came from Conſtantinople and could not ſpeak Latin, that tongue being entirely loſt in Greece. Of the Italians who wrote Greek with the greateſt purity, there was Strozza, a Florentine nobleman, who writes a very good ſupplement to Ariſtotle's books of Polity, in ſuch excellent Greek, that I cannot diſtinguiſh his ſtile from that of Ariſtotle,

I will only mention one other character, which, I think, is wonderfully marked by

(See vol. 3d of Ant. Metaphyſics, p. 45 of the preface): And Ariſtotle's books of *Economics*, we have preſerved to us, only in the Greek tranſlation from a Latin tranſlation, (the original having been loſt) by one Tuſcanus (vol. 5th of this work, p. 370.) Of the ſame century is alſo Wolfius, a profeſſor in Switzerland, who writes a *proœmium* or introduction to Demoſthenes's Orations, which Taylor, in his edition of Demoſthenes, has publiſhed. The next I ſhall mention is Lambinus, a profeſſor in the Univerſity of Paris, who has publiſhed an edition of Demoſthenes, which he has dedicated to Henry III. of France, with a Greek epiſtle, which, for elegance of the ſtile, and the perfect purity of the language, is inferior to very few things that have come down to us from antient times. Nor was this ſtudy and knowledge of the Greek confined to Italy and France: For in England there was in that age, not only private men and profeſſors in univerſities, but perſons of the higheſt rank, who were famous for their Greek learning: For, beſides Chancellor More, there was Queen Elizabeth; and Lady Jane Grey, not only underſtood and wrote the Greek, but ſpoke it.—See p. 193. of this volume, and p. 258. of vol. 4th.

That the writing of Greek, as well as the ſpeaking of it, is now entirely diſuſed, is, I am afraid no good ſign of the learning of the age, any more than of the

his ſpeaking. It is the character of Diomede. When the ambaſſadors from Troy came to the Greeks, and offered them, in the name of Paris, to reſtore all the wealth he had carried away with Helen, and more beſides, but not Helen herſelf; the Greeks, upon this offer, ſat ſilent a long while, deliberating what they ſhould do. At laſt Diomede aroſe, and made a very ſhort ſpeech, ſaying that they ought not to receive neither the wealth, nor even Helen herſelf, if ſhe had been offered. The effect of this ſpeech upon the Greeks is deſcribed in the following lines:

Ὣς ἐφάθ'· οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπιάχοντ' υἱες Ἀχαιῶν,
Μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι Διομήδεος ἱπποδάμοιο.

Iliad. Lib. 7. v. 303.

taſte; for it is certainly a language much finer in every reſpect than the Latin. And even the little that is now written in Latin in Europe, is ſo written, that it had better been written in any other language, except in Italy, where we have ſeveral writers of this century, who write moſt elegant Latin: So that I begin to conſider Italy as not only the country of fine arts, but of learning.

where we may obſerve how different the effect of this ſpeech of Diomede was upon the Greeks from the effect of the ſpeeches even of Neſtor and Ulyſſes; for when they ſpoke it is only ſaid of the Greeks,

——Οἱ δ' ἀρα του μαλα μιν κλυον ηδ' επιθοντο.

There is another ſpeech of Diomede, much of the ſame kind, related in the beginning of the ninth book, where Agamemnon, in a ſecret council of the chiefs, adviſes them to leave Troy and take to their ſhips, not feignedly as he did in the aſſembly in the ſecond book, but ſincerely, as their affairs were then in a very deſperate ſituation: After this ſpeech the Greeks ſat ſilent a long time, till at laſt Diomede roſe, and putting Agamemnon in mind how he had reproached him with being weak and cowardly, tells him, that the ſons of Greece were not ſo unwarlike as to take his advice, and to return without taking Troy. But, ſays he, if you have a mind to go, the way is open, and your ſhips are ready to carry you back to My-

cene. The other Greeks will ſtay and take the town: Or if they will go likewiſe, let them go, Sthenelus and I will ſtay and take the town *. And this ſpeech of his was received with the ſame acclamations, as the ſpeech above-mentioned. As Julius Caeſar was an excellent ſcholar, as well as a great general, I think it is probable that he had this paſſage of Homer in view, when, in the ſpeech which he made to his ſoldiers, to encourage them to march againſt Arioviſtus and his Germans, and not to be frightened with the terrible reports they had heard of them from the Gauls, he concludes, like Diomede, with ſaying, that if the reſt of the army would not follow him, he and the tenth legion would go againſt the Germans.

And not only does Diomede ſhew his character in this manner by ſpeaking, but alſo by not ſpeaking: For, in the fourth

* Iliad 9. v. 32. and following.

Iliad *, when Agamemnon, making the round of his army, came to where Diomede was poſted, and finding him not advancing to engage, reproached him with being a degenerate ſon of ſo brave a father, one of whoſe exploits he relates. To this, Homer ſays, Diomede made no anſwer, from reſpect and reverence to the king: and not only did he not ſpeak himſelf, but he rebuked Sthenelus, who anſwered Agamemnon, by telling him that he lied, for that they were better men than their fathers.

* V. 370, &c.

CHAP. II.

Of the Orators of later times in Greece and Rome.—Of the difficulty of excelling in that art, greater than in any other art; —therefore ſo few eminent orators either in Greece or Rome.—Yet it was an art very much practiſed, not only in peace but in war.—Pericles the greateſt orator that ever was in Greece.—Nothing of him come down to us.—Demoſthenes the next greateſt in Greece, and Cicero in Rome.—Theſe two compared together.—Quintilian's judgment of Cicero.—The high eulogium beſtowed upon him by that critic.—Not much regard to be paid to the ſtile of the writers in Quintilian's age, nor to their taſte and judgment.—Cicero had not that magnanimity and elevation of mind which is neceſſary to form a great orator;—Therefore he ſpoke with fear and trembling before a people

whom he deſpiſed as the dregs of Romulus.—*The* vanity *of Cicero another reaſon why he could not excel in his art.—Examples of this vanity.—Beſides the vanity of the individual, he had a* national *vanity, which made him ſpeak of the Greeks with contempt.—Of the poetry of Cicero.—Connected with his* vanity, *was his taſte for the* ridiculous.—*This taſte he has conſidered as neceſſary for an orator, and has given precepts for it at great length.—Quintilian has collected many of the jeſts in his orations.—Difference betwixt Cicero and Demoſthenes or even the beſt comic writers.—Of the qualities of body poſſeſſed by Cicero.—By nature weak and infirm.—That increaſed by his too great vehemence in ſpeaking.—A very bad account given of his action and pronunciation by himſelf.—To correct this manner he travelled to Athens and to Aſia.—Returned very much improved.—He learned therefore not only to write from Greek maſters, but alſo to ſpeak and pronounce.—One defect in the pronuncia-*

tion of Cicero, that he does not appear to have ſtudied the melody, but only the rhythm of his language.—In this reſpect his pronunciation very different from that of Demoſthenes.—The way, that Cicero learned the art of ſpeaking, ſuch, that he could not have been an orator like Demoſthenes.—It was by practiſing declamation that he learned.—Of the nature of that kind of ſpeaking.—Of the difference betwixt the Greek and Latin rhetoricians.—Of the figures of compoſition relating to the ſound.—Theſe ought not to be much ſtudied in ſpeeches of buſineſs.—But one thing relating to the ſound much ſtudied by the antient orators, viz. the rhythm.—Of the rhythm of their proſe.—The nature of it.—Some denied the exiſtence of it.—Of the melody of the Greek language, and the variety of that melody.—Cicero ſays nothing of the melody of the Latin language.—His oratory therefore defective in that reſpect.—Of the muſic of Demoſthenes's compoſition—not ſuch an ornament as could draw the

attention of the hearer from the matter. Cicero appears to have had no idea of the melody of oratorial compoſition.—He has adorned his ſtile by other figures of the ſound, which are of the poetical kind.—An account given of theſe figures:—Alſo with figures of the ſenſe that are poetical, ſuch as Exclamation *and* Proſopopoea.—*The Halicarnaſſian's opinion of Demoſthenes.—The Author's opinion of Cicero, the reverſe of that of Quintilian.—Cicero's critical works very much better than his Orations.—Praiſe of his dialogue* De Oratore.—*His ſtile extremely copious.—Very well imitated by ſome late Italian writers in Latin.*

I DESCEND from Homer, and thoſe antient times, to ſpeak of the famous Orators of Greece and Rome of later times. As eloquence is an art requiring ſuch eminent qualities not only of mind but of body, by which it is diſtinguiſhed, as I have obſerved, from all the fine arts *, and ſo is truly,

* See chap. 1. of book 1. of this volume.

what Cicero has ſaid it is, an art *incredibili magnitudine et difficultate*, it is no wonder that ſo few have excelled in it, many fewer than in any other art or ſcience: For we read of many great generals in Greece and Rome, many fine poets, ſculptors, and painters, philoſophers, too, and men eminent in different ſciences; but we hear of very few great orators: Athens, when it was in all its glory, and when it might be ſaid to be the domicile of arts and ſciences, produced only ten great orators. And as to the Romans, there is only one of any great reputation, whoſe orations have come down to us, I mean Cicero: And yet all public buſineſs, both among the Greeks and Romans, was carried on by ſpeaking; and in Athens no man could be ſure either of his life or fortune, unleſs he could ſpeak: For men there were not allowed advocates to plead their cauſe; but were obliged to defend themſelves both in civil and criminal cauſes: For though they uſed orations compoſed by others, they were obliged to ſpeak them themſelves. Even in military affairs, oratory was prac-

tiſed, eſpecially among the Romans: Julius Caeſar frequently harrangued his ſoldiers, particularly before his battle with Arioviſtus, in order to allay that fright into which the Gauls had thrown his ſoldiers, by telling them ſuch frightful ſtories of the ſize and ſtrength and valour of the Germans. And upon occaſion of the loſs which he ſuffered in the civil war, at Dyracchium, he likewiſe made a ſpeech to his ſoldiers. And alſo he harrangued his men, when they were drawn up to fight the great and deciſive battle of Pharſalia: And, he ſays, it was *ex more militari*; that is, it is cuſtomary to do ſo upon ſuch occaſions.

The greateſt orator, I believe, that ever was in Greece or Rome, was Pericles*: But of him nothing remains. Of all the other orators of Greece, Demoſthenes was undoubtedly the moſt renowned: And of him many orations have come down to us, both in public and private cauſes. Cicero, as I have ſaid, was the moſt

* See p. 215. of this volume.

eminent orator that Rome has produced: and of him a great many orations of different kinds have been preſerved to us. And I am now to compare together theſe two orators, and give my opinion which of them I think the beſt.

If we were to be determined by the judgment of Quintilian in this matter, the preference muſt be given to Cicero, of whom he ſpeaks, in ſeveral paſſages of his *Inſtitutions*, in the higheſt ſtile of admiraion. In one paſſage, he ſays, his eloquence was divine*; in another paſſage he denominates him *praecipuus in eloquentia vir*†.— The laſt paſſage I ſhall quote is from book

* Lib. 10. cap. 2. ſec. 2. where he is talking of that common clauſule of Cicero's periods, *eſſe videatur*; and which he uſed *uſque ad nauſeam*, as was obſerved by his cotemporaries. Quintilian's words are, 'Noveram quoſdam, qui ſe pulchre expreſſiſſe genus illud coeleſtis hujus in dicendo viri ſibi viderentur, ſi in clauſula poſuiſſent, *eſſe videatur*.'

† Lib. 6. cap. 3. ſec. 1.

10. cap. 1. ſec. 3. where he makes his eulogium in theſe words: 'Mihi videtur 'Marcus Tullius, cum ſe totum ad imita-'tionem Graecorum contuliſſet, effinxiſſe 'vim Demoſthenis, copiam Platonis, ju-'cunditatem Iſocratis; nec vero, quod in 'quoque optimum fuit, ſtudio conſecutus 'eſt tantum, ſed plurimas, vel potius om-'nes, ex ſeipſo, virtutes extulit immortalis 'ingenii beatiſſima ubertate. Non enim 'pluvias (ut ait Pindarus) aquas colligit, 'ſed vivo gurgite exundat, dono quo-'dam providentiae genitus, in quo to-'tas vires ſuas eloquentia experiretur.' And accordingly he appears to have ſtudied Demoſthenes but very little; at leaſt almoſt all the examples and illuſtrations of his precepts are taken from Cicero. But I do not admire the ſtile of Quintilian, or of any writer of that age; neither have I any high opinion of their taſte or judgement of authors: And therefore I am very clearly of an opinion different from that of Quintilian, and have not the leaſt heſitation to prefer Demoſthenes to Cicero.

And, in the firſt place, there were ſome things in the character of Cicero, which made it impoſſible for him to come up to the idea I have formed of a perfect orator. This idea I have given in the firſt chapter of the third book of this volume *, where I have deſcribed him to be a man of a great and elevated mind, much above the audience to whom he ſpeaks. Now that Cicero was not ſuch a man, but on the contrary a man of a weak and timid mind, is evident from what he tells us of himſelf; for he ſays, he never began to ſpeak in public without fear and trembling. In his ſpeech *pro Aulo Cluentio* he has theſe words, 'Hic ego, cum ad reſpondendum 'ſurrexi, quâ cura, Dii immortales! quâ 'ſolicitudine animi? Quo timore?' And he adds, 'ſemper equidem magno cum 'metu incipio dicere †.' And, in another place, he expreſſes his puſilanimity in this matter in terms ſtill ſtronger, and calls the

* P. 214.

† Orat. pro *Aulo Cluentio*, ſec. 18.

gods to witneſs for the truth of what he ſays. 'Ita Deos mihi velim propitios, ut, 'cum illius diei mihi venit in mentem, 'quo die, citato reo, mihi dicendum ſit, 'non ſolum commoveor animo, ſed etiam 'toto corpore perhorreſco *.'—And this before a people whom he calls the dregs of Romulus *(ex faece Romuli)* †; and indeed they were no better in his time.

There is another part of Cicero's character, which, I think, makes it impoſſible that he ever ſhould have arrived to any great perfection in any art, and that is—his vanity; for a very great artiſt never can be vain of any performance in his art, becauſe he cannot be a great artiſt, if he come up to the idea he has formed of the perfection of his art, which muſt be always ſomething beyond what he can come up to in practice, otherwiſe the work

* Orat. in *Quint. Caecilium; Divinatio.* ſec. 13.

† Lib. 2. epiſt. 1. *ad Atticum:* Where, ſpeaking of Cato, he ſays, 'Dicit tanquam in Platonis πολιτειᾳ, non tanquam in *Romuli faece*, ſententiam.' p. 100. Ed. Oliveti.

cannot be of very great excellency. It is for this reaſon that the ſtatuaries of old conſidered their works as unfiniſhed; and therefore they inſcribed upon their ſtatues, that ſuch a man εποιει, not εποιησε or πεποιηκε; that is, that he *was a-doing it, but did not do it, nor has not done it.* Now that Cicero was vain is well known; and he has furniſhed, himſelf, an example of it, (ſuch as I think is not to be parallelled), in a letter of his to one Lucceius *, who was writing a hiſtory of the Italic war, and of the civil war betwixt Marius and Sylla. The abilities of this writer he commends highly; and as, he ſays, he deſired very much to be praiſed by him, and to have his name in that way tranſmitted to poſterity, he entreats him to make a ſeparate hiſtory of the Cataline Conſpiracy, of his conſulſhip, and of all that happened to him after his conſulſhip till his return from baniſhment, and not to mix his hiſtory with the general hiſtory of the times: 'For,' ſays he, 'when you are wholly employed on one

* Ad *Familiares*, lib. 5. epiſt. 12.

'ſubject and one perſon, your narrative 'will be more copious and more ornament-'ed.' Then he proceeds to entreat 'That 'he would praiſe him even more than he 'thought he deſerved, and more than truth 'allowed, without regard to the laws of 'hiſtory *.'

* This is ſo remarkable an inſtance of Cicero's vanity, that I will give the reader his own words: 'Ne-'que tamen ignoro, quam impudenter faciam, qui tibi 'tantum oneris imponam, (poteſt enim mihi denegare 'occupatio tua), deinde etiam, ut ornes me, poſtulem. 'Quid, ſi illa tibi non tantopere videntur ornanda? 'Sed tamen qui ſemel verecundiae fines tranſierit, eum 'bene et naviter oportet eſſe impudentem. Itaque te 'plane etiam atque etiam rogo, ut et ornes ea vehe-'mentius etiam quam fortaſſe ſentis, et in eo leges hiſ-'toriae negligas: gratiamque illam, de qua ſuaviſſime 'quodam in procœmio ſcripſiſti, a qua te deflecti non 'magis potuiſſe demonſtras, quam Herculem, Xeno-'phontium illum, a voluptate: ea ſi me tibi vehemen-'tius commendabit, ne aſpernere; amorique noſtro 'pluſculum etiam, quam concedet veritas, largiare.'— The reader may ſee a tranſlation of the paſſage in Dr. Middleton's Life of Cicero, (ſec. 6.) and alſo the apology which the Doctor endeavours to make for him, but which does not at all ſatisfy me. In one thing, however, I perfectly agree with the Doctor, that the ſtile and compoſition of the letter is moſt elegant; and I am per-

He applied himſelf alſo to philoſophy when he was not employed in pleading, in declaiming, or in ſtate affairs; that is, when he had nothing elſe to do. And he boaſts that he had proceeded an orator, not from the ſhops of rhetoricians, but from the walks of the academy. And he has written a great deal upon philoſophy, when he could do nothing elſe, which was the caſe during the civil war betwixt Marius and Sylla, and under the Dictatorſhip of Caeſar; and he has given us the reaſon for his writing ſo much on that ſubject, that he thought it, *magnificum, Romaniſque hominibus glorioſum, ut Graecis de philoſophia literis non egeant: quod aſſequar pro-*

ſuaded it was very much laboured by him, for it is very different from the other letters to his friends contained in this collection, and alſo from his letters to Atticus, the greateſt part of which appear to me to be extempore productions, with very little regard to the ſtile or compoſition, ſo that they are rather what we would call *cards* than *letters*. But this letter, I think, deſerves the praiſe which he beſtows upon it himſelf, in a letter to Atticus, (lib. 4. cap. 6.) where he calls it *valde bella*.

*fecto, ſi inſtituta perfecero**. Whether he has accompliſhed this, thoſe, who have ſtudied the Greek philoſophy in the Greek books, will be beſt able to judge. For my own part I am of opinion, that the beſt uſe the Romans made of the Greek philoſophy, was to form, upon the principles of it, a ſyſtem of the law of private property, which the Emperor Juſtinian has preſerved to us, in the *Corpus Juris* that we have got from him, and particularly in the *Inſtitutes* and *Pandects;* and it is ſingular enough, that the Romans were the only antient nation who made a ſcience of the law of private property. It may alſo be obſerved, that all the ſyſtems of law in Europe, that have been formed in later times, are upon the plan of the Roman law.

From what I have laſt mentioned, it appears, that beſides his vanity as an individual, he had a great deal of national va-

* De Divinatione, lib. 2. ſec. 2.

nity, which he carried ſo far as to maintain, that the Latin language was a richer language than the Greek. This he has expreſſed in one paſſage by an exclamation, in which he has apoſtrophiſed Greece in this manner: *O verborum inops interdum, quibus abandare ſemper putas, Graecia* *! And this national vanity made him ſo ungrateful to the Greeks, from whom he and all the other Romans had learned every thing they knew, that he calls them *Graeculi*, and ſpeaks of them as idle and talkative people, *Otioſi et loquaces*; he adds, indeed, *fortaſſe docti atque eruditi* †.

Beſides his philoſophic and rhetorical ſtudies, he attempted alſo poetry: And we have ſeveral fragments of that kind preſerved to us, which Olivet has publiſhed

* Quaeſt. Tuſculan. lib. 2. cap. 15. See alſo upon the ſame ſubject *De Natura Deorum*, lib. 1. cap. 4. et *De Oratore*, lib. 2. cap. 4.

† Lib. 1. *De Oratore*, cap. 22. See alſo Orat. pro *P. Sextio*, ſec. 51.

in his laſt volume of Cicero's works. One of his poetical performances was in three books, on the ſubject of his own conſulſhip; of the ſecond book of which, we have ſome fragments preſerved, where we have that line which, I think, is ſo juſtly ridiculed by Juvenal,

O fortunatam, natam me conſule, Romam!

From this ſpecimen we may perceive that his ſtile in verſe had thoſe affected ornaments which I ſhall ſhow his proſe had, and that vanity was his predominant paſſion in every thing that he wrote, whether in verſe or in proſe.

With vanity is neceſſarily connected a delight in the ridiculous; for every vain man is very much diſpoſed to laugh at the folly of another. And the chief reaſon why laughing gives us ſo much pleaſure, is our vanity in thinking that we are free from the blemiſh or deformity that we laugh at, and therefore are ſo far ſuperior to the objects of our laughter *. Of this

* See vol. 3d. of this work, p. 305.

character of ſtile I have ſaid a good deal in my third volume*; where I have diſtinguiſhed betwixt the claſſical ſignification of the word *ridiculous*, and the ſenſe in which we commonly uſe it†. And to what I have there ſaid, I have made ſome additions in the ſixth chapter of the ſecond book of this volume‡.

For the reaſons I have given, we ought not to be ſurpriſed that there is ſo much of the ridiculous to be found in Cicero's Orations. But I am a little ſurpriſed that he has ſaid expreſsly, and has laid it down as a precept of the art, that it is the buſineſs of an orator to excite laughter: *Eſt plane oratoris, movere riſum* §. And accordingly he has given us a formal treatiſe upon it, in his ſecond book *De Oratore*, dividing it into that which ariſes from

* Book 4. cap. 16.

† Ibid. p. 299.

‡ P. 194.

§ *De Oratore*, lib. 2. cap. 58.

things, and that which ariſes from words; and, in explaining the ſeveral particulars which fall under thoſe two heads, he has employed no leſs than twelve chapters in that book *. Quintilian, in his chapter *de riſu* †, has not been ſo full upon it, and has given the orator ſome very proper cautions in the uſe of it, which Cicero has not given. He tells us that Cicero, *non ſolum extra judicia, ſed in ipſis etiam orationibus, habitus eſt nimis riſus affectator* ‡. His book of Jeſts in private converſation, written by himſelf or his freed-man, I have mentioned in this volume §. And as to his Orations, Quintilian, in the end of his chapter upon laughter above mentioned, tells us that there were many jeſts (ſome of which he mentions) in his oration againſt Verres; and in his oration for Muraena there were ſo

* Chap. 59.—71. incluſive.

† Lib. 6. cap. 3.

‡ Lib. 6. cap. 3. ſec. 1.

§ P. 200.

many of them, upon the ſubject of the Stoical philoſophy, that I think Cato's ſaying upon the occaſion was not at all improper, *Quam ridiculum conſulem habemus* *. How much Cicero differs from Demoſthenes in this reſpect, I have elſewhere obſerved †. In him there is nothing that has the leaſt tendency to excite laughter; and even in the comic writers of the beſt kind, ſuch as Menander and Terence, there is, as I have ſaid ‡, ſcarcely any thing to be found of that kind. So that here we have a ſpeaker, upon buſineſs of the greateſt importance, more jocoſe than a comic writer. And, upon the whole, if there were no other proof that Cicero was not, nor could not be, perfect in an art that requires a great genius and elevated mind, I think his love of the ridiculous is ſufficient; for I maintain, that there never was a man of great genius, who was a great

* Vol. 3. p. 299.

† Ibid. p. 308.

‡ P. 201. of this volume.

jeſter in private converſation, and much leſs in public ſpeaking; for even the Indians of North America, whom we call ſavages, do not, as I before obſerved, delight in the ridiculous, even in private converſation *: And the reaſon is plain; for though a man, who has the higheſt ſenſe of what is beautiful, graceful, and becoming, may, and indeed muſt perceive the ridiculous of things, he does not delight in it, but on the contrary turns his attention from it to that which his genius naturally leads him to contemplate;—I mean the dignified and beautiful †.

Such were Cicero's qualities of mind: As to thoſe of his body, he tells us himſelf ‡ that he was of a very ſlender and infirm habit; and that if he had continued the manner of ſpeaking in which he began, his health could not have held out: And in this paſſage he gives a very bad account

* P. 195. ibid.

† Ibid.

‡ *Brutus*, ſive De Claris Oratoribus, cap. 91.

of his action and pronunciation: For he ſays, 'Omnia ſine remiſſione, ſine varieta-'te, vi ſumma vocis, et totius corporis con-'tentione, dicebam.' He was therefore adviſed by his friends and phyſicians to give over pleading; 'But,' ſays he, 'thinking 'that I might avoid the hazard of hurting 'my health by moderating my voice, 'changing, and at the ſame time improv-'ing my manner of ſpeaking, I determined 'to go abroad.' And firſt he went to Athens, where he practiſed under the directions of Demetrius Syrus, an old maſter of the art: Then he went to Aſia, and applied himſelf to the moſt famous rhetoricians there; and not content with that, he went to Rhodes, and there exerciſed himſelf under one Molo, whom he had known in Rome. And he concludes the account of his travels by ſaying, that, after he had ſtayed two years abroad, he returned to Rome, 'non modo exercitatior, ſed prope 'mutatus; nam et contentio nimia vocis 'reciderat, et quaſi deferbuerat oratio; la-'teribuſque vires, et corporis mediocris

'habitus accefferat *.' And thus it appears, that his ſtile was not only formed by the imitation of the Greek orators, but his pronunciation was corrected by practiſing under Greek maſters, who gave a temperance to it, and a variety, which it had not before. So that he learned from the Greeks, or *Graeculi*, as he called them, the chief part, or what is principal in the rhetorical art;—I mean the action.

But there is one part of the pronunciation, which he does not appear to me to have ſtudied, and that is melody. Every language, that is perfect of its kind, muſt be muſical †. Now there can be no muſic without melody as well as rhythm. The Latin language was muſical as well as the Greek, and had thoſe accents or tones of muſic, which make the melody of ſpeech. Now it cannot be a matter of indifference how thoſe tones are diſpoſed and arranged in ſpeaking; and it muſt give a great

* *Brutus*, ſive De Clar. Orat. cap. 91.

† P. 135. of this volume.

beauty to the pronunciation, if theſe as well as the rhythms are agreeably varied: And accordingly the Halicarnaſian tells us that this ought to be done. Now Cicero ſtudied very much the rhythm of his language, but he does not appear to have conſidered at all the melody of it *. So that from all the many books he has written upon the rhetorical art, we cannot diſcover that he had ſo much as an idea of *the noble melody* †, which the Halicarnaſian admired in Demoſthenes.

But ſuppoſe his pronunciation had been as perfect as that of Demoſthenes; ſuppoſe alſo that the materials of his art, I mean the Latin language, had been as fine a language as the Greek; and further, let me ſuppoſe that he had had all the qualities both of mind and body, which are required to make a perfect orator, yet he

* Vol. 2d. p. 382.

† P. 151. of this vol.

was educated and trained to ſpeak in ſuch a way, that it was impoſſible he could have been ſuch an orator as Demoſthenes; but muſt have had thoſe faults, which are conſpicuous in his ſtile, and of which I ſhall afterwards take notice. The education I mean is the exerciſe of declaiming, which he tells us himſelf he practiſed every day *. And Suetonius tells us that he continued the practice of declaiming in Greek down to his praetorſhip †; and in Latin, after he became an old man, he declaimed with Hirtius and Panſa, then conſuls, whom he calls his ſcholars.

How much the practice of declamation contributed to ſpoil the taſte of eloquence in Rome, and indeed of all writing of every kind, verſe as well as proſe, I have ſhewn at ſome length in the third volume of this work ‡, which the reader, though he may have read it before, will perhaps

* *Brutus*, cap. 90.

† Suetonius *De Claris Oratoribus*, cap. 1.

‡ Book 4. chap. 13.

think it worth the while to read again, as it contains many things upon the ſubject of eloquence which never were before publiſhed in Engliſh. I will only add to what I have ſaid there concerning the practice of declamation, that when a man ſpeaks upon a fictitious ſubject, ſo that he has not, for his audience, people whom he would perſuade to act, or judges whom he would convince of the juſtice of the cauſe he pleads, but ſpeaks only to be admired by thoſe who hear him, it is impoſſible that ſuch a ſpeaker ſhould not be more ſtudious of the ornament of words, than of the weight of matter. To the arguments he uſes, he will endeavour to give a ſmart witty turn: And he will be accuſtomed to anſwer only objections of his own invention, and which are made to be anſwered, not thoſe made by a real adverſary*. In Cicero's time they did not declaim in public, but only before a maſter, or in company with a few friends: But in

* See what one Montanus has ſaid upon this ſubject, in a paſſage which I have quoted, vol. 3d. p. 263.

the days of Auguſtus there were public ſchools of declamation; and then, ſays Petronius, there was an end of eloquence. The practice was not at all known in Rome till a little before the days of Cicero, who, when he was a boy, heard the firſt Latin declaimer, one Lucius Plotius Gallus; for at firſt there were only Latin maſters of this declaiming art, which was not at all approved by the wiſer men at Rome; and it was prohibited by a decree of the ſenate, mentioned by Suetonius, in his book *De Claris Oratoribus*, and afterwards by an edict of the cenſors, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Lucius Licinius Craſſus the orator, who mentions this decree in Cicero's third book *De Oratore*, and calls the ſchools of thoſe declaimers *ludi impudentiae*, the ſchools of impudence*. Now, though I am perſuaded that thoſe Latin rhetoricians were not, as Craſſus ſays, ſo learned as the Greek, and that the practice of declaiming in that language, enabled the young orator to en-

* Cap. 24.

rich his Latin ſtile more than he could have otherwiſe done; yet I think it is impoſſible but that, by daily practice upon feigned ſubjects, a man ſhould acquire a ſtile of ſpeaking very different from the ſtile of real buſineſs: And it is from thence that Cicero, though he practiſed chiefly even with Greek rhetoricians, has derived theſe faults which are to be obſerved in the ſtile of his orations.

Of theſe faults I have ſpoken at ſome length in my third volume, particularly in the ſixth and ſeventh chapters, and ſhall ſay ſomething more before I conclude this chapter. Here I will only add ſome general reflections upon thoſe figures of compoſition which affect the ſound.

That the ear is pleaſed with a ſimilarity which it perceives in ſounds, if they be diſtinguiſhed by proper intervals, and not continued without any ſuch diſtinction, is a fact that cannot be denied. It is in this way that the Greek and Latin verſe pleaſes us, by the ſame rhythm returning at the

ſame intervals: And our own verſe pleaſes us by the ſame number of ſyllables, accented in the ſame way, returning at certain intervals. And in proſe, the figures I have mentioned in the 6th chapter of the 3d volume above quoted, ſuch as *repetition*, *paronomaſia*, and *pariſoſis*, pleaſe us in the ſame manner. But all figures, which only affect the ſound, ought to be very ſparingly uſed in ſpeeches of real buſineſs, and buſineſs often of the greateſt importance, ſuch as deliberations upon public affairs, or trials, upon the iſſue of which the life or fortune of a citizen may depend. In ſuch orations it is the figures of the ſenſe, according to the diviſion I have made of figures *, that ought to be chiefly uſed. And in general, the beſt compoſitions of every kind are thoſe which draw the attention of the reader, not to the words, but to the matter: For whatever attention is beſtowed upon the words, may be ſaid to be loſt as to the matter,

* P. 115. of this volume.

which, in every compoſition of any value, ought to be principal.

There was one thing, however, in antient oratory, which, though reſpecting the ſound only, was very much attended to by the orators, and, I think, with very good reaſon: And that was, the *numbers*, or *rhythm*, as it is more properly called *. Of the rhythm of the antient proſe I have treated at ſome length in the 5th chapter of the 2d book of this volume, to which I refer my readers. It is a rhythm compoſed of the ſame feet as the rhythm of verſe is, but very different in this reſpect, that it was not exactly meaſured as the verſe was, and did not return at certain intervals; nor did the feet, of which it was compoſed, follow one another in any certain order, as in verſe: But, as Cicero has told us, all the different feet are mixed together in this proſe rhythm, but not without a choice or ſelection of certain feet rather than others upon certain

* P. 156. of this volume.

occaſions, which Cicero has explained at conſiderable length *. And, inſtead of that uniformity which we obſerve in the antient verſe, and without which it would not be verſe, there was a very great variety; for, as the Halicarnaſian has told us, the placing words of the ſame rhythm near to one another, was avoided †. It was therefore a beauty which did not ſtick out, or *eminebat extra corpus orationis*, as Petronius expreſſes it. And though it muſt have been felt by all, who had ears to hear, yet Cicero could not give a reaſon why it pleaſed ſo much ‡; and he tells us ‖, that there were ſome who denied that it exiſted. But Cicero, though he cannot give a reaſon why theſe numbers pleaſe ſo much, has not the leaſt doubt of their exiſtence; and he goes ſo far as to ſay, that a man who does not

* *Orator*, cap. 63. and following.

† Vol. 2d. of this work, p. 382.

‡ *Orator*. cap. 55.

‖ Ibid. cap. 54.

perceive them does not deſerve to be called a man *.

But though Cicero has treated very fully of the rhythm of rhetorical compoſition, he has not ſaid a word of the melody of it, though that muſt have been perceived in the pronunciation as much as the rhythm, and have given equal if not ſuperior pleaſure to the hearer. For this I can give no other reaſon, than that the Latins, not being ſo muſical a people as the Greeks, did not attend ſo much to the melody of their language: For that the Latins had acute and grave accents, as well as the Greeks, cannot be doubted, though they had not the ſame variety in accenting their ſyllables that the Greeks had; for they never laid an acute accent upon the laſt ſyllable of a word, which the Greeks frequently did. What, therefore, the Halicarnaſſian reckons a great beauty in the compoſition of Demoſthenes, and mentions among the firſt

* P. 159. of this volume.

things that diſtinguiſh his ſtile*, I mean the beauty of his melody, Cicero does not ſo much as mention. And yet I think it is abſolutely neceſſary, that if there be a melody in a language, the order and arrangement of the tones muſt give a beauty and variety to the pronunciation, as well as the order and arrangement of the ſhort and long ſyllables: And accordingly the Halicarnaſſian requires that there ſhould be the ſame variety in the melody as in the rhythm; ſo that words accented in the ſame way ſhould not be put together, any more than words of the ſame rhythm †. And he further ſeems to have thought that there was an expreſſion of ſentiment by the melody as well as by the rhythm: And therefore he ſpeaks of *a noble melody*, and *a rhythm of dignity* ‡. Here, therefore, we have two beauties of the pronunciation joined together, but which are ſo incorpo-

* See vol. 2d. of this work, p. 382.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

rated with language as not at all to ſtick out, or to have any appearance of ſwell or affectation of pomp. The firſt orator who excelled in this way was, as the Halicarnaſſian tells us, Lyſias, who, he ſays, was the beſt compoſer of plain ſpeech without metre, having invented a particular harmony for ſuch a compoſition, by which the ſound of the words was both adorned and ſweetened, without any appearance of ſtudy or art *. As no author expreſſes himſelf better upon ſuch ſubjects, I have given his words in the note below †, where the reader will obſerve, that, though Lyſias ſweetened the pronunciation very much by his harmonious compoſition, his ſtile appeared to be altogether like to common ſpeech, though exceedingly different

* *De Lyſia Judicium*, ſect. 3.

† Ὁμοιως δε τοις ιδιωταις διαλεγεσθαι δοκων, πλειστον ὁσον ιδιωτου διαφερει· και επει ποιητης κρατιστος λογων, λελυμενης εκ μετρου λεξεως, ιδιαν τινα λογων ευρηκως ἁρμονιαν, ᾗ τα ονοματα κοσμει τε και ἡδυνει, μηδεν εχοντα ογκωδες μηδε φορτικον.

from it, which I think is the beſt account that can be given of any ſtile in proſe. And there is another paſſage in this work of the Halicarnaſſian (ſect. 8.) where he commends Lyſias for excelling in the greateſt art of a ſpeaker or writer, namely, the concealing of art; ſo that what has coſt the compoſer the greateſt pains and labour, appears to be altogether without ſtudy or art. And I am convinced, as I have ſaid *, that if I had lived in that age, and had had an ear as delicate as the Athenian, I ſhould have been as much, or even more pleaſed with the ſound, not to ſpeak of the ſenſe or matter, of the orations of Demoſthenes pronounced by himſelf, than with the verſes of Homer repeated by the rhapſodiſts.

It was in this way, as the Halicarnaſſian tells us, in a paſſage which I have tranſlated †, that Demoſthenes made muſic of

* P. 161. of this volume.

† Vol. 2. p. 381.

his ſpeeches, differing from the common muſic not ſo much in kind as in degree. By this muſic, he ſays, the ear was delighted with the melody, and moved by the rhythm; and at the ſame time that it was proper and ſuited to the ſubject, it had that variety without which no work of art can pleaſe. And it was an ornament to the ſpeech, of ſuch a kind, that it could not draw the attention of the reader from the matter to the words, any more than a ſong would do, if the muſic of it be ſimple and not too complicated and artificial, which is often the caſe of the muſic of the ſongs of the Italian opera: But on the contrary, by pleaſing the ear ſo much, it will make the matter have the greater impreſſion upon the hearers. And in this way he has made a ſtile, of which no part is not ſome way adorned and varied from common ſpeech *, not by tropes or figures of ſpeech, of which Demoſthenes is more ſparing than any other orator I know; but by melody and rhythm, and that variety

* P. 162. of this volume.

of arrangement of his words, by which, as I have ſhewn elſewhere *, not only he pleaſes the ear, but conveys the meaning more forcibly.

Of the melody of ſpeech, Cicero, as I have ſaid, does not appear to me to have had ſo much as an idea. The rhythm he ſtudied much: And there is no doubt a great deal of ornament of that kind in his orations. Whether in it he has ſucceeded better than Demoſthenes, I have not an ear that can judge. All I can ſay is, that by the compoſition of Demoſthenes the ſenſe is better conveyed to me than by that of Cicero. But it is by the figures of which I have treated in the 6th chapter of volume 3d, ſuch as *repetition*, *paronomaſia*, and *pariſoſis*, that he has choſen to diſtinguiſh his ſtile from common ſpeech, without adding any thing to the ſenſe or emphaſis, but on the contrary; and inſtead of pleaſing the ear with variety, he tires and diſguſts it by a diſagreeable ſame-

* In the 3d. diſſertation annexed to vol. 2d.

neſs in the compoſition. Of this kind of unmeaning repetition, I have given an example from the oration *pro Archia Poeta**, where we have the word *quantum* five times repeated, without adding any thing to the ſenſe, and merely for the pleaſure of the ear; but in which he has not, in my opinion, ſucceeded. There is a paſſage in the ſame oration *pro Archia Poeta*, in praiſe of the *humaniores literae*, which I have alſo quoted †, where there is a ſentence, (for I cannot call it a period, having nothing of the roundneſs and compactneſs of a period), divided into ſix or ſeven ſhort members, of the ſame form and ſtructure, correſponding exactly to one another. This, no doubt, gives a certain concinnity and prettineſs to the ſentence; but I hold it to be a puerility in ſtile, ſuch as is not to be found in Demoſthenes, or in any good Greek writer. And in his famous oration *pro Milone*, com-

* Vol. 3d. p. 80.

† Ibid. p 90.

poſed by him when he was in the fulneſs of years and glory, (not when he was young, and defended Sextus Roſcius Amerinus, where, upon the ſubject of the puniſhment of parricide, we have a number of very pretty little conceits thrown together, which he himſelf did not approve of when his judgment was more mature *), there is not only a ſtring of antitheſes †, but the words are made to anſwer all exactly to one another, both in the form of the caſe and tenſe, and in the ſound; ſo that it is really a kind of poetry, and rhyming poetry: For not only the words terminate with the ſame ſyllable, like our rhymes, ſuch as *ſcripta* and *nata*; but with two ſyllables, like the Italian rhymes. Thus you have *dicimus*, *accepimus*, *legimus*, correſponding to other three words terminated by the ſame two ſyllables, *arripuimus*, *hauſimus*, *expreſſimus*; and there are other two rhymes of the

* Vol. 3d. p. 87.

† Ibid. p. 88.

ſame kind, *inſtituti* and *imbuti*. And from what he has ſaid in his *Orator*, ad M. Brutum, and elſewhere *, it is evident that he ſtudied ſuch gingling of words, and thought them a beauty of ſtile.

Not only did Cicero, in this manner, make the ſound of the rhetorical ſtile poetical, but he has figured the ſenſe and matter with ſuch poetical figures as *exclamation*, προσωποποιϊα, and διατυπωσις, or *particular and picturesque deſcriptions of things*. Of theſe figures I have ſpoken pretty fully in the ſixth chapter of my third volume, and have quoted ſeveral examples of them from Cicero, and obſerved, that in ſome of them, particularly *exclamation*, he is more figurative than even Homer; and I have given a long quotation from him of the uſe of the laſt mentioned figure †, where we have a picture moſt accurately drawn;

* See the paſſages quoted in vol. 3d, p. 88. and following.

† Vol. 3d. p. 119.

but it is not what the French call the *belle nature*, which is there painted, but quite the contrary.

Upon the whole, I agree perfectly with the Halicarnaſſian in his opinion of Demoſthenes, whom he prefers to all the other orators of Greece: And particularly he admires his compoſition, (the greateſt art of ſtile), in which he was allowed to excel by all his cotemporaries, even by his greateſt enemy Æſchines *. But, as to Cicero, I differ ſo much from Quintilian, that what he ſays of him, *ille demum ſe profeciſſe ſciat, cui Cicero valde placet*, I would reverſe in this way, and ſay, *ille demum ſe profeciſſe ſciat, cui Cicero non placet.* I ſpeak of him as an orator, for in his critical and philoſophical works I admire his ſtile very much: And I do not retract what I have ſaid † in praiſe of his dialogue *De Oratore*, which I ſtill think an admirable

* Vol. 4th. of this work, book 2d. chap. 7.

† Dionyſius *De admiranda vi dicendi in Demoſthene*, cap. 35.

compoſition, both for matter and ſtile. I have lately read the diſcourſe which he puts into the mouth of the elder Cato, upon the ſubject of old age, and which I would recommend to the ſtudy of every man as far advanced in life as I am. It is one of the fineſt things in the Latin language, and I do not wonder that Theodorus Gaza made it the only example of any work tranſlated from Latin into Greek, by the learned Greeks who were then in Italy*. And I am perſuaded, thoſe faults that I have obſerved in his orations, aroſe from his practiſing declamation, in which more attention muſt neceſſarily be given to the words than to the things which have no real exiſtence, but are mere fictions†. And there is a copiouſneſs of words, and of good words too, in all his works, ſuch as is not to be found in any other Latin author; and therefore I would adviſe every man, who deſires to form a good Latin ſtile, to

* See vol. 4th. p. 335. and 336

† See what one Montanus has ſaid further upon this ſubject, vol. 3d. p. 256. and 257.

ſtudy his works diligently. This I find has been done by ſome late Italian writers in Latin, particularly one Politus, a profeſſor in the *Piae Scholae* of Florence, who has given us a tranſlation of ſeveral books of Euſtathius's Commentary upon Homer, with ſome dedications, prefaces, and diſſertations, written in excellent Latin. It is a work that he has carried no further than the fifth book of the Iliad; but, imperfect as it is, I recommend it very much to the young ſtudent of Greek, who may not be ſo learned in the language as to underſtand Euſtathius without a tranſlation and notes. But not only is the ſtudy of Cicero uſeful for enabling a man to form a good Latin ſtile, but it will give him a taſte for a rich and copious ſtile in any other language.

CHAP. III.

Julius Caeſar a greater orator than Cicero, —His eloquence is praiſed by Cicero under the characters of Brutus and Pomponius Atticus.——Natural advantages which Caeſar had, and which contributed much to make him excel as an orator:—firſt his birth—then his military genius—the beauty of his perſon—a fine voice, and a graceful dignified action.—To all theſe advantages Caeſar joined great application to the art.—Studied at Mitylene under a great maſter, Cratippus, and practiced daily rhetorical exerciſes.—His ſpeaking the moſt elegant of all the Latin orators.—This not owing ſo much to his domeſtic education as to his deep learning. —He wrote a book upon the Latin language, addreſſed to Cicero.—Pure Latinity the ground work of oratory.—This formerly learned by imitation of thoſe who ſpoke well.—But the language, now cor-

rupted by the conflux of ſtrangers, to be reſtored only by art and ſcience.—Theſe Caeſar applied, and in that way he became ſo great an orator, joining the ornaments of eloquence with the purity of language.—Concluſion of the eulogium of Caeſar's eloquence from the mouth of Atticus.—Caeſar was the Pericles of Rome.—He comes up to the idea of a perfect orator.—And he was likewiſe the greateſt and moſt amiable man of whom we read in hiſtory.

ALTHOUGH Cicero be the greateſt Orator of Rome, whoſe ſpeeches have come down to us, yet I think I ſhould not do juſtice to the Roman eloquence, if I did not mention an orator of theirs, who, in my judgment, muſt have excelled Cicero very much, though no orations of his have been preſerved, nor any thing of that kind, except ſome ſpeeches, which he tells us he made to his ſoldiers, but which we cannot compare with the orations of Cicero. The orator I mean is Julius Cae-

ſar, of whoſe excellence, as an hiſtorian, I have ſpoken in the preceding volume; and I think he excelled all his countrymen as much or more in oratory, than he did in writing hiſtory. I ſhall give an account of his eloquence from Cicero, who, I think, cannot be ſuppoſed to be partial to him; for he was of an oppoſite party in the ſtate, and, if he was not acceſſory to his murder, he at leaſt approved of it. It is in his *Brutus*, or book *De Claris Oratoribus*, that he ſpeaks of Caeſar as an orator; and introduces both Brutus and Pomponius Atticus praiſing him highly.

Caeſar had more advantages from nature to qualify him for excelling in that art than any other Roman we read of. In the firſt place, he was of high birth, being of an heroic race; for he was deſcended of one of thoſe Trojan families, which, the Halicarnaſſian tells us, were ſtill preſerved in Rome at the time he wrote, to the number of fifty *; and of the chief of them,

* *Antiquitat.* lib. 1. cap. 85.

for he was deſcended of their king Æneas*. And as I hold that there is a great difference of races and families in our own ſpecies, as well as in every other ſpecies of animals, this was a great advantage which Caeſar had over Cicero; and he was ſuperior to him in another reſpect, that he had an heroic ſpirit worthy of his birth, was a ſoldier as well as an orator, and the greateſt general of his age. He had, too, great advantages of perſon; Velleius Paterculus ſays, that he was *formâ omnium civium excellentiſſimus* †. He had likewiſe a ſplendid voice,

* Suetonius, in his life of Caeſar, cap. 6. tells us that he ſpoke a funeral oration upon his aunt Julia and his wife Cornelia: 'Et in Amitae quidem laudatione, 'de ejus ac patris ſui utraque origine, ſic refert. "Amitae meae, Juliae, maternum genus ab regibus or-"tum, paternum cum diis immortalibus conjunctum eſt: "Nam ab Anco Marcio ſunt Marcii reges, quo nomine "fuit mater; a Venere Julii, cujus gentis familia eſt "noſtra. Eſt ergo in genere, et ſanctitas regum, qui "plurimum inter homines pollent, et ceremonia Deo-"rum, quorum ipſi in poteſtate ſunt reges."

† Lib. 2. cap. 41. I will give the whole paſſage from Velleius, who writes good Latin, and, as he lived ſo near to the time of Julius Caeſar, that is, under Au-

as Cicero tells us, and great grace and dignity in his action*. With theſe advantages from nature, joined with his great genius and extraordinary abilities, it was impoſſible that he ſhould not have excelled in the oratorial art, if he gave ſufficient application to it: And that he did ſo, Cicero atteſts by what he makes Brutus ſay, that he ſaw him at Mytilene learning the art from one Cratippus, who, he ſays, was a great friend of Cicero. And he adds, that he learned with great application, omitting every other ſtudy, and was every day employed

guſtus and Tiberius, he muſt be ſuppoſed to be very well informed concerning the particulars he relates of Caeſar. 'Hic nobiliſſima Juliorum genitus familiâ, 'et, quod inter omnes antiquiſſimos conſtabat, ab Anchiſe ac Venere deducens genus, forma omnium civium excellentiſſimus, vigore animi acerrimus, munificentiae effuſiſſimus, animo ſuper humanam et naturam et fidem evectus, magnitudine cogitationum, celeritate bellandi, patientia periculorum, magno illi Alexandro, ſed ſobrio neque iracundo, ſimillimus.'

* *De Claris Oratoribus*, cap. 71.

in rhetorical exerciſes *; and in this way he acquired a great copiouſneſs of choice words †. And Cicero makes Atticus ſay, that of all the Latin orators, he was the moſt elegant ſpeaker ‡; which, ſays Atticus, was not ſo much owing to his domeſtic education, though that was not wanting neither, but to much deep learning which he had acquired by great ſtudy and diligence, and which made him excell ſo much in the art of language ‖; and here he takes occaſion to mention a book which Caeſar had written upon the Latin language, and addreſſed to Cicero. And he makes the ſame Atticus ſay a little after, that the ground-work and foundation of the oratorial art is a pure and correct Latinity §, which thoſe, who formerly poſſeſſed it, did not owe to art or ſcience, but to a good habit of ſpeaking, which they had formed by

* *De Claris Oratoribus*, cap. 71.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid. 72.

‖ Ibid.

§ Ibid. cap. 74.

imitation of thoſe who ſpoke well; for good ſpeaking as well as virtue was the praiſe of that age. 'But, ſays he, now by 'the conflux of ſtrangers, who ſpeak ill, the 'language both of Rome and Greece is 'much altered for the worſe. To correct 'this abuſe, and reſtore the language to its 'purity, art and ſcience muſt, like a touch-'ſtone, be applied, and in that way bad 'uſe muſt be corrected*. Now this 'rule Caeſar has applied, and in that way 'has purified and refined his language; and 'when, to this elegance of words, (which, 'though you be no orator, but only a free 'born Roman citizen, is neceſſary), he joins 'the ornaments of eloquence, he may be 'ſaid to ſet a well painted picture in a good 'light.' And he concludes his eulogium with the higheſt praiſe which I think he has yet beſtowed upon him, and which I will give in the words he puts into the mouth of Atticus: 'Splendidam quan-'dam, minimeque veteratoriam rationem

* *De Claris Oratoribus*, cap. 74.

'dicendi tenet, voce, motu; forma etiam 'magnifica et generoſa quodammodo.' So that he excelled in voice and action, the chief quality of an orator: His form was noble, magnificent, and generous; and his manner of ſpeaking liberal, without the appearance of cunning or art. This account of his ſpeaking, I think, may be depended upon, as coming from men who muſt have often heard him ſpeak; and there were alſo ſeveral of his orations that were publiſhed and read by them*. In ſhort, I think Julius Caeſar muſt have been ſuch an orator in Rome as Pericles was in Athens; and he muſt, I think, have come up to my idea of a perfect orator †, that is, a man who has an underſtanding and elevation of mind ſuperior to his audience, and which, therefore, muſt ſtrike them with awe. He would not therefore ſhake and tremble as Cicero did, when he ſpake before the dregs of Romulus, as he calls them; though he would no doubt treat them with that appear-

* *De Oratoribus*, cap. 76.

† P. 214. of this volume.

ance at leaſt of reſpect which was neceſſary to perſuade them; nor would he uſe theſe puerile figures to pleaſe their ears, of antitheſes, and like ſounding periods and members of periods, which Cicero uſes ſo frequently.

I will not repeat here, what I have ſaid elſewhere* of his great qualities; and I will conclude the chapter with ſaying, that he excelled ſo much both in acting and ſpeaking, that I hold him to be the greateſt man of whom we read in hiſtory, and at the ſame time the moſt amiable; for he was ſo much beloved by his friends, that it was a common oath of theirs, *Sic ego, vivente Caeſare, moriar.*

* Vol. 5. cap. 2. of book 1.

BOOK V.

Of the Oratory *of Demoſthenes, containing Obſervations on his* Matter *and* Stile.

CHAP. I.

Demoſthenes the greateſt orator in antient times, and greater than any that can be in modern.—Reaſons why it is impoſſible that any thing can be compoſed to be ſpoken, ſo perfect as the compoſition of Demoſthenes.—The greateſt part of Demoſthenes loſt, as he is only read, not heard.—Praiſe of him by his rival Eſchines.—Of the natural defects of the bodily qualifications of Demoſthenes;—his habit infirm.—his voice weak;—and his articulation imperfect.—Of the wonderful induſtry and application by which he ſupplied

thoſe natural defects;—ſuch as ſhutting himſelf up for months together in a habitation under ground—and ſpeaking with pebbles in his mouth:—By theſe means he overcame nature, and transformed himſelf into another man.—He could not have done ſo, if he had not had a genius which led him to the ſtudy of Rhetoric in preference to all other ſtudies.—The occaſion upon which he ſhewed this natural propenſity.—Of the education he had as an orator.—He may be ſaid to have been ſelf-taught.—He began the practice of the art, not in the ſchool of declamation, but with real buſineſs:—Did not attend Iſocrates but Iſaeus; and ſtudied Thucydides.—The beſt leſſon of all, he got from a player.—To practice what he had learned from him, he ſhut himſelf up in a ſubterraneous habitation,—ſtudied there the melody and rhythm of ſpeech,—and to compoſe in periods.

I COME now to ſpeak of Demoſthenes, the greateſt orator in antient times of thoſe who have left any monuments behind them, that are come down to us, and greater than any orator can be in modern times; for though we may write very well, and compoſe what for the matter is excellent, yet the modern languages do not furniſh materials of which we can make a compoſition to be ſpoken, ſuch as that of Demoſthenes: For there is a ſweetneſs and variety in the ſound of the Greek language, at the ſame time an arrangement of the words ſo various, as muſt have given great pleaſure to the ear, and likewiſe conveyed the ſenſe more emphatically and forcibly than could otherwiſe have been conveyed, as I think I have elſewhere ſhewn *. And when we join to all this the melody and rhythm of the Greek language, of the beauty of which, as we never heard it pronounced, we can hardly form an idea, I think it is not going too

* Diſſertation 3d. annexed to vol. 2d. of this work.

far to ſay, that it is impoſſible, by the nature of things, to compoſe any thing in our language, or in any modern language, which will pleaſe ſo much when ſpoken, as the language of Demoſthenes, who, as it is well known, excelled ſo much in action and pronunciation, that Valerius Maximus ſays very properly, that in Demoſthenes, as we have him, *magna pars Demoſthenis abeſt; quod legitur potius quam auditur* *. And when his rival Æſchines read to the people of Rhodes (the place to which he retired after his baniſhment) Demoſthenes's oration for Cteſiphon, and read it no doubt better than any man now living can read it, they admiring it very much, 'How much more,' ſays he, 'would you 'have admired it, if you had heard him 'pronounce it.'

Thoſe, therefore, who have formed their taſte of ſtile upon ſuch authors as Demoſthenes, will not, when they write or ſpeak

* Lib. 8. cap. 10.

Engliſh, beſtow much pains upon the ornaments of language, knowing that they never can make a compoſition of that kind which will pleaſe even themſelves, compared with that of Demoſthenes. Their only ſtudy, therefore, with regard to language, will be to expreſs themſelves in proper words, and as ſignificant of their meaning as any they can find. They will take care not to make their ſtile poetical by the frequent uſe of epithets, which are the proper ornaments of poetry: and they will uſe none that are merely ornamental, and not tending to inforce the ſenſe or the argument. Neither will they abound in antitheſes or metaphors. But, above all, they will avoid the affectation of any thing like numbers in Engliſh proſe; of which every ſcholar muſt know that our language is incapable. In this reſpect a great author in Engliſh is faulty, I mean Lord Shaftſbury, as I have elſewhere obſerved *; where I have ſhewn, that by concluding his ſentences with two, and ſometimes three

* Vol. 3d. p. 284, and following.

nouns, and their attendant epithets, he has given a kind of dancing cadence to his ſtile, to which you may beat time. But I have done this author the juſtice to obſerve, that this fault is only to be found in his Miſcellanies, and ſome other pieces he has written; but in his dialogue, entitled the *Morialiſts*, he has not wantoned with words in that manner, but the ſtile of it is chaſte and ſober *. It is therefore true what I have obſerved elſewhere †, and here repeat, that if we have a mind to adorn our proſe ſtile in Engliſh, it ſhould be chiefly by compoſition in periods, which, if well compoſed, will not only make the ſtile more a-

* Vol. 4th. p. 365. and 393. The reader perhaps may think it worth his while to read the whole chapter, which is upon the ſubject of this dialogue of Lord Shaftſbury, where I think I have beſtowed juſt praiſe upon the noble author, who, by this work, has, in my opinion, done a great deal of honour, not only to the Engliſh nation, but to modern times, which have produced nothing of the dialogue kind, (a compoſition of the greateſt beauty when well executed), that can be compared with it.

† P. 166. and the paſſages there referred to.

greeable to the ear when read or ſpoken, but will convey the ſenſe more forcibly. But even in periods we may abound too much, and by that make our compoſition too uniform, and without that variety which is required to make every work of art beautiful. No man ever compoſed better periods than Demoſthenes; but all his ſtile is not periodiſed, and there are thrown in, amongſt his periods, many ſhort ſentences, commonly in the form of interrogations. And in that reſpect his ſtile is very different from that of another Athenian orator, Iſocrates, whoſe compoſition is almoſt all in periods: And I would further obſerve, upon this ſubject, that periods are more proper for the oratorial, than for any other ſtile; and they are undoubtedly very proper for collecting together the ſeveral propoſitions of which an argument may conſiſt, and bringing them out with great force in the end of the period. But in the hiſtorical and didactic ſtile they ſhould be more ſparingly uſed. Livy, in his Narrative, has, as I have elſewhere obſerved *,

* Vol. 5th. p. 230.

too many periods, and ſo compoſed as often to make his ſtile perplexed and obſcure. Of the didactic ſtile I think Ariſtotle is the moſt perfect model. Now, in his works there is hardly any thing you can call a period, excepting the beginning of ſome of them, which he has adorned in that way; particularly, he has uſhered in his book upon Poetry with a period very well compoſed, and which, I think, ſhews that he could have compoſed in periods, if the ſubject had required it *.

To conclude this ſubject of the ornament of language—I think it is true what

* He begins his book of Poetry thus: Περι ποιητικης αυτης τε και των ειδων αυτης, ἡντινα δυναμιν ἑκαστον ἐχει, και πως δει συνιϛασθαι τους μυθους ει μελλει καλως ἑξειν ἡ ποιησις· ἐτι δε ἐκ ποσων και ποιων ἐστι μοριων· ὁμοιως δε καὶ περι των ἀλλων, ὁσα της αυτης ἐστι μεθοδου, λεγωμεν, ἀρξαμενοι, κατα φυσιν, πρωτον ἀπο πρωτων. And he begins his *Philoſophy of Nature*, or Φυσικη ακροασις, as he calls it, with a ſtill longer period, having a parentheſis in it of ſome length. There is alſo a period in the beginning of his treatiſe *De Anima*, much ſhorter, but very well compoſed. The reſt of his ſtile is all plain didactic, without any ornament of the words or of the compoſition.

I have ſaid above*, that in Rhetoric, as well as in other arts, the greateſt art is to conceal art; for if the ſtile appear to be much laboured, it will not pleaſe a critic of good taſte, even though the art be good; but if it be not ſo, which I obſerve is often the caſe, the author will appear to have laboured to write ill, which I think the greateſt fault that any author can have.

That there are certain qualities of body required for the practice of oratory, not neceſſary in any other of the fine arts, I have elſewhere obſerved †: Now, in theſe, and ſome of them of the greateſt importance too, Demoſthenes was by nature very deficient; and as he ſupplied thoſe natural defects by wonderful induſtry and application, he may be ſaid to have in that reſpect more merit than any other great orator ever had.

He was very infirm of body, ſo infirm, that he did not frequent the Palaeſtra

* P. 203. † Vol. 4th, p. 285.

when he was young, as all the other citizens of Athens of the ſame rank did; and for that reaſon he was thought to be of a character ſoft and effeminate, from whence he had the nick-name of Βατταλος, the name of a muſician who was remarkably delicate and effeminate *. The natural conſequence of this infirmity of his habit was, that his voice was weak, which was a very great defect in an orator who was to ſpeak to ſo many thouſands of people: For an antient orator, who ſpoke to the people of Athens or Rome aſſembled, or a general who harangued a whole army, muſt have had a voice, ſuch as I doubt is not now to be heard †. He was alſo ſo ſhort-winded, that he could not ſpeak a period of any length: And his articulation was natu-

* Libanius the ſophiſt, in an epiſtle addreſſed to the proconſul Montius.

† Dapper, in his deſcription of the Archipelago Iſlands, quoted by M. de Buffon, vol. 3d, p. 442. ſays, that in ſome of theſe iſlands the inhabitants have their voices ſo ſtrong, that they can converſe with one another at the diſtance of a quarter of a league, and ſome-

rally ſo defective, that he could not pronounce R, the firſt letter of the name of his art.

Theſe ſo great defects he cured by application and induſtry, ſuch as would ap-

times of a whole league. In the heroic age of Greece, when they had not the uſe in their armies of trumpets or drums to give ſignals, the epithet which Homer gives to ſome of his heroes, of βοην αγαθος, was a great praiſe, as it was only by the voice that any command could be given.—And here we may obſerve, in paſſing, how ſtrictly Homer obſerves the manners of the age (or the *coſtume*, as the Italians call it) of which he writes: For though the σαλπιγξ, or trumpet, was known in his time, and is accordingly mentioned by him in one of his ſimilies, yet he does not ſpeak of it as uſed in the Trojan war. See Euſtathius's Commentary, *p.* 1139. *lin.* 52. where he ſpeaks of other things that were in uſe in Homer's time, and which he likewiſe mentions in his ſimilies; but does not ſay that they were uſed in the heroic times. Virgil is not ſo accurate in this reſpect; for he makes men fight upon horſeback in that age; which they could not do, for a very good reaſon, that the horſes were not able to carry men of their ſize in war, or upon a journey, though ſometimes they mounted them occaſionally and for a ſhort way, as Diomede and Ulyſſes did the horſes of Rheſus, —Iliad 10.

pear incredible, if it were not very well vouched. He was in uſe to ſhut himſelf up, for two or three months together, in a dark habitation under ground, (which Plutarch ſays was to be ſeen in his time), with one half of his head ſhaven, that he might not go abroad or be ſeen by any body. There he amended the defect in his articulation, aud learned to pronounce the letter R as well as any body elſe. He practiſed there alſo, as Plutarch informs us, the compoſition of ſentences and periods: And it was in this retreat that I ſuppoſe he practiced a very ſtrange method, by which it is ſaid he improved his pronunciation: It was by ſpeaking with pebbles in his mouth, which no doubt would coſt him a great effort; but the conſequence of it would be, that he would ſpeak more diſtinctly and articulately when the pebbles were out of his mouth, than he could otherwiſe have done.

The ſhortneſs of his wind he cured by going up aſcents quickly, and at the ſame

time pronouncing many verſes in one breath; by which exerciſe he enabled himſelf to pronounce without ſtop or heſitation, *una continuatione verborum*, as Cicero ſays, thoſe beautiful long periods which we find in his Orations. And to accuſtom himſelf to bear the noiſe and tumult of the people aſſembled, he uſed to declaim upon the ſea ſhore, amid the noiſe of the waves breaking upon the rocks. In this way he fought againſt nature, as Valerius Maximus ſays, and overcame her by obſtinate perſeverance; and he adds, *Itaque alterum Demoſthenem mater, alterum induſtria enixa eſt* *.

He could not, I think, have thus triumphed over nature, nor transformed himſelf ſo much as he did, if he had not had a violent propenſity for the art, and a genius that led him to the practice of it, neglecting all other ſtudies. And accordingly we are told by Plutarch, that when he was very young, ſeeing a great confluence of

* Valer. Maxim. lib. 8. cap. 7.

people gathered together, to hear a famous orator of thoſe days called Calliſtratus, he deſired leave of his pedagogue to be one of his hearers. And accordingly having, with the aſſiſtance of the pedagogue, got into the court of juſtice, he was ſo charmed with the oratory of Calliſtratus, that he gave over every other ſtudy, and applied himſelf wholly to rhetoric *. And it was then, as it is ſaid, that he forſook Plato and the Academy, and addicted himſelf wholly to Oratory †.

As to the education, that he had to qualify him to make ſo great a figure in Oratory, he may, I think, be ſaid to have been ſelf-taught, in the ſeveral ways above deſcribed. He was inſtructed, however, as Plutarch informs us, by a great Athenian orator of thoſe times, Iſaeus, whom he admired and followed; for he had no occaſion to travel as far as Cicero did, for inſtruction in the art, which was better practiſed in Athens

* Plutarch's Life of Demoſthenes, in the beginning.

† Aulus Gellius, lib. 3. cap. 13.

at that time than any where elſe in the world. He appears, too, to have informed himſelf of the ſtile and manner of Pericles, whom he is ſaid to have imitated; ſo that he formed himſelf upon the model of one of the greateſt orators that, I believe, ever exiſted *. He began the practice of the art, not as Cicero did, by declaiming on fictitious cauſes, but with real buſineſs: For as ſoon as he was of age, he proſecuted his tutors for mal-adminiſtration of his eſtate, and recovered ſomething from them, but much ſhort of what they had embezzled †. He did not attend the ſchool of Iſocrates, becauſe, as Plutarch ſays, he could not afford to pay him. But I do not think that he ſuffered thereby any loſs; for though Iſocrates might have made of him ſuch a panegyrical orator as himſelf, he could not, by imitating him, have excelled ſo much in the judicial and the deliberative. He ſtudied Thucydides very much, and tranſcribed him, as it is ſaid, ſeveral times with his own hand. He

* P. 316.

† Plutarch, in the Life of Demoſthenes.

learned from him, no doubt, that argumentative ſtile which is ſo eminent in Demoſthenes, and to comprehend ſo much matter in his periods; but his periods are much better compoſed than thoſe of Thucydides, and not ſo much crouded, and often obſcured, with figures.

But the moſt important leſſon of all he got from a friend of his, who was a player, *Satyrus* by name. When he firſt began to ſpeak to the people he was very ill received; for he could not pronounce his own periods, full of matter and argument, ſo as to be diſtinctly underſtood: And one day he was ſo ill treated by the people, that he went out of the aſſembly with his head covered. It was then that his friend the player met him, to whom he complained, that though he had applied more to the ſtudy of ſpeaking than any other man, and had ſpent the prime of his life in it, yet he was not ſo well heard by the people, as low ignorant men, who practiced other trades, ſuch as that of a ſailor, and lived idly and diſſolutely. 'What

'you ſay is true,' ſays Satyrus, 'And I 'will give you the reaſon for it, if you 'will repeat me any verſes that you may 'remember of Sophocles or Euripides.' Accordingly Demoſthenes did repeat ſome of their verſes: And after he had done it, Satyrus pronounced the ſame verſes; but ſo much more gracefully, and with a tone and manner ſo different, that Demoſthenes hardly knew them to be the ſame: And in this way he learned that the ſtudy of the matter and compoſition of an oration ſignified little, if it was not well pronounced. It was then, as Plutarch tells us, that he took to his ſubterraneous habitation, where he would have remained, as I have ſaid, for two or three months together, without going abroad or ſeeing any ſtranger. And when he came above ground, and mixed with the world, he would deſcend at times into his cave, and what ſpeeches he had heard made, he would recollect and compoſe better in ſentences and periods. And then, no doubt, he would ſtudy that melody and rhythm which adorned his ſpeeches ſo much, as the Halicarna-

ſian has obſerved. And it was after this converſation with his friend the player, that I ſuppoſe he practiſed before the glaſs, and had a ſword hung over his ſhoulders, in order to prevent his raiſing them too high, which he was in uſe to do.

In this way was Demoſthenes formed to be ſo great an orator.

CHAP. II.

The Matter *moſt valuable in every good writing.—This holds particularly of the orations of Demoſthenes.—We cannot judge rightly of theſe orations, without knowing the political conduct of Demoſthenes, and the ſtate of Athens at that time.—Of the original government of Athens;—firſt monarchical, then ariſtocratical, and at laſt entirely popular.—The council there did not controul the people, any more than the Senate in Rome.—Of the character of the Athenians:—A noble, magnanimous, diſintereſted people;—in later times the deliverer of Greece from the Perſians;—ſhewed their great temper and moderation, as well as heroic bravery.—The people of Athens corrupted by wealth and luxury:—They deſired to live an eaſy and indolent life at the public expence.—This indulgence firſt given them by Pericles, who introduced the* theatrical *money, which every citizen re-*

ceived.—After that, under different pretences, the whole money of their treaſury was given to the people; and, in the time of Demoſthenes, the whole expence of the ſtate was defrayed by the richer citizens. The conſequence of this miſuſe of public money, was to make the people effeminate and indolent;—did not fight themſelves, but employed mercenaries, whom they did not pay.—Theſe, therefore, did no good; for which they blamed their commanders: —But ſtill they were a very intelligent and clever people.—Of the ſtate of affairs in Greece,—particularly of the Lacedemonians, Thebans, and Athenians.—In the diſtracted ſtate of Greece, Philip of Macedon appeared.—A hiſtory of his family, —of himſelf, and his education under Epaminondas.—Of the progreſs of his arms, —firſt in Thrace,—then in Theſſaly,—then in the war with the Phocians, whom he utterly deſtroyed,—then with the Locrians; and, laſt of all, with the Athenians and Thebans, and their allies, whom he utterly defeated in the great battle of

Chaeronaea.—He was aſſiſted in thoſe operations by Perſons whom he had in his pay in the ſeveral ſtates of Greece.—In the beginning of theſe conqueſts of Philip, Demoſthenes appeared.—The diſtracted ſtate of Greece then, there being no people among them who were leaders.—In this ſtate of Greece, Demoſthenes acted the greateſt part that ever was acted in the political line.—The wonderful influence of his councils and his eloquence upon the Thebans, when he perſuaded them to join the Athenians againſt Philip, which put him to a ſtand.—In the deciſive battle of Chaeronaea, his behaviour, as a ſoldier, not ſo bad as repreſented by ſome authors. —Steady and firm in oppoſing the Macedonian power.—Never took money from the Macedonians, as other demagogues did; —formed a great confederacy and great army againſt Philip;—In forming this confederacy, he had more difficulties to ſtruggle with at home than abroad.—He had three paſſions of the Athenians to combat with; their love of pleaſure and eaſe, their love of money, and their vani-

ty.—Their vanity much flattered by their demagogues —Demoſthenes rather abuſed them than flattered them:—His Philippics rather an invective againſt the people of Athens than againſt Philip, whom he praiſes for his bravery and contempt of danger.—Nothing but a noble manly ſpirit, as well as great eloquence, could have perſuaded the people of Athens to engage in ſuch a war againſt Philip.—He encourages the Athenians, by telling them, that if they will yet do what is right, all will be well;—alſo by ſhewing them that Philip was not invincible.—What diſtinguiſhes chiefly the matter of Demoſthenes from that of any other orator, is his inſiſting ſo much upon the topic of the pulchrum *and* honeſtum*:—Examples of this.—Learned this in the ſchool of Plato,—and by imitating Pericles, who had been the ſcholar of Anaxagoras.—There can be nothing perfect in the arts without philoſophy.—Of Demoſthenes's ſkill in mixing together the topic of the* poſſible, *the* profitable, *and the* honourable.—*The difference betwixt the rhetorical and the di-*

dactic ſtile in that reſpect.—One great difference betwixt Demoſthenes and Cicero as to the matter.—Demoſthenes never ſpeaks of himſelf in his orations, except when it is abſolutely neceſſary, as in the caſe of the oration De Corona.—*Cicero introduces himſelf very often into his orations, even in private cauſes.—Modeſty affected by Cicero, a ſure ſign of the greateſt vanity.—A great artiſt, ſuch as Demoſthenes, can never be ſatisfied with his own performance.*

IN all good writing and good ſpeaking, the matter ought to be principal: And this holds with reſpect to the orations of Demoſthenes, in which the matter is of much greater value than the ſtile, excellent as it is; particularly in his public orations, ſuch as his Philippics, his Olynthiacs, and his orations againſt Æſchines: For in theſe, beſides the ſenſe and argument, there is a ſpirit and dignity of character, ſuch as are not to be found in any other even of his orations, and which make a great part of

that δεινοτης, or *weight of matter and force of perſuaſion*, as we may paraphraſe the word, by which Demoſthenes was diſtinguiſhed from all other orators.

But however well written or well ſpoken theſe orations were, they could not have had the effect, which we know they had, upon his hearers, if his conduct in public affairs had not been ſuitable: For otherwiſe, the ſpirit he ſhewed, and the dignity he aſſumed, would have appeared ridiculous. We cannot, therefore, judge truly of the merit of theſe orations, without knowing the political conduct of Demoſthenes; nor of that, without being informed of the ſtate of Athens at that time, and likewiſe of the general ſituation of the affairs of Greece. This will lead me into a pretty long diſſertation, but in which I will not loſe ſight of Demoſthenes; for it is chiefly from his orations that I have collected what I am to ſay upon the ſubject.

The government of Athens, as well as of every other ſtate in Greece, was origi-

nally monarchical, the ſame I believe that was in every country where government was firſt eſtabliſhed by ſtrangers who came from civilized countries, and introduced arts and civility among ſavages; which was the caſe of all Greece, and particularly of Athens, originally an Egyptian colony, of which Cecrops the Egyptian was the firſt king *. But ſavages, as it is well known, are the freeſt of all men, and, as thoſe ſtrangers that came into Greece, had not power ſufficient to make them ſubmit by force to what they never would ſubmit to of choice, all thoſe antient Grecian monarchies were extremely limited, the kings governing more by perſuaſion, and ſuperior qualities both of mind and body, than by force or legal authority. This was the caſe of all thoſe heroic kingdoms of Greece, of which we read in Homer. But their power, ſuch as it was, and their wealth, greater than that of the other

* See what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, in vol. 1ſt of this work, p. 640, and following.

citizens, did, by degrees, corrupt their manners, and the desire of more power and more wealth made them tyrants, as Thucydides informs us *; the consequence of which, among a people uncorrupted, and whose minds, at least, were still free, was a change of government from monarchy to aristocracy, and from that to democracy. This was the fate of Athens. From monarchy, which was their government at the time of the Trojan war, they changed to a kind of aristocracy, under, first perpetual, and then decennial archons. And at last their government became entirely popular: For though they had a council, which had a considerable share of the government,

* Lib. 1. p. 10. edit. Stephani.

† This was called προβουλευειν, as appears from a passage of Demosthenes, περι στεφανου, p. 168. edit. Morell. where he says, that upon the news of the taking of Elataea by King Philip, the council assembled, and at the same time the people, και πριν εκεινην (την βουλην) χρηματισαι και προβουλευσαι, πας ὁ δημος ανω καθηστο. The same was the form among the Romans; for among them the authority of the senate, in antient times, went before the resolutions of the people; but when the peo-

(for by the forms of their conſtitution every thing came before the council, before it was propoſed to the people †), yet that council itſelf was choſen by lot from among the people; and we do not find, in the hiſtory of Athens, that there was ever any great difference of opinion betwixt the council and the aſſembly of the people, ſuch as there was in Rome betwixt the ſenate and the people, before the democracy there was perfectly eſtabliſhed. This was the government of Athens in the days of Demoſthenes.

The character of the Athenians, conſidered as a people, is, I think, the nobleſt to be found in hiſtory: For they were not only from the beginning brave and magnanimous, but they were of a nature ſo generous and beneficent, that Athens was the refuge and aſſylum of all the diſtreſſed in

ple there, as in Athens, ingroſſed all power to themſelves, they eluded this form by making a law, *ut patres auctores eſſent in incertum comitiorum eventum*; that is, *ſhould authoriſe* whatever the people ſhould determine.

Greece. The Heraclidae, when they were expelled Peloponneſus, they received, and protected, and defended againſt Euryſtheus, whom they killed in battle, and at laſt, by force of arms, reſtored them to their country*. Athens, too, was a ſanctuary for Œdipus, and thoſe with him, when they were expelled Thebes †; and in the firſt

* That they ſo far aſſiſted the Heraclidae, as to bring them back to Peloponneſus, is a fact, as far as I remember, only mentioned by Demoſthenes; but it is in a decree drawn up by him, in which he certainly would not have mentioned a fact which had no foundation in hiſtory. It was the decree upon which the alliance between the Athenians and Thebans was formed againſt Philip. In this decree he recounts ſeveral of the favours which the Athenians had beſtowed upon the Thebans: And among others he mentions this; Τους Ηρακλεους παιδας, αποστερουμενους ὑπο των Πελοποννησιων της πατρῳας αρχης, κατηγαγον, τοις οπλοις κρατησαντες της αντιβαινουσης πειρωμενους τοις Ηρακλειδαις ἐκγονοις.—(Περι Στεφανου, p. 171.) As to the fact of their receiving and protecting them, and killing Euryſtheus their perſecutor, it is related by Thucydides, in the beginning of his hiſtory.

† Demoſt. ubi ſupra.

Theban war, which followed ſoon after, they ſo far ſuccoured the unfortunate Argives, that they obliged the Thebans to give up the bodies of the Argive leaders, whom they had ſlain: And, to come down to later times, they were not only the firſt of the Greeks who durſt face the Perſians in the field; but, in the battle of Marathon, they defeated a prodigious army of them with a handful of men; and at Plataeae, when the Lacedemonians declined to be drawn up againſt the Perſians, they chearfully undertook it *. In that war they, for the ſervice of the common cauſe, forſook their city and their country, though they were offered by Xerxes, if they would abandon the common cauſe, not only to have the poſſeſſion of their own country ſecured to them, but to have any other country added to it that they themſelves ſhould chooſe, and to be governed by their own laws. He promiſ-

* This is related by Herodotus, in his account of that battle.

ed alſo to repair all the miſchief he had done in their country by demoliſhing their temples *. And thus, without city or country, they betook themſelves to the ſea, and furniſhed twice as many ſhips as all Greece beſides: So that it was by their means, that the Greeks became maſters at ſea; without which it was impoſſible that the liberties of Greece could have been preſerved. For, if the Perſians had not been defeated at Salamis, they would have ſo infeſted the coaſts of Greece, going round Peloponneſe, and landing wherever they pleaſed, that the country would not have been habitable, and the people muſt have ſubmitted. And, in general, throughout the whole of that moſt important and hazardous war, they behaved not only with

* See Herodotus, lib. 8. cap. 140. and following, and lib. 9. *in initio*; where we have a moſt noble and ſpirited anſwer made by the Athenians to theſe offers. One of the council, he tells us, was of opinion, that they ſhould accept of them; but the Athenians, he ſays, ſtoned him, and their wives ſtoned his wife. See alſo Demoſthenes, *ubi ſupra*, p. 174. *Morelli.*—and Iſocrates's *Panegyric*, p. 60. *Stephani.*

the greateſt bravery and diſintereſtedneſs, but alſo with ſo much temper and moderation, yielding in every thing to the Spartans, who, if they had not been allowed to take the lead, would otherwiſe have abandoned the common cauſe, that Herodotus very juſtly gives them the praiſe of having ſaved Greece. And in this reſpect they differed very much from their rivals the Spartans, who were very far from being a generous and diſintereſted people; but, on the contrary, very ſelfiſh and narrow-minded.

But the people of any country, as well as their kings and great men, may be corrupted by wealth and power; and this was the fate of the Athenians: For when, by their conqueſts and their trade, they had become rich and powerful, they became indolent and luxurious, and were as liable to be flattered by orators and demagogues, as any abſolute monarch by his courtiers and favourites; and in this reſpect I think Ariſtotle very properly compares a democracy

to a tyranny *. The firſt remarkable corruption of their manners began under Pericles, one of the beſt too of their demagogues, but who, in order to make his court to the more indigent of the citizens, introduced a thing which had very great conſequences, and may be ſaid to have been one of the principal cauſes of the ruin of Athens, and of the loſs of the liberty of Greece.

For underſtanding of this, we are to know that the Athenians, when they were in their glory, had a very great revenue, ſuch as Demoſthenes ſays might be compared with the revenue of all the other ſtates of Greece put together †. And he ſays, that during the forty-five years that they were the leaders of Greece, they collected a treaſure of more than ten thouſand talents ‡. This treaſure was appropriated

* *De Republica*, lib. 4. cap. 4.

† Περι συμμοριων p. 107. in fine. 1ſt Olynth. p. 7.

‡ Olynth. 3d, p. 25.

for war, and was what they called their χρηματα στρατιωτικα, out of which were paid the citizens, when they went upon any expedition, and likewiſe ſuch mercenaries as they had occaſion to hire. Some time before the Perſian invaſion, it was propoſed to divide among the citizens a great ſum which they had then in the treaſury; but this was prevented by the wiſdom of Themiſtocles, who, then foreſeeing the ſtorm that was coming, perſuaded them to employ it in building ſhips. Nor was this treaſure ever employed, as far as we know, for any other purpoſe than the ſervice of the people, till it was diverted to private uſes by Pericles, upon the following occaſion. In his time theatrical repreſentations, as well as every other art, were brought to great perfection in Athens, and as the theatre was then only of wood, and put up occaſionally, it did not contain all the ſpectators, ſo that there was a great crouding to get into it, and great contention about places, which often ended in blows. This produced a regulation, by which every one was to pay for his ſeat ſo

much, otherwiſe to have no place; and as the more indigent of the people could but ill afford this, Pericles took the opportunity of making his court to the people, by propoſing that there ſhould be paid out of the military treaſure two *oboli* to every one of the citizens, one of which was to be paid for a ſeat in the theatre, and the other for his maintenance. The bad effects of this appropriation of public money to private uſes were ſoon felt; for one Apollodorus wanted to bring back again the money to the treaſury; to prevent which, Eubulus, a great demagogue in thoſe days, in order to make his court to the people in the ſame way that Pericles had done, propoſed that it ſhould be a capital crime for any man ſo much as to move that the money ſhould be again applied to the uſe of the public *. And thus the χρηματα στρατιωτικα, at leaſt a great part of them, became what they called χρηματα θεωρικα.

* See Ulpian's Comment. upon the beginning of the 1ſt Olynthiac.

Nor did the thing ſtop here; for the people, having once taſted of the ſweets of living in pleaſure and eaſe at the public expence, by degrees laid hold of the whole revenue of the ſtate under various pretences, ſuch as being paid for their attendance in the public aſſemblies, which they called χρηματα εκκλησιαστικα, and for their trouble in judging cauſes, which they called χρηματα δικαστικα; ſo that, in the days of Demoſthenes, there was nothing left for defraying any public ſervice, except firſt, the contributions of the richer citizens called εισφοραι, a very unequal and arbitrary aſſeſſment, as it appears, and which gave occaſion to great complaints, till Demoſthenes got ſome regulations made which put the thing upon a better foot *; and, ſecondly, what they called the λειτουργιαι, or public ſervices, which was alſo a burden upon the richer ſort, ſuch as the fitting out of ſhips of war, called τριηραρχια, and the defraying the expence of the choruſes for their tragedy and comedy,

* Περι στεφανε, p. 154.

called χορηγια. For it appears from what the Scholiaſt ſays *, that the *obolus*, which each man paid for his ticket, was given to the architect who put up the theatre and furniſhed the machinery.

Another conſequence of this was, that the people became indolent and effeminate, preferring an eaſy and pleaſureable life, at the public expence, to thoſe toils and dangers for which only they were paid before. They did not therefore chooſe to go upon any expedition themſelves, but employed mercenary troops, which being very ill paid, by reaſon of the miſapplication of the public money, thoſe whom they ſent out as commanders were obliged to employ them in any way in which they could find ſubſiſtence for them, if the ſervice upon which they went was not ſufficient for that purpoſe; and ſometimes, for want of pay, they deſerted to the enemy. This

* Ulpian, ubi ſupra.

produced trials and accuſations of the commanders, upon whom the people were always willing to lay the blame, rather than upon themſelves; and though they were not willing to fight, they were very willing to judge, and were diſpoſed to be remarkably ſevere in their judgments; and the general opinion that prevailed among them was, that the ſafety of the ſtate conſiſted, firſt, in proper votes or reſolutions (ψηφισματα); ſecondly, in the ſtrict adminiſtration of juſtice. All this appears from the orations of Demoſthenes; and, if we can believe Iſocrates, they were come to ſuch a degree of degeneracy, that, even when they went abroad upon any expedition, they ſerved as rowers aboard their own veſſels, while they employed their barbarous mercenaries to fight for them. But, though they were thus declined in ſpirit and courage, they continued ſtill to excell in the arts *, and were beſides, in the com-

* Their taſte of pleaſure was no doubt very fine, but it was very expenſive; for Demoſthenes tells us, in his fifth Philippic, towards the beginning, that they

mon affairs of life, people of the quickeſt apprehenſion, and what we would call the cleverest people in Greece *.

Such was the character of the people with whom Demoſthenes had to do. We are now to conſider in what ſtate the affairs of Greece were, when Demoſthenes appeared upon the ſtage. The Lacedemonians, after having been for many years the leading people in Greece, had loſt that honour by their defeat at Leuctra, and were now engaged in war with ſome of the neighbouring ſtates of Peloponneſe, who had taken that opportunity to ſhake off their dependence upon them. The Thebans, who, ever ſince their victory at Leuctra, had taken the lead in Grecian affairs, were at this time engaged in an unſucceſsful war with the Phocians, who inhabited

ſpent more upon the feaſt of the Παναθηναιαι and of Bacchus, than upon any one of their naval expeditions.

* Demoſthenes, who did not flatter them, gives them this teſtimony, γνωναι παντων υμας οξυτατα ρηθεντα. Olynth. 3. p. 23.

a country adjoining to the Straights of Thermopylae. The Athenians, too, were likewiſe engaged in what they called the ſocial war, which was a war betwixt them and the Chians, the Rhodians, and the Byzantians, who were formerly their allies, or rather their ſubjects, but now had ſhaken off the yoke, and formed a confederacy againſt them *. In this diſtracted ſtate of the affairs of Greece, a new power appeared on the ſtage that never was heard of before. This was Philip king of Macedon, a country formerly tributary to the Athenians, and of ſo little eſtimation, that, as Demoſthenes tells us, a man did not chuſe to take a ſlave from that country. This Philip was the third ſon of Amyntas, the preceding king. The eldeſt was aſſaſſinated, and the ſecond was killed in a battle with the Illyrians †. By theſe accidents Philip became king of Macedon. But there was another, which contributed moſt of all to make him the man he afterwards proved to be, and which may be ſaid to have laid

* Libanius in Prolegom. ad Demoſt.

† Ulpian, ubi ſupra.

the foundation of the univerſal monarchy of the Macedonians. It was this: Amyntas having had ſome difference with the Thebans, who were then the governing people in Greece, and being obliged to ſubmit to them, ſent his third ſon Philip to Thebes, as a hoſtage for the performance of the conditions impoſed upon him. There he became acquainted with Epaminondas, the greateſt man, perhaps, that ever Greece produced, who had been inſtructed by Lyſis, a Pythagorean philoſopher, that happened then to be reſiding at Thebes. Beſides the inſtruction he got from Epaminondas, the care of his education was committed to Nauſithous, another Pythagorean philoſopher, who was reſiding at Thebes while Philip was there *; ſo that Philip may be ſaid to have been a nurſling of philoſophy, without which, I think it would have been impoſſible that, coming from a barbarous nation, ſuch as Macedonia was at that time, he ſhould have been ſo great a king; as impoſſible, as that his

* Diodorus Siculus, lib. 16. ſec. 2.

ſon Alexander ſhould have conquered Aſia, and been one of the greateſt men we read of in hiſtory, if he had not been educated by Ariſtotle. How ſenſible Philip was of the benefit of a philoſophical education, is evident from a letter of his, ſtill extant, to Ariſtotle, written upon occaſion of the birth of Alexander; wherein he ſays, That he does not thank the gods ſo much for having beſtowed a ſon on him, as for giving him the opportunity of having him educated under ſuch a philoſopher as Ariſtotle. Thus inſtructed, Philip, very ſoon after his father's death, ſhewed how much he had profited by theſe inſtructions; and firſt he enlarged himſelf upon the ſide of Thrace, where there were many flouriſhing Greek cities, ſuch as Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea *, and, among others, Olynthus, which was a colony from Chalcis in Euboea, and which itſelf was originally a colony from Athens†. All theſe cities he ſubdued; and then he began to extend his power upon the other

* Olynth. 1. p. 5.

† Liban. Argum. ad Olynth. 1.

ſide, viz. in Theſſaly, where taking advantage of the diviſion of that people among themſelves, he became likewiſe maſter of them. Being thus in the neighbourhood of Greece, he got into it by the means of the war above mentioned, betwixt the Thebans and the Phocians, in which the Thebans being unſucceſsful, were prevailed upon by ſome friends that Philip had there, to call him to their aſſiſtance; for Philip, by his money and his intrigues, had procured to himſelf friends in almoſt all the cities of Greece, by whoſe help, as much as by the force of his arms, he ſubdued that country. Having thus got into Greece, he very ſoon put an end to the Phocian war, by totally deſtroying that people, in whoſe place he was admitted to be of the council of the Amphictyons *. After this, that council having quarrelled with the Locrians, (a contrivance, as Demoſthenes ſays †, of Philip's friend at A-

* Liban. Argum. ad Orat. περὶ εἰρήνης.

† Περὶ στεφάνου, p. 164.

thens, Æſchines,) on account of ſome land which the Locrians poſſeſſed, but which the Amphictyons ſaid belonged to the Delphic God, and having tried in vain to ſubdue them by arms, they called to their aſſiſtance Philip, and choſe him general of the Amphictyons. Upon which he, not minding the ſacred ground which was the ſubject of the controverſy, turned his arms againſt Elataea, a ſtrong town upon the confines of Baeotia, and made himſelf maſter of it*. This gave the alarm to the Thebans, and made them join againſt Philip the Athenians, with whom before they were at variance. Then followed the battle of Cheronaea, which made Philip maſter of Greece.

It was when this mighty power was yet but in its infancy, and when Philip was beginning to extend himſelf upon the ſide of Thrace, by the conqueſt of the cities above mentioned, that Demoſthenes firſt ap-

* Demoſt. ubi ſupra.

peared in the ſcene of public buſineſs. At this time it could not be ſaid that there was any leading people in Greece: For the Thebans, though in war they had prevailed againſt the Lacedemonians under their philoſophical leader Epaminondas, had not wiſdom or ability ſufficient to fill their place in time of peace. All Greece, therefore, at that time conſiſted of ſo many independent ſtates, each contending for the maſtery; and, as I have ſaid, Philip had his partizans almoſt in every city, and particularly in Athens.

In theſe circumſtances, the part that Demoſthenes acted was perhaps the greateſt that any man ever acted in the political line; and, if Greece could have been ſaved by counſel and eloquence, it would have been ſaved by him: And I believe it is true what he ſays himſelf *, that, if there had been ſuch another man in each of the cities of Greece, that country never would

* Περὶ στεφάνου.

have been conquered by Philip. The greateſt triumph of his eloquence was in Thebes, whither he was ſent ambaſſador by the Athenian people, after Philip had taken poſſeſſion of Elataea, in order to perſuade the Thebans to join the Athenians againſt Philip, in defence of the common liberties of Greece. And though he was oppoſed by Philip's ambaſſadors, who were there preſent, and though the Thebans were under great obligations to Philip, and had long been at variance with the Athenians, and though they ſtill felt the loſs they had ſuffered in the unſucceſsful war with the Phocians, yet nothing could ſtand before the force of Demoſthenes's eloquence, exciting them to act the noble and generous part, ſo that with a kind of enthuſiaſm they ran to arms, and Demoſthenes was ſo great a man among them, that he not only guided their public aſſemblies as much as he did at Athens, but directed their generals *. By

* This is related by Plutarch in the life of Demoſthenes, upon the authority of Theopompus, a very diligent and accurate hiſtorian, and who lived about that time.

the acceſſion of the Thebans, ſuch a confederacy was formed againſt Philip, as fairly put him to a ſtand, and obliged him to ſue for peace. But the war going on, the confederates had at firſt the advantage in two actions *, till at laſt the fatal battle of Chaeronea put an end to the liberties of Greece, an event for which Demoſthenes could not be anſwerable, as he ſays himſelf, not having the command of the army; for with reſpect to his behaviour as a ſoldier, beſides that it could have no influence upon the fate of the day, I ſuſpect it has been much exaggerated by Plutarch and other writers; for if it had been as bad as they repreſent it, it certainly would have been mentioned, and much inſiſted on by Æſchines, in his oration againſt Cteſiphon, where he throws out all ſort of abuſe againſt Demoſthenes.

In his political conduct, too, there was a ſteadineſs and a conſtancy which is not commonly found in politicians, eſpecially

* Demoſt. περὶ στεφάν.

thoſe of modern times: For he oppoſed, from the beginning, the Macedonian power, and continued to oppoſe it, while he lived, chooſing rather than ſubmit to it, and put himſelf into the hands of the Macedonians, to go out of life. Whatever truth, therefore, there may be in the ſtory of his taking the Perſian money againſt the Macedonian, or of Alexander's money which Harpalus had run away with *, he was incorruptible by the Macedonian.

* As to his taking money from the king of Perſia, for ſtirring up Greece againſt the Macedonian, Plutarch ſays, it was proved by writings which Alexander found in Babylon. But with regard to the money which Plutarch ſays he took from Harpalus, in order that he might not ſpeak againſt him, and perſuade the people to deliver him up to Alexander, I think he is juſtified by what Pauſanias tells *in Corinthiacis*; who relates, that after the death of Harpalus, one of his domeſtics, who had been his treaſurer, was apprehended by a Macedonian commander, to whom he gave an account of all thoſe to whom Harpalus had given money, but Demoſthenes was none of them; and when it was laid to his charge, his deſiring to have the matter tried by the Areopagus, the moſt ſolemn and ſevere tribunal in Athens, looked as if he had been confident of his innocence.

In forming this grand alliance*, of which it appears he himſelf was the life and ſoul, he found more difficulty at home than abroad; for he had two paſſions of his countrymen to ſtruggle with, both as ſtrong as any in human nature, viz. firſt the love of pleaſure, together with that ſoftneſs and averſion to toil, and danger, and hazardous enterpriſe, which a life of that kind neceſſarily produces. Secondly, the love of money, by which I do not mean the deſire of ſuperfluous wealth, or what is called avarice; but the deſire of money to live upon in the way in which they had been ac-

* Plutarch, in the life of Demoſthenes, reckons up all the ſtates that he confederated againſt Philip, viz. the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans, beſides the two great ſtates of Athens and Thebes.—(See what Demoſthenes himſelf ſays of this confederacy *De Corona*, p. 179. edit. Morelii.) —Amongſt all theſe, ſays Plutarch, he went about as ambaſſador, and by his eloquence perſuaded them to join the public cauſe; ſo that in this way he collected a force againſt Philip of no leſs than 15,000 foot and 2000 horſe of mercenaries, beſides the national troops belonging to each of theſe ſtates. This, perhaps, was the greateſt army of Greeks that ever was collected together.

cuſtomed to live for many years: For, as I have obſerved, they were in the uſe of ſubſiſting upon the ſpoils of the public, which they divided among themſelves, and applied, partly to their living, and partly to their theatrical entertainments *. There was alſo a third paſſion of theirs, which Demoſthenes had to encounter, equally ſtrong, and as deeply implanted in human nature; I mean their vanity, which was greatly flattered by the demagogues at that time, who, as Demoſthenes tells us †, uſed frequently to aſk them, What they would have? What they ſhould move for? What they ſhould do to pleaſe them? And in almoſt every ſpeech made by ſuch orators, they were entertained either with their own praiſes, or thoſe of their anceſtors. This made it very dangerous to ſpeak freely to them, as Demoſthenes frequently obſerves, being very irafcible, as all vain men are, and very apt to do ſevere things in their anger. Nor indeed could Demoſthenes have treated them

* P. 351. and following.

† Olynth. 3. p. 24. edit. Morelii.

with the freedom he did, if he had not laid the blame of their ill conduct upon thoſe demagogues: Yet even that way it was by no means ſafe; and he tells them, that he ſhould not wonder, if he ſuffered more from them by telling them ſuch things, than thoſe gentlemen ſuffered by doing them; and he adds, 'For you are not always to be 'ſpoken to freely; and I am ſurpriſed that 'you now hear me *.' And indeed he had reaſon; for what is called his Philippics, and which, from the name, one ſhould imagine, was an invective againſt Philip, as the orations of Cicero, bearing the ſame name, are againſt Anthony, is rather an invective againſt the people of Athens, whom he every where reproaches with their indolence, effeminacy, and ſcandalous abuſe

* Olynth. 3. p. 27. & Philipp. 1, *in fine*, where he ſays, 'That as he knows certainly it is for their advan-'tage to hear what he told them, ſo he wiſhed he knew 'as certainly, that it was for his advantage to tell them 'ſuch things; for then (ſays he) I ſhould have told you 'them with much more pleaſure. Uncertain, however, 'as it is, what ſhall befal me, I venture to tell you what 'I am ſure it will be for your good that you ſhould do.'

of public money; whereas Philip he commends for his activity, bravery, and contempt of toil and danger, when ſet againſt glory and empire *. And when at any time he mentions the great actions of their anceſtors, it is only by way of reproach to them, who had degenerated ſo much from thoſe anceſtors †.

Without this noble ſpirit of liberty and manly boldneſs, which feared not the rage of a multitude any more than the frowns of a tyrant, his eloquence could have availed nothing; nor even with it, could any eloquence leſs than that of Demoſthenes, ſeconded too, and enforced as it was, both

* The Olynthiacs, I think, ſhould be rather called the Philippics of Demoſthenes; for in them he is very ſevere upon the vices of Philip, ſuch as his perfidy, his jealouſy of ſuperior merit, and his debauchery.—See particularly Olynth. 2. p. 17. It is, however, evident, that he does not do this merely for the pleaſure of railing at a man whoſe power he oppoſed, without any hatred to his perſon; but in order to encourage the Athenians, and make them conſider his power as not altogether invincible.

† Olynth. 3. p. 25. edit. Morelii.

by his private life and public conduct, have perſuaded a people, ſunk in pleaſure and indolence, to give up their feaſts, their ſhews, and elegant entertainments of the theatre, and what was ſtill more, even their daily bread, to reſume the ſpirit of their forefathers, and to engage in a moſt perilous war againſt a great king, at the head of a mighty army hitherto invincible.

The ſpeeches, by which ſo great things were accompliſhed, are ſuch as might be expected, full of ſenſe, ſpirit, and political prudence. While he reproaches the Athenians for their paſt conduct, he tells them that yet, if they will do what they ought to do, all will be well *. And while he

* In the beginning of the firſt Philippic he tells them, that though their affairs had then a very bad aſpect, they muſt not deſpair; 'For,' ſays he, 'what is 'worſt in time paſt, that is beſt with reſpect to the fu-'ture:—And what is that? It is this,—that you having 'done nothing of what you ought to have done, your 'affairs are in a bad ſituation; for if they were in ſuch

magnifies the valour and enterprifing ſpirit of Philip, he at the ſame time ſhews his weakneſſes; and ſays what was certainly true, that it was a ſingle man only that they had to deal with, not the ſtrength of a ſtate *; ſo that, if they were to do nothing but gain time, even that would be profitable.

But what chiefly diſtinguiſhes the rhetoric of Demoſthenes, and gives it an air of grandeur which ſets it much above that of any other orator, is what Plutarch has obſerved, that the topic he inſiſts moſt upon in his public orations is the το καλον, or the fair and the handſome; for it is only from three motives that men are perſuaded to act—the pleaſureable, the profitable, and the beautiful or the honourable. Now, of theſe three, the laſt is by far the nobleſt both for the ſpeak-

'a ſituation, you having done every thing that was pro-
'per, there were no hope of their mending.'

* Philipp. 3. p. 73.

er and the hearers. It was by arguments of this kind, as Plutarch has reported from Theopompus, that he perſuaded the Thebans to aſſociate with their enemies the Athenians againſt their friend Philip, when every motive of intereſt and ſafety was upon the other ſide. It was in this way that in the oration, *about the crown*, he juſtifies himſelf for having perſuaded his countrymen to act the noble, though unſucceſsful part, which they acted, in defence of the liberties of Greece againſt Philip; and it is this which gives the beauty to that fine paſſage, ſo juſtly celebrated by Longinus, where he ſwears by the ſhades of thoſe that fell at Marathon and Plataeae, that the Athenians did not err in preferring what was dangerous and in the event fatal, becauſe it was honourable, to what was eaſy and ſafe, but inglorious. And in general we may obſerve, that the arguments which he uſes with the Athenians in his public oratious are almoſt all drawn from this ſource; and it is particularly in this view that he urges the example of their anceſtors, who did ſo much

for the common liberties of Greece, with ſo generous a neglect of their own intereſt as is not to be equalled in the hiſtory of mankind. He therefore very well deſerves the praiſe which Panaetius the orator, quoted by Plutarch in his life of Demoſthenes, gives him, for his inſiſting ſo much in theſe orations upon the το καλον, or what is beautiful and honourable, and which is eligible for his own ſake, and preferable to what was pleaſant, eaſy, and even profitable *. And it is certain, that no orator, whoſe works are extant, inſiſts ſo much upon this topic in any deliberative or judicial oration.

This elevation of mind, which raiſed Demoſthenes ſo much above all other orators, and this enthuſiaſm for the το καλον, it is probable that he acquired in the ſchool of Plato, whoſe ſcholar he was. In the ſame

* See Plutarch in the life of Demoſthenes, where he gives us the words of Panaetius, which Taylor, in his edition of Demoſthenes, vol. 2d. p. 657. has tranſcribed.

manner Pericles, whom Demoſthenes propoſed to himſelf as his model, by hearing Anaxagoras the philoſopher, attained to that ſublime of eloquence, compared by the writers of his age to the bolt of Jupiter, which nothing could ſtand before; and it was Cicero's boaſt that he came forth an orator, not out of the ſhops of rhetoricians, but from the walks of the academy *. And in general it may be ſaid, that it is philoſophy which perfects all the arts; nor is there, without philoſophy, any thing truly great in the works of men †.

* Cicero, *De Oratore*, lib. 1. where he tells us, that this appeared from a letter of Demoſthenes, which it ſeems was then preſerved; and if he had not ſaid ſo, Cicero thinks that it appears *ex genere et granditate verborum*; I think I may add, that it appears ſtill more from the *matter* of his orations.

† See Quintilian, lib. 12. cap. 2. Of this philoſophical rhetoric the Halicarnaſſian ſpeaks much in ſundry places, particularly in his work upon the ſubject of the antient orators, where he calls it, ἡ ἀρχαία καὶ φι-

And ſo much for the matter of Demoſthenes's orations, upon which the Halicarnaſſian tells us he intended to write a treatiſe; but which if he ever executed, it has not come down to us *. In it he no doubt would have explained the order and economy which Demoſthenes commonly obſerves in his orations, and would have

λογοθος ρητορικη, cap. 1. and ſays, that it was quite loſt in his time, but was beginning to be revived under the patronage of the great men of Rome. He alſo mentions it in the ſame volume 2d of his works, p. 203. and 212. of the Oxford edition.

* Who would deſire to read more in praiſe of Demoſthenes, may conſult Lucian's encomium upon him, which he puts into the mouth of Antipater the Macedonian, upon occaſion of Callias, whom he had ſent to apprehend Demoſthenes, reporting to him the manner of Demoſthenes's death. This converſation Lucian pretends was found in the archives of the kingdom of Macedonia; but it is plainly a compoſition of his own, and, like all his other compoſitions, very elegant. See another encomium of Lucian upon Demoſthenes, which I think ſtill finer. I have quoted it in my Diſſertation upon the Compoſition of the Antients, p. 583. annexed to vol. 2d of this work.

ſhewn us how artfully he mixes the arguments drawn from ſeveral topics, ſuch as the poſſible, the profitable, and the honourable: For this way of complicating arguments, and ſo making them more forcible than when ſingle and detached, is noted as a peculiar excellency of Demoſthenes. This has been done by the Scholiaſt upon ſome of his orations, but in a much leſs maſterly manner than it was done or could have been done by the Halicarnaſſian.

I ſhall only further obſerve upon this head, that the method of teaching and of rhetorical perſuaſion, that is, perſuaſion without teaching, are quite different: For in teaching we ſeparate every thing from every thing, and explain things diſtinctly each by itſelf; and hence it is that accurate diviſion, as well as definition, is abſolutely neceſſary in matters of ſcience: Whereas in ſpeaking to the people, who are only to be perſuaded, not taught, at leaſt not in the ſpace of an hour or two, inſtead of ſeparating things, we accumulate

them, in order to give them more weight; and we follow not the order of ſcience, but ſuch as we think beſt fitted to influence the opinions and paſſions of uninſtructed men.

The Halicarnaſſian has given us an admirable treatiſe upon what he calls the λεκτικη δεινοτης of Demoſthenes, that is, the force and energy of his language, of which I ſhall make much uſe in the next chapter; and he promiſes another upon his πρακτικη δεινοτης, that is, the force of conviction which his matter carries. But this work, as I have obſerved, he either never wrote, or it has not come down to us. This want I have endeavoured to ſupply, as far as I am able, and I ſhall only add upon the ſubject, that both in the invention of arguments, and in the arrangement and diſpoſition of them, there is no orator, that ever I read or heard of, that equals him: And, beſides all the force that the rhetorical art gives to his arguments, there is more plain good ſenſe in them than in any oratorial compoſition I have ever ſeen: And he ex-

cells as much in exciting the paſſions of the readers, as in argument: And I think it is true what the Halicarnaſſian has obſerved *, that if a man has any feeling at all, it is impoſſible he can read Demoſthenes without being agitated by the different paſſions, which the Halicarnaſſian mentions. But how much more would he have been agitated, if he had heard Demoſthenes ſpeak his orations?

As what I have ſaid of the ſtate of Athens and Greece, at the time when Demoſthenes was engaged in public buſineſs, is taken almoſt altogether from his famous oration *De Corona*, it is proper that the reader ſhould be informed upon what occaſion this oration was made. Cteſiphon moved in the aſſembly of the people, that Demoſthenes ſhould be crowned with a golden crown on account of his virtue, and the good will he had conſtantly ſhewn to

* De admiranda vi dicendi in Demoſthene.—Cap. 22. 50. & 54.

the people of Athens and to all the Greeks, and on account of his firmneſs and reſolution, and becauſe he ſtill continues ſaying and doing every thing for the good of the people of Athens. And accordingly, upon this motion of Cteſiphon, a decree or enactment of the people paſſed, and Demoſthenes was ſo crowned. For this decree Cteſiphon was accuſed by Æſchines, as having ſet forth to the people what was falſe concerning Demoſthenes. He was charged alſo with having acted contrary to law and form, both as to the time and place of the proclamation of the crown *. The trial came on long after the decree was pronounced, after the death of Philip, and when Alexander was maſter of Greece, and engaged in the war againſt the Perſians. And as the indictment was ſo conceived as to make Demoſthenes a party as well as Cteſiphon, he was heard in defence both of Cteſiphon and himſelf. This, as I have obſerved, neceſſarily led him to

* See the whole indictment or γραφη, as they call it, ingroſſed in the oration itſelf, p. 143. edit. Morelli.

ſpeak much of himſelf, and to ſet forth what he had done for the ſervice of the Athenians, and for the preſervation of the liberty of all Greece. Of all theſe ſervices you have a ſhort ſummary account towards the end of the oration *. And the fact undoubtedly was, that he put Philip fairly to a ſtand, having leagued againſt him not only the Athenians and Thebans, but almoſt all the other ſtates of Greece there named; and brought to the field againſt him an army, as I have ſaid, of no leſs than 15,000 foot and 2000 horſe of hired troops, beſides thoſe which were compoſed of the citizens of each of the ſtates: So that I think it was with reaſon he ſays, that he was then at the head of the affairs of the greateſt conſequence in his time.

There is one thing which diſtinguiſhes the ſtile of hiſtory from that of rhetoric more than any thing elſe, which is, that the orator lays down general abſtract propoſitions of the moral or political kind, from

* P. 189. and following.

which he argues. Theſe are called in Greek γνωμαι, and in Latin *ſententiae*; and they were reckoned by the antients a great beauty of the rhetorical ſtile. There may however be too many of them, which will give the oration the appearance of a philoſophical diſcourſe, rather than a ſpeech of buſineſs: And this is a fault which I have obſerved in ſome of Tacitus's ſpeeches, and in thoſe of Salluſt; but Demoſthenes has uſed them more moderately, and always ariſing naturally from the ſubject. As thoſe he has uſed are, I think, the fineſt any where to be found, I will give ſome examples of them. The firſt I ſhall mention is to be found in the third Olynthiac, towards the end, where he tells us, that the Athenians of his time, inſtead of applying to the great and important affairs of Greece, as their forefathers had done, employed themſelves in making high-ways, plaſtering their ramparts, collecting water in fountains, and ſuch like trifles; and he adds, 'That it is not poſſible that men, who ap-'ply to mean and trifling things, ſhould 'be great minded men; for ſuch as the 'ſtudies and applications of men are,

'such of neceſſity will their minds be.' This is true not only of nations, but of every individual; for there is no more certain way of diſcovering the ſpirit and genius of any man, than by obſerving his purſuits, and what he values himſelf for excelling in.

Another inſtance of the ſame kind is to be found in the firſt Olynthiac †, 'Where 'a man (ſays he) ſucceeds beyond what he 'deſerves, it diſpoſes him, if he has not a

* Εστι δ' ουδεποτ', οιμαι, μεγα και νεανικον φρονημα λαβειν, μικρα και φαυλα πραττοντας· 'οποι' ατλα γαρ αν τα επιτηδευματα των ανθρωπων ῃ, τοιουτον αναγκη και το φρονημα εχειν.

† P. 8. Ed. Monelii.—Το γαρ ευ πραττειν παρα την αξιαν, αφορμη του κακως φρονειν τοις ανοητοις γινεται· διοπερ πολλακις δοκει το φυλαξαι ταγκθα, του κτησασθαι χαλεπωτερον ειναι. And here we may obſerve how conciſely, and at the ſame time how clearly this is expreſſed in the Greek. It is expreſſions of this kind, not to be imitated in any other language, which gives that weight of matter to the ſtile of Demoſthenes, not to be found in any other orator, nor any other writer that I know, in which his λεκτικη δεινοτης, as the Halicarnaſſian calls it, conſiſts.

'great deal of prudence, to act very unwisely; and therefore it appears, in many cases, to be more difficult to preserve 'what you have acquired, than to have acquired it.' This is a maxim, the truth of which may be verified from many examples, both of nations and of individuals.

There is a noble sentiment on the subject of the το καλον, and which I am persuaded he brought with him from the school of Plato. It is in the oration *De Corona* *, where he says, 'That death is necessarily 'the end of human life, which no man can 'avoid, if he were to shut himself up altogether from the commerce of the world. 'But good men it becomes to act the beautiful and honourable part in life, hoping 'the best, but disposed to bear with fortitude whatever lot it shall please Providence to assign them †.'

* P. 153. edit. Morelii.

† The reader who would form a taste of the beauty of Demosthenes's composition, should read it in the original, where he will find a very fine period, which

I will only juſt mention another very fine paſſage of the ſame kind upon the ſubject of traitors to their country, ſuch as there were many at that time in Greece. It is to be found in the oration *De Corona* *, where he ſhews that traitors, however happy they may think themſelves by the rewards they get for their treaſon, are truly the moſt miſerable of men, which he proves both by reaſons and facts.

Before I conclude this ſubject of the matter of Demoſthenes, I muſt obſerve one great difference betwixt him and Cicero as to the matter:—Demoſthenes never ſpeaks of himſelf in any of his orations, but where it is abſolutely neceſſary, which it certainly was in the oration *De Corona*; for there, if he had not ſpoken a great deal of himſelf, and enlarged much upon what he had done in defence of the liberty of his country, and of all Greece,

muſt have pleaſed the ears of the Athenians, as much as the ſenſe of it their underſtandings.

* P. 142. edit. Morelii.

he could not have defended himſelf againſt the charge which Æſchines brings againſt him, that he was unworthy of the honours which had been decreed to him upon the motion of Cteſiphon: But though abſolutely neceſſary, he makes an apology for ſpeaking ſo much of himſelf *. How dif-

* This apology is ſo well expreſſed, and in words ſo plain and ſimple, but ſuch as no better could be deviſed, that I will give them at length as a ſpecimen of his ſtile, which I admire for nothing more than the plainneſs of his language, and at the ſame time the propriety of it, and the weight of matter contained in it. He obſerves two things in that cauſe in which Æſchines had a great advantage over him. The firſt was, that upon the iſſue of the trial with reſpect to him, depended what he thought of the greateſt value, the preſerving the good will and eſteem of his countrymen, whereas Æſchines riſked nothing but the loſing his ſuit: And here he uſes a figure, called by the Scholiaſt αποσιωπησις, which expreſſes more by ſaying nothing, than could have been done by many words. Then follows the other thing: "Ετερον δε, ὁ φυσει πασιν ανθρωποις ὑπαρχει, των "μεν λοιδωριων και των κατηγωριων ακυειν ηδεως· τοις επαι- "νουσι δε 'αυτους, αχθεσθαι. Τουτων τοινυν, 'ο μεν εστι προς 'ηδο- "νην, τουτῳ, δεδοται· 'ο δε πασιν 'ως επος ειπειν ενεχλει, λοιπον "εμοι. Και μεν ευλαβουμενος τουτο, μη λεγω τα πεπραγ- "μενα εμαυτῳ, ουκ εχειν απολυσασθαι τα κατηγορημενα δοξω·

ferent is Cicero in this reſpect from Demoſthenes? He brings himſelf into his orations upon every occaſion: And not only into his public orations, but alſo thoſe in private cauſes, ſuch as that for *Archias the poet*, where he ſpeaks a great deal of himſelf, and of his application to letters, very near as much as upon the queſtion, which was, Whether Archias was a Roman citizen? beginning the oration with himſelf, where there is an affected modeſty, in theſe words: *Si quid eſt in me ingenii, judices, quod, ſentio, quam ſit exiguum;* which affectation, as I have obſerved, is always a ſign of the greateſt vanity: And I think I have ſhewn that Cicero was perhaps as vain a man as ever lived.

And here it may be obſerved, that a great artiſt like Demoſthenes, who has moſt

" ουδ' εφ' οις αξιω τιμασθαι, δεικνυναι. Εαν δ' εφ' α και πε-
" ποιηκα και πεπολιτευμαι βαδιζω, πολλακις λεγειν αναγκασθη-
" σομαι περι εμαυτου. Πειρασομαι μεν ουν, ως μετριωτατα,
" ταυτο ποιειν. Ο'τι δ' αν το πραγμα αυτο αναγκαζη, του-
" του την αιτιαν ουτος εστι δικαιος εχειν, ο τοιουτον αγωνα
" ενσηναμενος.

diligently ſtudied the art, and by that means diſcovered the extreme difficulty of excelling in it, can never be perfectly ſatisfied with his own performance, nor come up to his own idea of perfection in the art. This, I have ſhewn, was the caſe of the great painters of old *: And therefore, if a man deſires only to pleaſe himſelf, it is better for him not to be ſo perfect in the art, ſo that he may rather admire, as Horace ſays, even his own faults, *quam ſapere et ringi.*

* P. 276, and 277. of this vol.

CHAP. III.

Stile *divided into the words and the compoſition of the words.—The words ornamented by* Tropes, *compoſition by* Figures. *The ſtile of Demoſthenes ſimple with reſpect to the words; but the compoſition artificial.—He excelled in two ſtiles diametrically oppoſite to one another, the plain and ſimple, the artificial and elaborate.—Of his excellence in the firſt, his ſpeech againſt Olympiodorus is a proof.—The difficulty of excelling in that compoſition.—The ſtile of his public orations perfectly different.—This artificial ſtile not the ſtile of converſation, nor of the decrees of the ſenate and people.—It is made by figures of compoſition, not by metaphorical or poetical words.—Theſe* Figures *of three kinds, the Figures of the ſyntax, of the ſenſe, and of the ſound.—The Figures of ſyntax very few in Demosthenes.—His Figures of the ſenſe not ſuch as Cicero uſes.—Not ſo im-*

moderate in his uſe of Figures of the ſound as Iſocrates is Figures of ſound are produced by a certain ſimilarity of ſound, which ſtrikes the ear.—The Halicarnaſſian mentions ſeveral of them, among others Antitheſis, *a figure alſo of the ſenſe. —Of the peculiarities of Demoſthenes's ſtile:—Firſt, the arrangement of the words. —That in his public orations very different from the ſtile of Lyſias, or his own ſtile in private cauſes —Examples of the inverſion of the natural order.—Shewn that this may be done in ſome degree in Engliſh.--This artificial compoſition makes the ſtile of Demoſtenes obſcure to one who is not a good Greek ſcholar —Dr. Johnſon's judgment of the ſtile of Demoſthenes. —It could not be obſcure to the people of Athens.—Wherein the artifice of this compoſition conſiſts.—Example of it, with a correction of the text.—The uſe of accuſtoming one's ſelf to ſuch a compoſition. —Another peculiarity of Demoſthenes's ſtile is Hyperbatons and Parentheſes.— This makes the* δεινοτης *or* denſity *of his*

ſtile.—Another peculiarity of his ſtile is the roundneſs or compactneſs of his periods.—A period muſt have a beginning and an end, of which the connection muſt be perceptible, and marked by the voice in reading or ſpeaking.—Of that figure of the ſound which conſiſts of like endings.—This an ornament of the proſe ſtile among the antients, as well as of modern poetry.—Several examples of it from Iſocrates.—The difference betwixt it and what is called the παρονομασια.—Of the ſimilarity of the compoſition or ſtructure of periods.—This figure of ſound alſo much too frequent in Iſocrates.—Iſocrates concludes his periods too frequently with a verb.—This a general practice among the Latin writers.—Some apology to be made for both.—Compariſon of the ſtile of Plato with that of Demoſthenes.—Iſocrates alſo avoided ſtudiouſly the concourſe of vowels gaping upon one another.—Plutarch's account of his ſtile.—Such a ſtile was very ſuitable to the genius and ſpirit of the writer.—Demoſthenes ſtudied the

muſic of his language, and made of it a noble melody and dignified rhythm, with ſuitable variety.—The variety of Demoſthenes's ſtile, the moſt diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic of it.—In this he excells all other authors.—Demosthenes to be conſidered not as a writer only of orations, but as a ſpeaker.—He studied action and pronunciation very much, and excelled in it more than in any other art.—The beauty of his orations pronounced by himſelf not to be conceived by us.—What is come down to us of Demosthenes, only the lifeleſs carcaſs of his orations.—Thoſe only orators, who ſpeak their orations.—It does not appear that Cicero excelled in action.—As to the compoſition of Cicero, it does not deſerve the character which Quintilian gives of Demosthenes's compoſition.—He imitated Iſocrates more than Demoſthenes, particularly in the figures of the ſound.—Examples of that.—Quintilian prefers him to Demosthenes.—It became a piece of national vanity among the Romans, to preſer their own writers to the

Greeks.—But this was not the caſe in the days of Cicero.—The critics of that time diſapproved of his ſtile.

I COME now to ſpeak of the ſtile of Demoſthenes, which, if it be anſwerable to his matter, muſt make his orations the fineſt of all rhetorical compoſitions. Stile conſiſts of ſingle words, and the compoſition of theſe words: And it is either a plain and ſimple ſtile, ſuch as is uſed in common diſcourſe; or it is a ſtile of art, ſuch as is not commonly uſed. The words are varied from common uſe by what are called *tropes*, and the compoſition by what are called *figures;* of both which I have elſewhere ſpoken at ſome length *.

As to the words of Demoſthenes, there is nothing remarkable, or what we would call ornamented or *fine:* For they are either the common words of the language, or words of buſineſs appropriated to the government in Athens, or to judicial proceedings, which may be called *verba forenſia*,

* Vol. 3d. of this work, book 4. chap. 4.

nor is there much of metaphorical language in him, or great uſe of epithets, with which we ſo much adorn our proſe as well as our poetry. But his ſtile, as far as reſpects the words, is perfectly ſimple *; and it is the compoſition only which diſtinguiſhes it from common language, and, I may ſay, from the ſtile of every other author: For as to the beauty and variety of compoſition, he exceeds all that ever wrote in proſe †.

* There is ſome part of the oration *about the crown*, which I think is an exception to this rule. It is where he deſcribes the education and life of his adverſary Æſchines; for he there uſes words which may be called Dithyrambic, and ſome of them, I am perſuaded, were made by him for the occaſion, as when he calls Æſchines αυτοτραγικος πιθηκος. It was of thoſe terms of abuſe that Æſchines ſaid, (as Cicero informs us, *De Oratore Perfecto*), that they were prodigies, not words—θαυματα, ου ρηματα. They ſerve to ſhew, that our orator could have excelled even in that *made* ſtile, if he had judged it proper to uſe it upon any other occaſion.

† Æſchines, his rival, allowed him the praiſe of admirable compoſition, as well as excellent pronunciation,

And in the firſt place, he is perhaps the only author that has excelled in the two kinds of compoſition I have mentioned, diametrically oppoſite to one another, firſt the ſimple, plain, and unornamented; and, ſecondly, the artificial, elaborate, and ſuch as is as different from common idiom, as the art of compoſition can make proſe. Of the firſt kind are ſome of his orations in private cauſes, ſuch as that againſt Conon, and another againſt Olympiodorus, the ſtile of both which is ſo different from that of his public orations, that I ſhould not believe that they were his, if it was not univerſally ſo reputed. The Halicarnaſſian has ſpoken at ſome length of the oration againſt Conon *, and has told us that it was written in imitation of Lyſias's manner. If ſo, I think we muſt allow that he has outdone his maſter; for there is nothing of Lyſias that

and he appears to have thought that it was by his compoſition chiefly that he got the better of him. See vol. 2d, p. 365.

* Περι της δεινοτητος του Δημοσθενους.

is ſo perfectly ſimple. In this kind of compoſition every appearance of art is avoided, and yet I am not ſure, but that the ſtile of it coſt Demoſthenes as much pains as that of any of his orations in public cauſes. For, though it ſeem very eaſy, and ſuch as any one might imitate, yet, upon trial, one will be ſoon convinced that it is of the kind which Horace mentions:

——————————ut ſibi quivis
Speret idem; ſudet multum, fruſtraque laboret,
Auſus idem; tantum ſeries juncturaque pollet.
A. P. v. 240.

The other, againſt Olympiodorus is in the ſame ſtyle: And as it was ſpoken by the party, though written by Demoſthenes, it is admirably ſuited to the character of the ſpeaker, who being no orator, but a vulgar illiterate man, in the very beginning declares himſelf unable to ſpeak, and more than once, in the courſe of his pleading, puts the judges upon their guard againſt the artificial arguments of orators, which his adverſary had uſed. It would therefore have been very unnatural if he had ſpoken

in the ſame artificial manner, and would have entirely taken away that air of truth and ingenuity which runs through the whole oration, and muſt have had a great effect upon the judges.

The difference of the ſtile of theſe orations from that of his public orations, ſhews that he underſtood perfectly

Deſcriptas ſervare vices, operumque colores *,

and could ſuit his ſtile to his ſubject, than which nothing ſhews more judgment and taſte in a writer.

And here we may obſerve in paſſing, that theſe orations are a proof, among many others which might be produced, that the artificial arrangement of words which we obſerve in the Greek orators and other elegant writers, was not the common language of the people of Athens, of which the two orations above mentioned were undoubtedly an exact imitation. Neither was it their ordinary ſtile of buſineſs, or of their public acts, as is evident from ſe-

* Horat. *Ars Poetica.*

veral decrees of the ſenate and people, which we have in the orations of Demoſthenes, and particularly in the oration *about the Crown.* Only there is one decree of the people, drawn up by Demoſthenes himſelf, mentioned in that oration, which I think is an exception to this rule; for, in the firſt place, it is very much longer than any other decree mentioned in that or any other oration: And, ſecondly, has a great deal of the rhetorical compoſition, and alſo of rhetorical argument *: And it

* The ſentences in this decree, are almoſt as long as thoſe in any of his orations. One begins with the words Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις, and ends with the word μιγας. The next ſentence begins Και ἑως μεν, and ends with the word καταδουλουμενους. The ſentence containing the decree itſelf, (for what goes before is only an introduction to it), and immediately following the other two ſentences, is almoſt as long as the other two put together. And it concludes with a period very well compoſed, containing an argument of the rhetorical kind, drawn from a topic, which, as I have obſerved, Demoſthenes inſiſts much upon, I mean the topic of the το καλον, and to which he has given the rhetorical turn. The words are, Εἰδως ὁτι και αυτοις μεν προς

is more ſevere againſt Philip, than any of the orations we call Philippics, in which he often finds more fault with the Athenians than with Philip.

But we are to conſider that this decree was written upon a great occaſion, the taking, by Philip, of Elataea, a town of Bœotia, upon the confines of Attica. Upon this occaſion it was proper to excite the people of Athens to join with their enemies the Thebans, in a confederacy that was neceſſary for the preſervation of both ſtates, and of the liberties of Greece. And I have no doubt that this decree contained the ſubſtance of Demoſthenes's ſpeech upon the occaſion, in conſequence of which the decree was made *.

αλληλους αμφισβητειν περι της ηγεμονιας ουσι Ελλησι, καλον· υπο δε αλλοφυλου ανθρωπου αρχεσθαι, και της ηγεμονιας αποστερεισθαι, αναξιον ειναι, και της των Ελληνων δοξης και της των προγονων αρετης.

* This decree is to be found in Morell's edition, p. 170.

His other kind of ſtile is, as I have ſaid, in reſpect of the compoſition, very artificial. It is the ſtile of his Olynthiacs, his oration about the Crown, and, in general, all his public orations, to which he thought a ſtyle, much more elevated and more raiſed above common ſpeech than that which he uſed in common cauſes, was ſuitable.

But it was not by metaphorical, poetical, and dythyrambic words, as they called them, that he raiſed his ſtile in thoſe orations, (for, as I have obſerved, his words in all his orations are either terms of buſineſs or of common uſe), but it was by figures of compoſition.

Theſe figures of compoſition are of three kinds: For they are either figures of the ſyntax, of the ſenſe, or of the ſound. In theſe three ways language is wonderfully varied, and ſtiles formed exceedingly different from one another. Of the two firſt I have ſpoken pretty fully in an-

other volume of this work*; and I ſhall only add here, that with reſpect to figures of ſyntax, there are very few of them to be found in Demoſthenes, unleſs we call by that name certain eliptical expreſſions, which produce a brevity very remarkable in the Attic writers, by which they both expreſs their meaning in fewer words, and arrange theſe words in a manner different from what is practiſed by other Greek writers. If to theſe expreſſions you give the name of figures, Demoſthenes certainly abounds with them. And it is in the uſe of them, that a great part of the δεινοτης of his ſtyle conſiſts; for by them, his matter is more condenſed, and makes a greater impreſſion upon the mind of the hearer, or reader, than it could otherwiſe do. And as to the figures of the ſenſe, Demoſthenes has none of thoſe poetical figures which Cicero uſes, ſuch as *Exclamation* and *Proſopopoeia*. His figures of that kind conſiſt chiefly of what Cicero calls the *conformatio ſententiarum*; by which

* Volume 3d.

he arranges his arguments in all the different ways by which he thinks they will have the greateſt weight and force. There is one very common figure of this kind, which Demoſthenes uſes very often, and I think to very good purpoſe, I mean *Interrogation*: And which is commonly in very ſhort ſentences, whereby he not only varies his compoſition very agreeably, but inforces his arguments. As to the figures of ſound, having ſaid very little of them in any other part of this work, I think it is proper to explain them here at ſome length, more eſpecially as I do not find that done in any antient grammarian or rhetorician. And yet I think they vary the compoſition very much, and conſtitute a great part of the florid and ornamented ſtile in Greek; and which, as I ſhall ſhew in the ſequel, Iſocrates has uſed very immoderately, but Demoſthenes properly and moderately.

Theſe figures are all produced by certain ſimilarities which affect the ear, in the

ſound of the compoſition. Under this definition will be comprehended all the different figures of this kind mentioned by the Halicarnaſſian *.

To diſtinguiſh exactly from one another all theſe figures, which the Halicarnaſſian mentions, would be a work of ſome trouble, and, I think, not worth the pains; and therefore I ſhall only obſerve, that the figure which he calls Antitheſis, is commonly reckoned to belong to the ſenſe, as it relates to the meaning of the words which are ſet in oppoſition to one another: But it is alſo a figure of the ſound, as it gives the ſame form and ſtructure to the periods and their ſeveral members, and ſo produces a ſimilarity of ſound.

* It is in his treatiſe Περι της δεινοτητος του Δημοσθενους. He there mentions the παρισωσις, παρομοιωσις, αντιθεσις, παρονομασια, αντιστροφοντα, and επαναφερομενα: And he adds, και αλλα πολλα; that is to ſay, wherever there is a ſimilarity of ſound, ſuch as is in the figures he mentions, it is a figure of the kind of which I ſpeak, and is reckoned an ornament of ſtile.

But, beſides theſe figures of ſound, the whole compoſition of Demoſthenes, particularly in his public orations, muſt have given the greateſt pleaſure to the ears of his hearers. I have ſpoken already * of the beauty of his melody, and of his rhythm. This indeed is a beauty, of which we may form an idea, but of which our ear has no perception. But the artificial arrangement of his words is what I think muſt pleaſe the ear of every ſcholar and man of taſte; and it is by this chiefly, that I think his ſtile is diſtinguiſhed from that of every other Greek orator.

To be convinced of this, we need only compare his ſtile in theſe public orations with the ſtile of Lyſias, or even with his own in the orations above mentioned againſt Conon and Olympadiorus, where the words are in ſo ſimple an order, that they might almoſt be tranſlated into Engliſh in the order in which they ſtand; or with the ſtile of other orators of the ſame age, and particu-

* Chap. 4th. & 5th. of book 2d. of this volume.

larly with the ſtile of an oration, intituled, περι Αλονησου, which is publiſhed among the orations of Demoſthenes: But we know certainly that it does not belong to him, and by no mark more ſurely than the inartificial ſtructure of the words; and it very probably is the work, as Libanius conjectures, of Hegeſippus, who took the ſame ſide in politics that Demoſthenes did, and particularly in that matter of Haloneſus *.

This artificial ſtructure of words, eſpecially if it be diverſified, as it often is, by parentheſes, or by genetives abſolute, which detach that member, where they are uſed, from the reſt of the ſentence, as much as a parentheſis does, makes the ſtile appear very obſcure to a man who is not a good

* See Libanius's argument of that oration. I think it would not be a diſagreeable occupation for a man, who would deſire to know perfectly the peculiar beauties of Demoſthenes's ſtile, to arrange the words, which Hegeſippus uſes in this ſpeech, in the artificial manner of Demoſthenes.

Greek ſcholar, or has not made a particular ſtudy of Demoſthenes *. I therefore

* Of this artificial ſtructure the Halicarnaſſian has given us ſundry examples in his treatiſe Περι της λικτικης Δημοσθενους δεινοτητος, or, as it is rendered by the Latin tranſlators, *De Admiranda vi dicendi in Demoſthene*. This, I think, is one of the beſt of the Halicarnaſſian's critical works, Demoſthenes being an author for whom it appears he had a kind of enthuſiaſtical admiration. But unfortunately the MS. of this piece is more mutilated than that of any other of the Halicarnaſſian's works: Even where there is no blank in the MS. the text is more incorrect than in any other of his works. This is evident from the paſſages which he has tranſcribed from Iſocrates, Plato, or Demoſthenes himſelf, which are ſo ill copied, that if thoſe paſſages were not to be found in the editions which we have of thoſe authors, they would hardly be intelligible. Many of the errors of Demoſthenes's text in this work, Sylburgius and Wolfius have corrected, as many as I believe can be corrected. But incorrect and mutilated as it is, I hold it to be a moſt valuable piece of criticiſm, though it may be thought by many, to be trifling, as it relates only to words, and their compoſition. He was to have written, as mentioned before, a work upon the πραγματικη δεινοτης of Demoſthenes, which he ſays was more wonderful than his λικτικη δεινοτης; but which is not come down to us. In the

did not wonder when I heard the late Dr Johnſon ſay, That it was impoſſible that

work that is preſerved to us, cap. 9. he has given us two examples of Demoſthenes's artificial compoſition, one of them the famous period with which he begins his third Philippic, and another period in the ſame Philippic not ſo long, but I think of more artificial compoſition. It begins with the words Εἰτ' οἴεσθε, &c. He has taken the trouble to ſhew us how the words of each of them might have been arranged ἁπλῶς καὶ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἑρμηνείαν; but he has arranged them in ſuch a way, that τοῦ συνηθοῦς ἐξηλλαγμένην καὶ περιέργου πεποιηκε τὴν λέξιν. Upon both theſe paſſages I have commented, in my diſſertation upon the compoſition of the antients, annexed to the ſecond volume of this work, p. 573. and following, where I have ventured to give a tranſlation of the laſt mentioned paſſage into Engliſh, by which I think I have ſhewn that the inverſion from the natural order of the words is not ſo great, but that the paſſage may be tranſlated with the ſame order of the words preſerved, and yet not be obſcure, but, in my judgment, (and I am ſure Milton would have thought ſo), more beautiful than if it had been rendered in our common phraſeology: For I hold it to be a general rule, that whereever a ſpeaker, upon any great and important ſubject, can depart from the common arrangement of the words, without making his ſtile obſcure or poetical; he ought to do it, but not conſtantly, as the Halicar-

the orations of Demoſthenes could have been underſtood by the people of Athens, if they had been ſpoken as we have them written. But if they ſhould appear obſcure to a better Greek ſcholar than Dr Johnſon, it will not from thence follow, that they would not be intelligible to ſo acute a people as the Athenians, who certainly underſtood their own language better than any man now living, and who beſides were accuſtomed to that artificial arrangement, and ſhort way of expreſſing things, more than any other people in Greece, theſe two qualities of ſtile, in a greater or leſs degree, being remarkable in all the Attic writings. For my own part, I have ſtudied Demoſthenes's ſtile ſo much, and have become ſo fond of it, that to me it is ſo far from being obſcure, that what appears a diſorderly arrangement of the words, conveys the ſenſe to me more

naſſian has obſerved: For there muſt be variety in every work of art, and therefore a great part of the compoſition ſhould be of words put together in the common and ordinary way.

forcibly, and I think I underſtand it better, than if it were written in plain Engliſh, eſpecially if it be well read to me: For all the compoſitions of Demoſthenes clearly bear the mark of having been written to be ſpoken. There is therefore to me not the leaſt obſcurity in his orations, except what ariſes from our ignorance of particular cuſtoms, laws, and forms of proceeding in judicial matters. But theſe muſt have been all perfectly known to the people of Athens, who were ſo much accuſtomed to hear ſpeeches upon all ſubjects, deliberative and judicial; and were themſelves judges in all cauſes, public and private. And indeed it is impoſſible that they could have praiſed and admired him ſo much, if they had not perfectly underſtood him. At the ſame time they muſt have perceived that he did not ſpeak to them a common language, but a language ſo artificially compoſed, that, at the ſame time that it pleaſed their ears, it conveyed the ſenſe more forcibly to them, than it could otherwiſe have been conveyed; as I

think I have ſhewn in the diſſertation upon the compoſition of the antients, which I have annexed to the ſecond volume of this work.

And here it may be obſerved, that the ordinary way, in this artificial compoſition, is to begin the period with a noun in the genetive, or any other oblique caſe, and then to go on for ſeveral lines, and at the end of the period to give us the verb or the noun by which the noun in the beginning is governed: And by this means the ſenſe is ſuſpended, and the reader or hearer is obliged to carry on his attention to the end of the period, when the whole ſenſe comes upon him at once, and conſequently muſt make a greater impreſſion than if it were frittered down into ſmall detached ſentences. Of this kind of compoſition the public orations of Demoſthenes are full of examples. I will give but one, which happens at preſent to be before me. It is in the oration *pro Corona*. The

words I give in the note below *. But upon this peculiarity of Demoſthenes's ſtile I will inſiſt no longer here, as I have ſaid a good deal upon the ſubject, both in the diſſertation above quoted, and in the third chapter of the third book of the ſecond volume of this work, where I have ſhewn, that this artificial compoſition, however forced and unnatural it may appear to ſome who pretend to be critics, gives a denſity and compactneſs to the compoſition that otherwiſe it would not have, and makes the mind exert that faculty, the foundation of all reaſoning and ſcience,

* Τον μεν ουν γραψαι πραττοντα μι και λιγοντα τα βελτιστα τω δημω διατελειν, και προθυμον ειναι ποιειν ὁ, τι αν δυνωμαι αγαθον, και επαινεισθαι επι τουτοις, εν τοις πεπολιτευμενοις την κρισιν ειναι νομιζω. p. 144. Ed. Morelli. In this period we ſee that the word κρισιν, which governs the genetive in the beginning of the period, is thrown to the end of it, by which the ſenſe is brought all at once to the mind of the reader or hearer.

by which it unites ſeveral things together, and comprehends them in one view *.

The next peculiarity of his ſtile that I obſerve is connected with the former. It is the frequent uſe of Hyperbatons and Parentheſes, by which the period is drawn out to a great length, and the reader obliged to carry on the ſenſe a long way, and to connect words at a great diſtance from one another. In this reſpect I know no author that can be compared with him, except Thucydides, whom it appears Demoſthenes imitated very much in the ſtile and compoſition, as well as in the matter and method of his harangues. But Thucydides carried this farfetched and implicated conſtruction ſo far as to make his ſtile obſcure; while Demoſthenes has uſed it more temperately, ſo much only as to raiſe his ſtile much above common ſpeech,

* Vol. 2d. p. 355.—363. where I have given, from Milton, a fine example of the beauty of this compoſition, contraſted with the ſame words, put into what is commonly called the natural order.

and to give to his periods that weight of matter closely compacted together, which makes what is called the πυκνότης, or, as it may be not improperly translated, the *denſity* of his compoſition.

The third peculiarity I obſerve is alſo near a-kin to the laſt mentioned. It is a roundneſs and conſtriction, if I may uſe the expreſſion, in the form and ſtructure of his periods, which have nothing redundant or deficient, and are equally remote from the looſe flow of the hiſtorical period, and the pompous and panegyrical periods of Iſocrates, and other orators of the epideictic kind. The way in which he commonly gives this roundneſs to his periods, is, as I have obſerved, by beginning them with a word, one or more, of which we cannot diſcover the connection with the other words of the period till we come to the end. In this way we are neceſſarily obliged to connect the beginning with the end of the period, without which the period is not intelligible; and the great ſkill in pronouncing ſuch periods, is to

mark, by the voice, the connection betwixt the beginning and the end of the period, which, according to Ariſtotle's definition of a period *, are eſſential to it. But without being marked by the voice, it may be a period as it is written, though not as it is read or ſpoken. It is this compoſition in periods, pronounced as they were by him, which made his ſtile ſo fit for buſineſs and action, and gave to it the το θεατρικον and αγωνιον, which, the Halicarnaſſian obſerves, is a peculiar characteriſtic of his ſtile †. And it is ſo much fitted for ſpeaking, that the words themſelves, as they are compoſed, ſhew how they are to be pronounced ‡.

* See p. 166. and 168. of this volume, and the references to other volumes of this work in note ‡ of p. 166.

† Dionyſius, *De admiranda vi dicendi in Demoſthene*, cap. 21.

‡ Cap. 22. ibid.

The next thing I am to obſerve in the ſtile of Demoſthenes, is concerning the figures of ſound which he has uſed. All theſe figures, as I have obſerved, conſiſt of a certain ſimilarity of ſound. Of this ſimilarity there is one very common among the moderns; and that is, the ſimilarity of like endings in their rhyming poetry. Of this I ſhall ſpeak at ſome length in the next volume, the ſubject of which is to be poetry. But at preſent it may be proper to obſerve, that there may be rhymes in proſe as well as in verſe; when periods, or members of periods, are concluded by words terminated by the ſame ſyllables, one or more. Of words ſo terminated there are very many, both in Greek and Latin: For all the nouns of the ſame declenſion muſt neceſſarily have the ſame termination in the ſeveral caſes: And verbs of the ſame conjugation in their ſeveral tenſes, perſons, and numbers, muſt alſo have the ſame termination of perhaps two or three ſyllables; and likewiſe the par-

ticiples of verbs of the ſame conjugation, in their ſeveral numbers and caſes.

That theſe like endings were accounted an ornament of proſe as well as of verſe, is evident from the practice of Iſocrates and others, who have ſtudied the florid and pleaſureable ſtile. The Halicarnaſſian, in his treatiſe upon the ſubject of Iſocrates's ſtile, cap. 20. has given us ſundry examples from Iſocrates of this ornament of ſtile: And particularly, he has mentioned one period, where he has uſed three words rhyming to one another, viz. ἐπιχειροῦμεν, πειρῶμεν, ἐπαλείφομεν: And he has given to this ornament the name of παρίσωσις: And then he obſerves, that there are in this period three members of the ſame length; and this figure he calls παρομοίωσις: For not only does the ear perceive a ſimilarity of ſound, when the periods, or members of periods, terminate with the ſame ſyllables; but alſo, when the periods, or the members of the periods, are of the ſame length, and of the ſame form and ſtructure. As

Iſocrates has made more uſe of thoſe figures of ſound, of both the kinds I have mentioned, than any other author I know, I will give more examples from him, of this kind of rhyming compoſition: And I will take them from his Panegyric, an oration upon which, it is ſaid, he beſtowed ten years, and ſome ſay fifteen; and where, conſequently, every thing he thought ornamental in ſtile muſt have been moſt diligently ſtudied. The firſt example I give is from p. 132. (Baſil edition, anno 1594.) where you have a ſtring of eight ſentences, all of which, and their ſeveral members, are nearly of the ſame length, and of the ſame form and compoſition, and moſt of them rhyming to one another. Another example is in p. 170. where you have a ſtring indeed of no more than three ſhort ſentences, but all of the ſame form and ſtructure, and all in rhyme. And in p. 188. you have likewiſe three ſhort ſentences of the ſame, or nearly the ſame length, and each of them terminated with the double rhyme of μενης, in the words στρατηγουμενης, αθροιζομενης, and

ἐκπεπτωμένης. And here it is to be obſerved, that it is not the juxta poſition of words of like endings that makes this rhyming, which is accounted an ornament by ſuch writers as Iſocrates; but it is the placing thoſe rhyming words in the ſame place of a ſentence, or a member of a ſentence, and where the ſenſe requires that an emphaſis ſhould be laid upon them, which makes the above mentioned ornament that they call παρίσωσις; where there is a concourſe of ſuch words together, it makes the figure which the Halicarnaſſian, in the paſſage above quoted, calls παρονομασια; but it appears to me not to be practiſed by any good writer in Greek, not even by Iſocrates. And indeed it ſeems to be nothing but an inſignificant jingle, which could not pleaſe the ears any more than the underſtanding of ſuch men as the Athenians.

As to the other figure, called by the Halicarnaſſian παρομοίωσις, which makes the ſentences, or their members, nearly of equal length, and gives the ſame ſtructure

and form of compoſition to the words, there is no doubt a certain concinnity and prettyneſs in it, which may pleaſe, if not too often repeated; but which I think is uſed much too frequently by Iſocrates, as appears from the examples I have given. And if the reader wants more examples of the ſame kind, he may have many more of them in Dionyſius's diſſertation upon Iſocrates, cap. 14.; where he ſhews a moſt wonderful ſimilarity of ſtile, ſtudied by Iſocrates, both in the ſound, and in the antitheſis of words to one another. But he obſerves, that of theſe pretty little ornaments he abated much in the laſt orations he wrote, when he was become old and his judgment more mature.

But in his earlier ſpeeches, particularly one περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, where he has compared the manners of the Athenians of his time with thoſe of their anceſtors, an oration, upon which he valued himſelf very much, he has ſhewn that he abounds in thoſe pu-

erile ornaments of the παρισωσις and παρομοιωσις, and particularly the laſt, beginning his periods, or the members of them, with the ſame words; ſuch Εκεινοι μεν γαρ—ημεις δε,—Τουτο μεν, and τουτο δε. And that he abounds alſo very much in antitheſis, which, as I have already obſerved, though it be a figure relative chiefly to the ſenſe, yet has a great effect likewiſe upon the ſound, if the antithetical words are contraſted with one another in the ſame parts of the period or members of the period *.

There is another ſimilarity in the compoſition of Iſocrates, and which, I think, may be reckoned a ſpecies of the παρομοιωσις; and that is the too frequent termination of his ſentences with a verb. This is a fault which I have elſewhere obſerved in the Latin compoſition †; and that it applies alſo to the compoſition of Iſocrates, any perſon will be convinced, who will take

* Περι της δεινοτητος του Δημοσθενους. cap. 20. *verſus finem.*

† Vol. 4. book 1. chap. 11.

the trouble to compare accurately his ſtile with that of Demoſthenes, who has much more variety in this, and in every other reſpect, than Iſocrates. It, may however, be obſerved, as an apology for Iſocrates and the Latin writers, that, by terminating the ſentence with the governing verb, the beginning and the end are often connected together, by which the ſenſe of the whole is brought altogether to the mind of the reader or hearer. But though it often ſerve this purpoſe, it ought not to be conſtantly uſed, otherwiſe it gives a tedious uniformity to the compoſition, which to me is offenſive. And yet this is the caſe of almoſt all the compoſition in Latin, both oratorial and hiſtorical. Of the practice of it in their hiſtorical ſtile, I have ſpoken in the paſſage above quoted from vol. 4th of this work. And as to the oratorial, we have but to read one oration of Cicero, to be convinced that he uſes it much too frequently; and from a paſſage in the end of his *Orator*, he very plainly tells us, that the compoſition is defective, if the period is not concluded in this way.

The paſſage is ſo remarkable, that I will give it in Cicero's words.

'Quantum autem ſit apte dicere, expe-
'riri licet, ſi aut compoſiti oratoris bene
'ſtructam collocationem diſſolvas permu-
'tatione verborum. corrumpatur enim to-
'ta res, ut et haec noſtra in Corneliana, et
'deinceps omnia: 'Neque me divitiae mo-
"vent, quibus omnes Africanos et Laelios
"multi venalitii mercatoreſque ſupera-
"runt.' immuta paulum, ut ſit, 'multi ſu-
"perarunt mercatores venalitiique;' pe-
'rierit tota res. et quae ſequuntur: 'Ne-
"que veſtis, aut caelatum aurum et ar-
"gentum, quo noſtros veteres Marcellos
"Maximoſque multi eunuchi e Syria Æ-
"gyptoque vicerunt.' Verba permuta ſic,
'ut ſit, 'vicerunt eunuchi e Syria Ægyp-
"toque.' Adde tertium: 'Neque vero or-
"namenta iſta villarum, quibus L. Paulum
"et L. Mummium, qui rebus his urbem
"Italiamque omnem referſerunt, ab ali-
"quo video perfacile Deliaco aut Syro
"potuiſſe ſuperari,' fac ita, 'potuiſſe ſu-

" perari ab aliquo Syro aut Deliaco.' Vi-
' deſne, ut ordine verborum paulum com-
' mutato, iiſdem verbis ſtante ſententia, ad
' nihilum omnia recidant cum ſint ex ap-
' tis diſſoluta * ?'

In this reſpect, too, as well as in every other, that variety which characteriſes the ſtile of Demoſthenes, and diſtinguiſhes it from every other, is preſerved: For though he very often terminates his periods with a verb, as in many caſes it is no doubt proper, he likewiſe often concludes them with a noun, as in that little ſhort period which Longinus celebrates ſo much, Τουτο το ψηφισμα τον τοτε τῃ πολει περισταντα κινδυνον, παρελθειν εποιησεν ὡσπερ νεφος. p. 171. *Morelli.* And the laſt ſentence of his famous oration *De Corona*, is concluded with the adjective ἀσφαλη; and often he concludes with a participle, and ſometimes with a pronoun or an adverb. But he always gives that place to a word ſignificant of ſomething principal in the pe-

* *Orator*, cap. 70.

riod, and tending to combine and to give an unity to the ſeveral parts of it.

There are two paſſages, one from Iſocrates, and another from Demoſthenes, both upon the ſame ſubject, and therefore very properly compared together. The ſubject, too, is very important, and very intereſting. It is the compariſon of the character and manners of the Athenians in former times, with their character at the time when Iſocrates and Demoſthenes lived. The paſſage of Iſocrates upon this ſubject, you have in the 17th chapter of this treatiſe, and in the three following chapters you have a moſt accurate criticiſm upon it, where the author not only ſhews that the compoſition of Iſocrates is flat and languid, and not ſufficiently condenſed and rounded; but he ſhews how it might be made better, which is the moſt inſtructive of all criticiſms, and indeed it is teaching the reader, as I am perſuaded he taught his ſcholars. And he concludes with ſaying, that it is full of that puerile

figure above mentioned called παρισωσις, which he ſays ſerves to divert the attention of the reader from the ſubject: And all his periods, he adds, are antitheſes to one another, beginning, as I have ſaid, with the words Εκεινοι μεν γαρ,—then ἡμεις δε, and with a τουτο μεν, and a τουτο δε.

The paſſage from Demoſthenes, too, upon this ſubject, is likewiſe given at length, and both for matter and ſtile it is wonderfully ſuperior. And indeed I think I never read a finer compoſition upon any ſubject. There are very few periods that are figured in the ſame way: And he enlivens his ſtile greatly, both in this and his other compoſitions, by uſing ſome ſhort ſentences without any period at all: Theſe are commonly interrogations, by which he excites very much the hearer or reader. At the ſame time he has not avoided altogether thoſe figures of ſound which Iſocrates appears to have ſtudied chiefly; for he has uſed them ſometimes, but never where it is improper, or where they do

not ſerve to inforce his arguments: As where he ſums up what he had ſaid of the noble actions of their anceſtors, both in peace and war, he has theſe words: Ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰ μὲν Ἑλληνικὰ πίστας, τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς· τὰ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἴσως διοικεῖν, μεγάλην εἰκότως ἐκέκτηντο εὐδαιμονίαν. Here we have two members of the period concluded, each, with an adverb of the ſame termination: In the third member there is alſo an adverb of the ſame termination, but the member is concluded with the verb διοικεῖν. And the whole period is concluded, not with a verb, as Iſocrates's periods almoſt always are, but with the noun εὐδαιμονίαν. As to the matter of this compoſition, it does not belong to my preſent ſubject to ſpeak of it: But I think that, in the matter, it exceeds Iſocrates ſtill more than in the ſtile. And I do not wonder at what the Halicarnaſſian ſays, that, he could not read the orations of Demoſthenes, without feeling moſt ſenſibly all the ſeveral paſſions which he wants to inſpire, ſuch as fear, contempt, hatred, anger, envy, pity, and the reſt. And that

he was agitated by a kind of enthuſiaſm, like thoſe who were initiated into the myſteries of the great Goddeſs. And if we, he adds, ſo far removed from thoſe times, and having no concern or intereſt in them, are ſo much moved by his ſpeeches, how muſt the Athenians and other Greeks, living at that time, and ſo much intereſted in the affairs which are the ſubject of thoſe orations, have been affected by them, when ſpoken by him who is allowed by every body to have excelled ſo much in Action, the firſt quality of an orator *. It was his excellence in that art, which made Æſchines obſerve to thoſe who ſo much admired his oration *De Corona*, when it was read to them, that they would have admired it very much more if they had heard him pronounce it †.

* Ibid. cap. 22.

† See p. 321. of this volume, and Cicero, *De Oratore*, lib. 3. cap. 56. where the ſtory is told at ſome length.

He next compares two orations of Plato and of Demoſthenes, both on the ſame ſubject, namely, the praiſe of the Athenians. The oration of Plato is a λογος επιταφιος, that is, a ſpeech in praiſe of thoſe who had fallen in battle, fighting for their country. It is contained in that dialogue of Plato called *Menexenus*. See chapter 25th and following of the Halicarnaſſian, where we have a very ſevere criticiſm of the ſtile of Plato, ſhewing that he is full of thoſe pretty little ornaments firſt uſed by Georgias, as he tells us, of *antitheſis* and *pariſoſis*, for the ſake of which he has made his ſtile much too diffuſe, and enervated the ſenſe of it: And he gives an example in this period: Εργων γαρ ευ πραχθεντων, λογῳ καλως ρηθεντι μνημη και κοσμος τοις πραξασι γινεται παρα των ακουοντων; where he obſerves, that in this ſhort period there are three words that are παρισα to other three, that is, of the ſame form and ſtructure, each to each. Then he ſays that the words in the end, viz. παρα των ακουοντων, add nothing to the ſenſe, but ſerve only to give a termina-

tion to the period which pleaſed the ear of Plato*. In another paſſage of this panegyric he obſerves theſe words, τειχισαμενη δε και ναυπηγησαμενη, εκδιξαμενη τον πολεμον; where we have three words with a triple rhyme to one another. Such rhymes, as I have obſerved, are not uncommon in Greek; but in good compoſition the words ſhould be ſeparated from one another, and ſhould not be put in any remarkable place, ſuch as the beginning or end of a period, or member of a period, ſo that they may appear to anſwer to one another. And he has given us another flower of Plato in theſe words: Ων ενεκα και πρωτον, και υστατον, και δια παντος, πασαν παντως προθυμιαν, πειρασθε εχειν; where there is a ſtrange gingle of words. But, in order to do all juſtice to Plato, he has given us the concluſion of this ſpeech at full length †, which, he ſays, is very juſtly admired: And indeed, for the matter it is much better than the

* Cap. 25. and 26.

† Cap. 30.

reſt of this oration; for there is a great deal of excellent morality in it, and much ſaid in praiſe of a virtuous and a noble death, ſuch as that of thoſe men. But Dionyſius ſays that it is more political than rhetorical; I would add, more philoſophical: And his ſtile favours more of the Socratic dialogue than of public ſpeaking. And, upon the whole, I am of opinion, that it is only in philoſophy and dialogue-writing that Plato excels; and I think Dionyſius very properly applies to him what Jupiter in Homer ſays to Venus:

Ου σοι, τεκνον ἐμον, δεδοται πολεμηια ἐργα·
Αλλα συ γ' ἱμεροεντα μετερχεο ἐργα γαμοιο.

As the profeſſed purpoſe of this work is to ſhew the excellency of Demoſthenes's ſtile, by comparing him with other famous orators, (for, ſays he, every thing is beſt known by compariſon with other things of the ſame kind *), he gives us a long paſſage from Demoſthenes's oration περι

* Cap. 30.

στεφανου, upon a very fine ſubject, and not unlike the ſubject treated of by Plato in his λογος επιταφιος, I mean the praiſe of the Athenians*. It is a moſt wonderful compoſition, and I cannot praiſe it higher, than by ſaying that I think it the fineſt to be found in Demoſthenes. It is, both for the matter and ſtile, very much ſuperior to the paſſage from Plato, which he ſets againſt it, and which, he ſays, is the beſt thing in that funeral oration. There is none of thoſe puerile ornaments in it which I have obſerved in Plato, but a great variety in the ſtructure of the periods, which are now and then intermixed with ſhort interrogations; and ſometimes a ſingle word makes a ſentence by itſelf. And, in the whole of the compoſition, there is a tone of public ſpeaking and of contention (for he was pleading againſt Æſchines) which diſtinguiſhes it from all other kinds of ſtile, even from the ſtile of a panegyrical oration; I ſay the tone of public ſpeaking,

* Cap. 31.

which is felt by every body when the orator ſpeaks his orations: But I think it is to be perceived even in the written compoſition of Demoſthenes *.

But to return from Plato to Iſocrates.—This author has taken another way, beſides thoſe I have mentioned, to ſmooth and poliſh his ſtile; and that is, by avoiding moſt anxiouſly the gaping of vowels upon one another. And, in general, I think Plutarch gives a very good account of the eloquence of Iſocrates in the end of what he has written *De Gloria Athenienſium*, where he ſays that he ſpent his time in contriving ἀντιθέσεις, παρίσωσεις, and what he calls ὁμοιοπτωτα that is, words of like flection, joining and ſoldering words together, and ſmoothing his periods as it were with a chiſſel and a plane.

From what I have ſaid, it is evident that Iſocrates ſtudied very much the ſimilarity

* See the Halicarnaſſian upon the ſubject of Demoſthenes, cap. 22.

of ſound in his compoſition. And I am perſuaded he was a man of ſuch a genius, that he ſpent a great part of the many years which he employed in writing his famous oration, the Panegyric, in ſtudying ornaments of that kind. And I think it was natural enough that a little minded man, ſuch as Iſocrates appears to have been, ſhould employ himſelf in ſtudying thoſe puerile ornaments, more than the matter, or the real beauties of compoſition: For that he was ſuch a man, we muſt believe, if the ſtory be true which Plutarch tells of him in the paſſage above quoted, that being aſked, when he was very old, How he lived? As well, ſays he, as a man can do, that is above ninety years of age, and thinks death the greateſt of all evils.

But Demoſthenes had a genius above thoſe puerile ornaments, which can only pleaſe boys or vulgar men. There is therefore very little of the ſimilarity of ſound, of either of the two kinds I have mentioned, to be found in Demoſthenes.

But, in place of thoſe gingling ornaments, and that uniformity of compoſition ſo frequent in Iſocrates, he ſtudied what was of much greater value, the muſic of his language, and laboured to grace his compoſition with *a noble melody and digniſied rhythm*, (to uſe an expreſſion of the Halicarnaſſian), giving it alſo that variety which, as the ſame author obſerves, muſt be ſtudied in the melody and rhythm, as well as in every other part of the compoſition *.

The Halicarnaſſian, in his treatiſe *De Admiranda vi dicendi in Demoſthene*, has told us, what I think muſt certainly be true, of a muſical language, ſuch as the Greek, that with reſpect to the ſound of the compoſition, nothing has ſuch a power to affect the ears as the rhythm †:

* See vol. 2d. p. 382.

† Ου γαρ δη φαυλον τι πραγμα ρυθμος εν λογοις, ουδε προσθηκης τινος μοιραν ιχων ουκ αναγκαιας. αλλ' ει δει τ'αληθες, ως εμη δοξα, ειπειν, απαντων κυριωτατον των ποιητικην δυναμενων, κηλειν τας ακοας.—Cap. 39.

For in all muſic, whether it be the diaſtematic muſic, that is, what we commonly call muſic, or the muſic of language, the rhythm is moſt powerful, and is what affects very much, not only the ears, but the mind; for, according to the antient ſaying, 'Rhythm is all in muſic *.'

I have ſaid a great deal of both the melody and the rhythm of the Greek language, in the fourth chapter of the ſecond book of this volume, where I have endeavoured to ſhew, that though we have no practice of them in our language, nor indeed hardly an idea how they ſhould be applied to language and make it ſo beautiful, yet we ought not for that to deny that they exiſted in the Greek language, and made a great part of the beauty of compoſition in Greek. And I will only add here, that the admirers of modern times, or rather of themſelves, ought to conſider, that the antients were men much ſuperior

* Παν παρα τοις μουσικοις ὁ ρυθμος.

to us in all the arts, and particularly in the great art of language, the greateſt, in my opinion, as well as the moſt uſeful of all the human arts. If it were not ſo, we ſhould be much to blame in paſſing ſo many of the moſt docile years of our life in the ſtudy of their language and arts: and a claſſical education, for promoting of which ſo many foundations have been made by our anceſtors of ſchools and colleges and univerſities, would be a great abſurdity. Now, if this ſuperiority be admitted, we ought not to be ſurpriſed that the antient languages are not only ſuperior to any modern in the grammatical part, which is ſo much more perfect in them than in the modern languages, that we could not have had an idea of its perfection, if their grammatical art had not come down to us exemplified by their writings, but alſo in the ſound, which could not be tranſmitted to us as their grammar has been, and of which, therefore, we never can have the practice, though we may learn a little of the ſcience of it, by what ſome of their authors have

told us; as much, at leaſt, as may ſatisfy us of the poſſibility of its exiſtence. For my own part, the more I ſtudy antient books, and the more I live in the antient world, where I live as much, or rather more, than in the modern, the more I am convinced of the benefit of a claſſical education, without which, I think, no man can excel in any art or ſcience of any value, nor can act a great or noble part in life *.

Every work of art, though in every other reſpect perfect, yet if it want variety, can never pleaſe. Now Demoſthenes has made his compoſition ſo various, that by variety itſelf he has diſtinguiſhed it more from the compoſition of other authors, than by any other mark; for in moſt authors there is ſome word, or phraſe, or particular turn of expreſſion, which marks their ſtile, in the ſame manner as any ſtrong feature diſtinguiſhes a face. But

* See farther upon this ſubject, p. 147. and following of this volume; alſo p. 165. and 166.

there is nothing of this kind in Demoſthenes; for there are no ſuch words or phraſes in him. There is nothing like the *eſſe videatur* of Cicero, with which he concludes ſo many of his periods *: And the general colour and complexion of his ſtile is as various as poſſible; for ſometimes he compoſes in long periods of many members, and ſometimes in ſhort periods; the members of his periods are alſo of different lengths, and variouſly joined together; and though it be true, what Cicero ſays of him, that he has hardly ſaid any thing without ſome particular turn or figure of one kind or another †, yet theſe are ſo varied, that he has no figure recurring ſo often as to diſtinguiſh his ſtile from that of any other author; and you will hardly find in him two periods together of the ſame form and ſtructure. And there is a conſiderable part

* See what I have ſaid of this clauſule of Cicero's periods, p. 273.

† Nullus fere ab eo locus ſine quadam conformatione ſententiae dicitur. *De perfecto Oratore.*

of his compoſition that is not in periods; for though there can be no good rhetorical compoſition without periods, more or fewer, yet it would be a fault if the whole compoſition was in periods; for it would be too uniform, wanting that variety, without which no work of art, as I have often had occaſion to obſerve, can be beautiful. And this is a fault which I obſerve in Iſocrates, in whoſe orations you have hardly any compoſition without a period. Such a ſtile I call declamatory; for there may be declamation in the ſound of the compoſition, as well as in the words and the figure. Now Demoſthenes has avoided that, by throwing in, among his periods, ſhort ſentences, commonly in the form of an interrogation, by which he excites the attention of his hearers, and brings home to them the argument more forcibly. The ſhort ſentence πολλου γε και δει, he uſes very frequently; and he ſometimes makes the ſingle word μηδαμως ſtand for a ſentence*. At o-

* P. 156. *Ed. Morelli.*

ther times he throws the ſingle word, diſjoined from all the reſt, into the middle of a ſentence, as in the word ὁρᾶς, in the oration *De Corona* *. And, in the ſame oration, he throws into the middle of a period theſe two words, ἀκούεις, Αἰσχίνη? unconnected with the reſt †. In this way he not only varies his compoſition agreeably; but he takes from it altogether the air of declamation, inforcing his arguguments as if he were in private converſation with his hearers; which makes his orations much more perſuaſive than any declamation can be.

The reader ought not to be ſurpriſed that I have dwelt ſo long upon the ſound of the language in Demoſthenes's orations; which he has varied not only by melody and rhythm moſt agreeably, as the Halicarnaſſian thinks, nor by compoſition

* P. 179. *Ed. Morelli.*

† Ibid. p. 156.

only in periods, but by that variety of arrangement of his words, which ſo perfect a language as the Greek admitted, but which in him is more remarkable than in any other Greek author; and which, I am perſuaded, muſt have very much pleaſed the ears of his hearers. Now, to pleaſe the ears of thoſe he ſpeaks to, is a great part of the art of an orator: For, as I have obſerved elſewhere *, through the ear the mind is not a little affected, even of the beſt judges: And as to the people, they may be ſaid to be *led by the ears:* And accordingly the ſtatue of the Gallic Hercules, who, it ſeems, was their God of eloquence, was repreſented, as Lucian deſcribes him, drawing the multitude after him by a chain, which reached from his mouth to their ears †. How much the order and arrangement of words was ſtudied among the Romans, I have proved from a paſſage of Cicero quoted a-

* Vol. 3d. p. 63.

† Lucian's treatiſe of the *Gallic Hercules.*

bove*: Nor can we ſuppoſe that it was leſs ſtudied by Demoſthenes, though I think I have ſhewn, in what I have written upon the compoſition of the antients, that he did not ſtudy it for the pleaſure of the ear merely, but likewiſe for the ſenſe, which is more forcibly conveyed by one arrangement of the words than by another †.

The pleaſure which an oration gives to the ear, muſt depend upon the pronunciation of it: And therefore I conſider Demoſthenes, not as a writer only of orations, but as a ſpeaker of them. It was in this that he excelled more, I believe, than in any other quality of an orator. Such was the opinion of his enemy Æſchines, who certainly was a very good ſpeaker himſelf; and yet he acknowledged the ſuperiority

* P. 420.

† See the Diſſertation on the Compoſition of the Antients, annexed to volume 2d. of this work, particularly p. 572.

of Demoſthenes in that branch of the art *. Nor would Demoſthenes have ſaid that Action, of which pronunciation is the chief part, was the firſt, the ſecond, and the third quality of an orator †, if he had not himſelf excelled in it. He learned by his own experience, as well as by the advice of his friend the player ‡, that the beſt compoſition, if not well pronounced, could not have the effect it ought to have upon the hearers: And I have no doubt but that, in his ſubterraneous retreat, his chief application was to form his voice and geſture §. There muſt have been a beauty in the pronunciation of ſuch compoſitions as his, with all the various changes of voice, of countenance, and of geſture, that the ſubject required, and, joined to all theſe, the melody and rhythm of the

* See p. 425. of this volume.

† Ibid. p. 206.

‡ Ibid. p. 333.

§ Ibid. p. 329.

Greek language, (with the agreeable variety, too, which we are told he gave them *), ſuch as we can hardly form an idea of, but which we are ſure, from the effects it produced, muſt have pleaſed and moved his audience exceedingly. The written orations of his, that have come down to us, we may conſider as only the carcaſes of his orations, without that life and animation which his Action muſt have given them. And it is only the authors who ſpoke their orations, as Demoſthenes did, not thoſe who, like Iſocrates, did no more than write what others ſpoke, that I dignify with the name of orators: For the ſpeaking orator may be compared to Daedalus, who, it is ſaid, gave life and motion to his ſtatues; whereas, thoſe who only write ſpeeches, are like our ſtatuaries, who make ſtatues without life or animation.

Whether Cicero excelled or not in this principal quality of an orator, we do not know with any certainty; but I ſhould

* See p. 161. and 162. of this vol. and p. 382. of vol. 2.

rather think that he did not: For none of the cotemporary writers ſpeak of his being eminent in action, not even he himſelf, who is never deficient in his own praiſe; nor does Quintilian, who praiſes him ſo much, ſpeak of his eminence in that way; and Cicero himſelf tells us, that it was quite neglected by the orators of his time*. When this was the caſe, I do not think that it is probable that it was much attended to by Cicero.

As to compoſition, I think there is no compariſon betwixt him and Demoſthenes: Nor do I think that he deſerves at all the character which Quintilian gives of Demoſthenes: 'Tanta vis in eo, tam denſa 'omnia et quibuſdam nervis intenta ſunt, 'tam nihil otioſum is decendi modus, ut

* Lib. 3. *De Oratore*, cap. 56. where, after ſaying a good deal of the beauty of action in an orator, and the effect it had upon the hearers, he adds, 'Haec eo 'dico pluribus, quod genus hoc totum oratores, qui 'ſunt veritatis ipſius actores, reliquerunt; imitatores 'autem veritatis hiſtriones occupaverunt.' Where the reader may obſerve, that the diſtinction is very well laid down betwixt an orator and a player.

'nec quid redundet, invenias*.' Now, this denſity or conſtriction, if I may uſe the expreſſion, in the form and ſtructure of the periods of Demoſthenes, which have nothing in them redundant or diffluent, and are equally remote from the looſe flow of the hiſtorical ſtile, and the pompous and panegyrical periods of Iſocrates, is wanting in Cicero. He is copious, indeed, but he is too much ſo. He has a great deal of the *opimum* and *adipatum genus dicendi*†: For he has much fleſh, but it is looſe, not firm, nor of a good colour. And though he ſtudied Demoſthenes much, and even tranſlated ſome orations of his; yet he appears to me to have formed himſelf more upon the model of Iſocrates, and to have imitated him particularly in the figures of ſound, and even to have exceeded him, as I think I have ſhewn. And indeed there is a rhyming, or rather a gingling of ſounds, not ſet at

* Quintilian. lib. 10. cap. 1.

† Lib. *De Oratore perfecto.*

ſome diſtance from one another, as in Iſocrates, but joined together *, ſuch as I am perſuaded would not have been endured in Athens, not even by the boys there, though it is likely that in Rome he was admired for them, and clapped in the manner that we applaud our players. And there is in his oration for Milo, (one of the moſt laboured, I believe, he ever wrote) a ſtring of *antitheſes* and *pariſoſes*, upon the ſubject of ſelf-defence, ſuch as is not to be found in Iſocrates.

It is evident, however, that Quintilian prefers him to Demoſthenes, and to every other orator of Greece. But it appears to me, that it had become a piece of national vanity among the Romans, as I have elſewhere obſerved †, to prefer their own writers to the Greek. This began as early as the days of Cicero, who has not ſcrupled to ſay, that his own countrymen had made greater diſcoveries than the Greeks;

* P. 304 of this volume.

† Vol. 5th. p. 225.

and what they had taken from the Greeks, they had improved *. But, at the time when Quintilian wrote, the ſtudy and imitation of the Greek writers appears to have been, in a great meaſure, laid aſide among them; and their own authors were ſet up as ſtandards of perfection in every kind of writing; Cicero in oratory, Virgil in poetry, and Livy in hiſtory.

But matters had not gone ſo far in the days of Cicero; nor do I believe that there was then in Rome a man of any taſte or genius, who preferred Cicero to Demoſthenes: Nor was Cicero's ſtile approved of by the critics of that age. His friend Brutus, and likewiſe Calvus, uſed the freedom to find fault with his compoſition, even to himſelf; and both the Aſiniuſes did the ſame †. Cornelius Nepos, likewiſe, who is

* Tuſcal. Quaeſt. lib. 1. *in principio.* See what I have further ſaid of the national vanity of the Romans, p. 281. of this volume.

† Quint. lib. 12. cap. 1.

himſelf a correct and chaſte writer, differed ſo much from him in judgment of ſtile, as Cicero himſelf tells us, that he diſapproved very much even of what Cicero thought beſt in his own writings. Theſe critics thought that his ſtile had not the true Attic colour, and was not ſuited to pleaſe a people, to whoſe taſte Cicero himſelf bears this teſtimony, that, 'eorum 'ſemper fuit prudens ſincerumque judi-'cium, nihil ut poſſent niſi incorruptum 'audire et elegans *.' They thought his ſtile had the Aſiatic tumor, and was florid but not pure, nor what they call *ſincere*. In ſhort it was of that taſte which, as Cicero himſelf tells us, prevailed in Caria, Phrygia, and Myſia, but which the Rhodians, though ſeparated from theſe people only by a narrow ſea, diſapproved of, and which the Greeks, particularly the Athenians, utterly rejected †.

But I have ſaid enough, and perhaps more than enough, in another part of this

* *De perfecto Oratore.*

† Ibid.

volume, to ſhew that Cicero, as an orator, cannot be compared with Demoſthenes, who, I agree with the Halicarnaſſian, was the greateſt of all the antient orators, and therefore the greateſt orator that ever has been, and the greateſt that ever will be: For, as I have obſerved elſewhere *, we have not materials in the modern languages, of which it would be poſſible to compoſe ſuch orations as thoſe of Demoſthenes, any more than it would be poſſible of ſuch rough ſtones as we have in this country, to build temples ſuch as thoſe of Athens were, built of Penthelic marble. As, therefore, he is the perfection of the rhetorical art, it was proper that I ſhould explain, as well as I was able, all the virtues of an orator which he poſſeſſes. I have for him an enthuſiaſtical admiration, ſuch as the Halicarnaſſian ſeems to have had †; for I have ſtudied him more than any other Greek or Latin author; and he has been

* P. 320. and following of this volume.

† Ibid. p. 424. & 425.

my companion in my journies for many years. I have alſo tranſlated a great deal from him, and in ſhort have formed my ſtile upon him, and have made it as like to his as a didactic ſtile, ſuch as mine, ſhould be to a rhetorical. This, I know, makes my ſtile very unlike the faſhionable ſtile of this age; but I flatter myſelf that it is not unlike the ſtile of Milton, the beſt Engliſh writer, in my opinion, both in verſe and proſe, and who, I have no doubt, formed his ſtile, particularly in his ſpeeches, by the imitation of Demoſthenes.

I will conclude this chapter, with recommending to the reader, if he deſires perfectly to underſtand the beauty of Demoſthenes's compoſition, to ſtudy what the Halicarnaſſian has written upon the antient orators, and particularly his treatiſe *De admiranda vi dicendi in Demoſthene*, which, both for the matter and ſtile, I think, is the beſt of his critical works. He is, of all the writers upon criticiſm, the

beſt teacher I ever read; for he not only ſhews you what is ill written, and gives you the reaſons why it is ſo, but he likewiſe ſhows you how it may be better written, than which nothing can be more inſtructive. I know no author of any reputation, of whoſe works the manuſcripts are more incorrect; and in ſeveral of his works, particularly his treatiſe upon Demoſthenes, as I have obſerved *, they are, in many places, mutilated and imperfect. But there is one uſe the Greek ſcholar may make, even of the defects of the manuſcripts or of the printed editions; and that is to exerciſe his talents of criticiſm, by trying to anticipate the corrections made from the Vatican manuſcript, or by ſuch excellent ſcholars, as Henry Stephen, Sylburgius, and Wolfius, before he looks to their conjectures at the bottom of the page. It will be for a ſcholar, an agreeable, and I think not an illiberal amuſement.

* P. 404.

I will only add one obſervation more upon the ſtile of Demoſthenes, which I do not think has been made by the Halicarnaſſian, and it is this: That of the three kinds of eloquence, the Deliberative, the Judicial, and the Epideictic, he appears only to have practiſed the two firſt. This made him perfectly maſter of the ſtile of theſe two, which he has practiſed without any mixture of the Epideictic, and of thoſe figures with which the Epideictic abounds, ſuch as the *pariſoſis*, *paronomaſia*, *antitheſis*, and *like endings*, by which the ear may be agreeably entertained; but the ſtile will want entirely the nerves and the force which we have both in the matter and ſtile of the deliberative and judicial orations of Demoſthenes. And this makes the ſtile of Demoſthenes more the ſtile of buſineſs than that of any other orator I know; for buſineſs muſt be treated in the ſtile of buſineſs, not in the pompous ſtile of declamation. When ſuch is the ſtile, we are more apt to admire the orator, and to be pleaſed and entertained than con-

vinced by his arguments; and in narrative, that ſtile is ſo far from being convincing, that it rather diſpoſes us to believe that the ſtory told by the orator, is a work of fancy and imagination.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Lord Mansfield's oration pronounced at Oxford upon the ſubject of Demoſthenes ſpeech, De Corona.—*The greater part of it loſt by the fire which burnt his houſe ſome years ago.—The whole of what remains not tranſlated from the Latin, but only ſome obſervations made upon it.—Firſt obſervation is, That Demoſthenes inſiſts more upon the topic of the* Pulchrum *and* Honeſtum, *than any other orator.—This obſervation made alſo by Panetius the philoſopher.—Demoſthenes learned this in the groves of the academy.—It was particularly neceſſary that he ſhould inſiſt upon it in this oration, and it was the only way he could reconcile the Athenians to the meaſures he had adviſed.—He ſwears, that they did not err, that famous oath, by the*

manes of thoſe that fell at Marathon, Salamis and Plataeae.—The people to be admired who liſtened to ſuch a topic of perſuaſion, as well as the orator who uſed it.—The character of the people of Athens at that time, compared with their character in later times.—What Livy ſays of them then.—2d Obſervation of Lord Mansfield, That Demoſthenes has neceſſarily introduced the praiſe of himſelf, and with it connected the praiſe of the Athenians, ſo that he could not have made a defence, that muſt have been better received by the people.—3d Obſervation of Lord Mansfield, That Demoſthenes has concealed the orator under the form of a hiſtory in which he has given us an account of the loſs of the liberties of Greece, by the corruption of the Daemagogues, ſuch as Æſchines, in the ſeveral ſtates of Greece.—This hiſtory otherwiſe very curious and inſtructive.—Lord Mansfield's obſervation upon the ſtile of Demoſthenes.—That it is as excellent as the matter, but appears not at all elaborate, and draws the attention of the reader, not to the words,

but to the matter.—This the greateſt praiſe of ſtile.—He excels in concealing the art which he beſtows upon his words.—This art, as he practiſed it, was wonderful.—But the generality of readers ſo carried away by the importance of the matter, as not to perceive it;—but it is perceived by the learned critic.—Æſchines acknowledged his excellence in compoſition.—He abounds with Parentheſes, which are a great beauty in a ſtile that is to be ſpoken: But the pronunciation of Parentheſes muſt be good;—If ſo, they convey the meaning more forcibly than if they were connected with the reſt of the ſentence.—Lord Mansfield prefers the ſtile of Demoſthenes to Cicero's.—If his diſcourſe had been continued, he would have given examples of the puerilis fucus *of the ſtile of Cicero.—One given by the author, where two paſſages from Demoſthenes and Cicero, containing the ſame thought, are compared.—The words both of Cicero and Demoſthenes given.—Of the uſe my Lord Mansfield has made of his eloquence, formed upon*

the model of Demoſthenes;—has made one uſe of it very ſuitable to the office of a judge.—Concluſion of the volume, with an addreſs to my Lord Mansfield, exhorting him to bear with patience the infirmities of old age, comforting himſelf with the thoughts of a life ſo well ſpent.

I ſhould be ungrateful to a man to whom I owe many other obligations, if I did not acknowledge how much I am indebted to him for the obſervations I have made upon the oratory of Demoſthenes. The man I mean is the Earl of Mansfield, who, before he left Oxford, made an oration upon the ſubject of Demoſthenes ſpeech *De Corona*, (the fineſt of all his ſpeeches, in the judgment of the Halicarnaſſian,) in very elegant Latin, where he has ſhown, in a moſt maſterly way, the great talents of an orator exhibited by Demoſthenes in that ſpeech. A great part of the manuſcript, (for it is not printed, which I think it ſhould have been), was conſumed in the fire which burnt my Lord

Mansfield's houſe in London ſome years ago. With a copy of what remains of it I was favoured by my Lord Stormont, whoſe love and knowledge of Greek learning I have taken occaſion elſewhere to mention *.

All that my Lord Mansfield has written upon this famous oration, I will not here ſet down; for what he has ſaid in ſo good Latin, I do not chuſe to ſay over again in worſe Engliſh. I will, therefore, only take notice of ſome few things which he has obſerved on this oration.

There is one thing which he has obſerved and dwelt upon a good deal, as it is what diſtinguiſhes Demoſthenes, more perhaps than any thing elſe, from every other orator; and that is, his inſiſting ſo much upon the topic of the *pulchrum* and *honeſtum*, the *beautiful* and *praiſe-worthy* in ſentiments and actions. There is a good deal of this in almoſt all his public

* Vol. 4th. p. 336.

orations, but particularly in the one at preſent under our conſideration, that *De Corona*. It is the nobleſt topic of oratory, being the nobleſt paſſion of the human mind, and furniſhes arguments more perſuaſive to a great-minded man, than any that can be brought from what is pleaſant, profitable, or even ſafe. This peculiarity of the oratory of Demoſthenes, Panetius, the philoſopher, obſerved, as Plutarch has informed us in his life of Demoſthenes: And I have no doubt that Demoſthenes, as my Lord has told us, learned from Plato this philoſophy in the groves of the Academy, which we know he frequented, and where Horace learned his philoſophy *. And it was a very neceſſary topic in this oration, where he was to defend the meaſures he had adviſed,

* Horace, after relating the education he got in Rome, which I think was little better than our education, adds,

'Adjecere bonae paulo plus artis Athenae,
'Scilicet ut poſſem curvo dignoſcere rectum,
'Atque inter ſylvas Academi quaerere verum.

Epiſt. 2. lib. 2. v. 43.

which had ſucceeded ſo ill; and which indeed could not be defended upon any other principle, than that the part, he adviſed the Athenians to act, was moſt honourable, and worthy of them and their anceſtors; and that they would have diſgraced themſelves and their country, if they had acted otherwiſe. He has carried this ſo far as to ſay, 'That if they had 'all known what was to happen, and you 'Æſchines, inſtead of being ſilent as you 'then were, had foretold every thing that 'happened, yet the Athenians ought to 'have done what they did, if they had 'any regard to their own reputation, to 'the fame of their anceſtors, and to the 'teſtimony of poſterity.' So ſtrong an aſſertion as this needed ſome preface, and preparation of the minds of the people for it: And accordingly, he conjures them, in the name of the Gods, not to be ſurpriſed at the paradox he was to advance, but to hear him with patience and good will *.

* See the whole paſſage tranſcribed by the Halicarnaſſian, cap. 31. Περι της δεινοτητος του Δημοσθενους, and his excellent obſervations upon it, cap. 32.

And he carries it ſo far, as to affirm upon oath, that they did not err, when they followed his counſel, though with ſuch ill ſucceſs, ſwearing that famous oath, which the antient critics celebrate ſo much *, 'By 'the Manes of thoſe, who periſhed at 'Marathon, Salamis, and Plataeae, defend-'ing the liberties of Greece.'

Who can read this without admiring not only the orator, but the people who had ſuffered ſo much by his counſel, and yet could hear him ſpeak thus, not only with indulgence, but even with applauſe. They were not then indeed ſuch a people as when they conquered at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataeae: But they were ſtill a noble-minded people, and much better than they were ſome generations after that, when Livy the Roman hiſtorian, ſpeaking of what they did in the war betwixt the Romans and Philip of Macedon, ſays, 'Athenienſes literis verbiſque,

* See Taylor's notes upon the paſſage, p. 656. of vol. 2.

'quibus ſolis valent, bellum adverſus Phi-'lippum gerebant *;' words, that I can never read without feeling compaſſion, and ſome indignation againſt the author, who makes this reflection upon a people, to whom the Romans owed, not only all their arts and learning, but all the virtue they had in later times, and to whom the inhabitants of Europe, at this day, may be ſaid to be indebted for all the arts and ſciences they poſſeſs: For if Xerxes had ſucceeded in his enterpriſe upon Greece, which muſt have happened but for the Athenians, it appears to me that we ſhould have been little better than ſavages at this day.—But to return to Demoſthenes's oration.

Another obſervation of Lord Manſfield's is, That Demoſthenes has introduced into this oration, with great propriety, not only the praiſe of his own conduct in public affairs, without which he never could have defended Cteſiphon, who was

*Livii, lib. 31. cap. 44.

accuſed for having beſtowed upon him a crown which he did not deſerve; but alſo the praiſe of the Athenians, without which he never could have reconciled them to the meaſures he had adviſed them to follow, and which in the end proved ſo fatal. And, beſides, nothing could make his cauſe more favourable than to connect his defence with the praiſe of his judges; and in ſuch a way, as not to appear to be mere flattery, but belonging to the cauſe.

Another excellent obſervation of Lord Mansfield's as to the matter of this oration is, That Demoſthenes under the hiſtorian conceals the orator: For he has given us what may be called a hiſtory of Greece at that period, where he ſhows that the liberties of Greece were loſt by the corruption of the Demagogues in the ſeveral ſtates, who acted a part very different from what he acted in Athens, and were truly the mercenaries of Philip, ſuch as he ſays Æſchines was. Beſides its importance in the cauſe, I think it is a very curious and inſtructive piece of hiſtory,

ſhowing us from what ſmall beginnings great changes in human affairs may be brought about: For the loſs of the liberties of Greece took its riſe from a trifling quarrel betwixt the Amphyctions, and a tribe of the Locrians about ſome acres of ground, which the Locrians took poſſeſſion of and cultivated, but which, the Amphyctions ſaid, were conſecrated to Apollo. This quarrel, Demoſthenes ſays, was inſtigated by Æſchines for the purpoſe of bringing Philip into Greece; and which accordingly happened, the Amphyctions having called him to aſſiſt them againſt the Locrians.—And ſo much for my Lord Mansfield's obſervations upon the matter of this oration of Demoſthenes; about which, what is preſerved of Lord Mansfield's diſcourſe is chiefly employed.

As to the ſtile, he has ſaid what is certainly true, That it is as excellent as the matter, being moſt chaſte and correct, having nothing wanting in it, nor any thing ſuperfluous or redundant; and without

thoſe *pigmenta*, or that *puerilis fucus*, as he very well expreſſes it, of which I have given ſo many examples from the ſtile of Iſocrates. He farther ſays of the ſtile, that, 'Demoſtheni, rerum magnitudine 'occupato, non vacabat eſſe diſerto.' And it is certainly true, that, even reading him, we are ſo much carried away by the weight of the matter, that we give but little attention to the words; and this muſt have been much more the caſe of thoſe who heard him pronounce his orations. Now I hold it to be one of the greateſt praiſes of ſtile, not to draw the attention of the reader or hearer from the matter to the words. At the ſame time, from what the Halicarnaſſian has told us, we are ſure that he ſtudied his words very much, not only the arrangement of them, and the compoſition in periods, but even their rhythm and melody *. But, as my Lord has obſerved, he excelled, more than

* See p. 300. of this volume, and ſeveral other paſſages where I have ſpoken of the melody and rhythm of the Greek language.

any orator ever did, in that greateſt art of a ſpeaker or writer, the concealing of art. And therefore, though he laboured his words very much, the weight of his matter and the force of his arguments were ſuch, that he ſeemed to the generality of his hearers or readers to be ſo much taken up with the great affairs, which were the ſubject of his orations, that he gave no attention at all to the words, further than to convey his meaning. But the learned critic will perceive a worderful art in the order and arrangement of theſe words, by which not only the ear is much pleaſed, but the ſenſe more forcibly conveyed, than it could otherwiſe have been, as I think I have elſewhere ſhown *. His excellence in compoſition, his rival Æſchines acknowledged. But ſo artificial a compoſition muſt have been very well pronounced, otherwiſe it would have been hardly intelligible; for it abounds with parentheſes,

* Diſſertation on the compoſition of Demoſthenes, annexed to vol. 2d of thiswork.

ſome of them very long, and with paren-theſes within parentheſes, as the Halicar-naſſian has obſerved. Now a parentheſis, properly introduced and well pronounc-ed, I hold to be one of the greateſt beau-ties of ſtile, and particularly of what is written to be ſpoken. For it not only gives a denſity and compactneſs to the matter, but, by being detached from the reſt of the ſentence, it draws the attention of the hearers the more. It ſhould therefore con-tain ſome thing worthy of that attention; and, if it be alſo pronounced with a proper variation of the voice, ſuitable to the ſubject matter, will give great force and weight to the meaning of the whole ſentence.

My Lord Mansfield agrees perfectly with me in preferring Demoſthenes to Cicero. And if the reſt of his diſcourſe had been pre-ſerved, I am perſuaded, we ſhould have had many proofs of that preference. I will ſupply this want, as well as I can, by giving one example from Cicero of the *pigmenta*, and the *puerilis fucus* of his ſtile, compared with the ſimplicity and ſolidity

of the ſtile of Demoſthenes upon the ſame ſubject. The paſſage in Cicero is taken from his famous oration *pro Milone*; and I have no doubt, that it was imitated from a ſimilar paſſage in Demoſthenes, but made very much worſe in my judgment, and really *puerile*, though there are, I know, who will think it much amplified and adorned. The paſſage of Demoſthenes is in this oration *De Corona*, where he complains of the injuſtice that Æſchines did him, by imputing to him the ill ſucceſs of the war againſt Philip: 'If a man,' ſays he, 'commit injuſtice willingly, he is a 'proper object of anger and puniſhment. 'If he err unwillingly, he is to be forgi-'ven and not puniſhed. But if, neither 'committing injuſtice nor erring, he en-'gage in public affairs, manage them in 'the way that ſeems beſt to all, but do not 'ſucceed, and be with the reſt of the citi-'zens involved in the general calamity of 'the ſtate, him it is unjuſt to reproach 'or abuſe, inſtead of grieving with him 'for the common misfortune.' Then follows the paſſage which Cicero has imitat-

ed. 'This,' says he, 'must appear not 'only to be the law of Athens, but of Na-'ture herself, which she has established by 'laws unwritten and by the manners of 'men*.'

* The words are, 'Φανησεται τοινυν ταυτα παντα 'ουτως, ου μονον εν τοις νομοις, αλλα και 'η φυσις αυτη τοις 'αγραφοις νομιμοις, και τοις ανθρωπινοις ηθεσι, διωρικεν.' p. 573. of volume 2. of Taylor's edition. I recommend to the reader to study the whole passage in the original, beginning at the preceding page with the words, 'Βουλομαι δε των ιδιων απαλλαγης, &c. and going on to about the middle of the following page; and he will there see two examples of long parentheses, very properly, I think, thrown in; which I find marked in Taylor's translation, but not in the original, as I think they should have been: So that, unless the reader be a good Greek scholar, and well acquainted with the stile of Demosthenes, he will be obliged to cast his eye down to the translation, which I always very unwillingly do. And in general it may be observed, that if a composition, so artificial as that of Demosthenes, be not carefully pointed, it is hardly intelligible to a modern reader; though, as points were not used in the antient manuscripts, and not even the division of the words in some of the most antient, the readers of those times would by custom learn easily to make sense of what we cannot understand without much difficulty.

I will now give the words of Cicero, which I have given elſewhere *, but will here repeat. They are upon the ſubject of ſelf-defence, a law as common as that which Demoſthenes has mentioned, but which Cicero has expreſſed in a manner very different. His words are, '*Eſt e-*
'*nim, judices, haec non ſcripta ſed nata lex:*
'*Quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus;*
'*verum ex Natura ipſa arripuimus, hauſi-*
'*mus, expreſſimus: Ad quam non docti ſed*
'*facti, non inſtituti ſed imbuti ſumus.*' Here the artifice of the compoſition is ſuch, that it muſt draw the attention of the hearer or reader as much or more to the words than to the matter: For there is a ſtring of antitheſes, in which the words are made to anſwer exactly to one another both by their poſition and in the forms of the caſe or tenſe, but alſo in the ſound: For they rhyme to one another, and we not only have ſingle rhymes but double, of two ſyllables; and with all this vain oſtentation of art, this *puerilis fucus*,

* Vol. 3. p. 88. ſee alſo p. 303. of this volume.

there is no more meaning expreſſed than what Demoſthenes has given in a few plain words, put together in the moſt ſimple manner.

Upon this ſo perfect model of eloquence, my Lord Mansfield formed a chaſte and correct ſtile of ſpeaking, ſuitable to buſineſs, and particularly the buſineſs of a judge; to whoſe office it belongs, not only to determine controverſies betwixt man and man, but to ſatisfy the parties that they have got juſtice, and thereby give eaſe and contentment to their minds, which I hold to be one of the great uſes of law. In this my Lord Mansfield, as it is well known, was ſo ſucceſsful, that even the loſing party commonly acknowledged the juſtice of his decrees: And I knew myſelf one example of a man, who had loſt more than one half of his fortune by a judgment of his Lordſhip's, which nevertheleſs he acknowledged to be juſt.

'Having ſpent ſo many years of your 'life, more I believe than any man of

'this age, in the adminiſtration of juſ-
'tice, with ſo much applauſe and public
'ſatisfaction, I hope, my Lord, you will
'bear with patience and reſignation, the
'infirmities of old age, enjoying the
'pleaſure of reflecting, that you have
'employed ſo long a life ſo profitably
'in the ſervice of your country. With
'ſuch reflections, and a mind ſo entire
'as your's ſtill is, you may be ſaid to live,
'over again, your worthy life, accord-
'ing to the old ſaying,

'——————————hoc eſt
'Vivere bis, vita poſſe priori frui.

'That you may live this life as long as
'you retain a mind capable of enjoying
'it, and without pain of body, ſuch as
'would diſturb that enjoyment, is the ear-
'neſt wiſh of all your friends, and of none
'more than the author of this work: For
'in the midſt of all your great public oc-

'cupations, you have always found time 'to cultivate private friendſhip; and I 'believe no man living has enjoyed more 'the two greateſt pleaſures of human 'life, that of loving and being loved.'

Here I conclude, and I hope the reader will think not improperly, this volume upon the ſubject of Rhetoric. The next volume, with which I propoſe to conclude this work, will treat of Poetry, the fineſt of all the fine arts, if the poet be not a mere verſifier, or ſervile copier of hiſtory or nature, but be what his name imports, a *maker*, or what may be called a *creator*, which I hold to be the greateſt effort of the genius of man, ſhowing more than any other art he practiſes, the *particle of divinity* that is in him. For this work I have collected a great many materials,

——————————— quae——
Multa dies et multa litura coercuit;——

and, if I ſhall live to put theſe materials in order, and to finiſh this great work upon

Language and Stile, I think I may venture to ſay, that it will be the greateſt work of the kind, (whether well or ill executed, does not belong to me to determine), that has been publiſhed in later times.

END OF VOLUME SIXTH.

ERRATA.

Pag. 9. line 4. in the note, for *ineps* read *inops*

68. 4. in the note, *for* αλειβομενοις *read* κατ-αλειβομενοις

84. 1. in the note, *after* γαρ, *insert* τι

153. 20. *for* they were distinct syllables, *read* it was one long syllable

159. 12. *after* than *insert* of

160. 3. in the note, *for* by Demosthenes, *read* from Demosthenes

188. 20. *for* Adjicere *read* Adjecere

195. 8. *for* and *read* nor

245. 20. in the note, *for* exerted, *read* exserted

272. 14. *for* is *read* was

323. 7. for *Morialists*, read *Moralists*